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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
The economy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is dominated by the 
oil industry, which provides the largest percentage of government 
revenue and foreign exchange. But since oil is an exhaustible re-
source, the government is emphasizing a new development stragegy of 
diversification by developing other non-oil industries such as com-
merce and agriculture. The government has taken steps toward mas-
sive investment in the agricultural sector and has proposed policies 
to enhance productivity and thus lessen the Kingdom•s dependence on 
foreign food stuff imports. Large quantities of agricultural machin-
ery and equipment have been imported. Experimental farms have been 
established in most regions of the Kingdom and an agricultural lend-
ing institution has been established to provide farm operators with 
needed capital. 
But the conditions in agriculture are still characterized by 
rudimentary methods of production and lack of knowledge of effective 
farming practices. The most important factors contributing to the pre-
vailing conditions of the Kingdom • s agriculture are characterized by a 
lack of (1) effective agricultural policies pertaining to production 
and marketing, (2) coordination and supervision in implementing agri-
cultural development programs, (3) managerial and technical skills by 
2 
farm operators to adopt modern farming techniques, (4) adequate and 
effective agricultural extension units to help farm operators and 
laborers acquire the skills and know-how to adopt the modern tech-
nologies, and (5) coordination between the agricultural lending insti-
tution and the extension units to jointly assist farm operators in 
making the best use of capital provided by the government. 
Various studies have indicated that the Kingdom•s agricultural 
potential is limited by the amount of cultivable land and water for 
irrigation. But even with these limitations there is still signifi-
cant potential for increasing agricultural productivity. The Kingdom 
could be more self-sufficient in food stuff if government policies 
were oriented towards better resource management with special emphasis 
on increasing productivity and efficiency. Government funds allocated 
for developing the agricultural industry are not being effectively put 
to use. Extending credit to farm operators without also extending 
technical assistance does not change agricultural productivity signif-
icantly. 
Increasing agricultural production is a complex task. It is com-
plex because so many different conditions have to be created or modi-
fied by individuals and groups of people. Improved production tech-
niques have to be learned and analyzed but, when combined with 
appropriate market information and marketing methods, usually result 
in increased productivity of resource use. This generally requires 
some analytical ability, imagination, experimentation, and much hard 
work. Agricultural development is as dependent on how effectively 
people work together as it is on the natural resources with which 
they have to work (25, p. 1). If the agricultural production is to 
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be increased adequately so as to support growth in other economic 
sectors, funds for investment in agriculture and for services to pro-
mote technical improvement are needed. 
There is general acceptance of the important role of credit for 
financing farm investments and a widespread appreciation for the role 
of government in granting such credit. Even so, an overwhelming ma-
jority of farmers in most newly developing countries live and work 
without any financial help from institutional credit sources. There 
is a lack of public agencies organized specially for the purpose of 
granting rural credit or extending credit as part of a more general 
development program. Although farming is the main activity of rural 
people, most farmers lack an accessible public agricultural credit 
institution, but, rather, are assisted by non-institutional credit 
sources, such as professional moneylenders, merchants, brokers and 
landlords. 
There is a striking contrast between the general interest in 
giving credit to farmers on the one hand and lack of credit facilities 
on the other. The main reason for this contrast is deeply rooted in 
the social, economic, and institutional conditions of agriculture in 
newly developing countries. Frequently, it is the consequence of the 
attitude of government authorities toward agriculture in general and 
credit in particular. It is often believed that, where countries are 
emerging from a subsistence economy toward a part cash economy, there 
is no need for credit. This attitude comes about either from a lack 
of knowledge on the benefits of credit or from an aversion to tackling 
credit distribution because of its complexity (14, p. 5). 
The social and economic conditions of farmers differ widely in 
various parts of the world. In general a great majority of farmers 
in developing countries have insufficient capital (both invested and 
working), low income, and inadequate knowledge of new methods of 
farming. These conditions are normally associated with illiteracy 
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and ignorance and thus often related to prejudice against new farming 
methods. Agricultural credit in many developing countries is static 
credit (has no effect on increasing production and income), yielding 
little net increase in the output or income of farmers or in farm 
assets. This means that at the end of a credit period they are no 
better off than at the beginning. Static or subsistence credit has 
little or no impact on the development of agriculture or on the 
improvement of the living conditions of the rural population, although 
conditions might be worse without it. The goal should be to convert 
static credit into dynamic credit, which means that at the end of the 
credit period the farmer has increased his assets, productivity, power 
and income. This leads to a gradual change in the internal economic 
structure of the farm, by providing the fixed and/or semi-fixed means 
of production necessary to enhance the efficiency of labor and to 
change traditional, primitive farming practices. A mere increase in 
the quantity of credit is unlikely, by itself, to lead to this result. 
Credit must be so designed as to have a strong positive inducement to 
the improvement of farm techniques, institutions and organizations 
and it must be supported by, and closely linked with, such related 
services as cooperatives, agricultural extension, marketing and 
agrarian reform programs ( 14 _, p. 5). 
As agriculture increasingly becomes commercial, more credit is 
needed, and agricultural extension and cooperative support services 
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must be expanded to train fanners in ma.king appropriate use of credit. 
Therefore, agricultural development depends to a large extent on the 
amount and availability of financial resources, the terms and condi-
tions under which borrowed funds can be obtained and the amount of 
managerial and technical assistance available to farm operator borrow-
ers. 
Farm operators obtain the capital to operate their business from 
different sources including savings, gifts or borrowing from mer-
chants, brokers, individuals, moneylenders, or lending institutions. 
Most farm operators in the Kingdom are unable to obtain the needed 
capital by savings (retained farm income} because their farm oper-
ations are so small that they generate only enough income to pay for 
present farm expenses and withdrawal for family living. As a result, 
little use is made of new or improved inputs including modern farm 
machinery and equipment. The traditional sources of borrowed funds 
are inadequate in meeting the credit requirements of the farm oper-
ators. The cost of borrowed funds from private moneylenders, mer-
chants, brokers, and individuals is generally very high, ranging from 
20 to 30 percent. 
As indicated by M. P. Mirale, decision making by farmers can 
vary because of capital considerations and there are reasons to 
expect variations in decision making even among small farmers if they 
become dependent on sources outside the family for capital (27, p. 8}. 
Where family capital is obtained only through savings, the ranqe of 
enterprise combinations and techniques considered is severely restrict~ 
ed by the volume of savings. Farmers who can borrow from relatives 
but cannot, or will not, borrow elsewhere can consider a somewhat 
larger range of innovations. However, by borrowing they also place 
themselves in a situation involving more uncertainty and generally 
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at a cost of capital, although cost of capital may be either explicit 
or implicit (implicit, for example, through an agreement to pay the 
lenders a share of any net return resulting from the loan). If, how-
ever, farmers rely on sources of credit outside the kinship group, the 
uncertainty added is usually higher, the obligation to repay may be 
stronger, and the farmer may lose a great deal of his independence as 
a decision maker. Especially where capital is obtained largely from 
buyers of crops, as seems to be common in developing countries, farm-
ers may have their freedom to make decisions regarding crops and tech-
niques severely restricted. 
The Saudi Arabian Government, therefore, took the initiative to 
make loanable funds available to farm operators thro~gh its lending 
' 
institution, th~ Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank (SAAB). The SAAB was 
founded in 1963 and in 1964 began making interest free loans to farm 
operators, herdsmen, and to persons who are primarily engaged in agri-
culture or allied and subsidiary industries. There is no limit to the 
amount the SAAB can withdraw from the government treasury to lend to 
farm operators and the allied or subsidiary agricultural industries. 
Specific Problems in Supplying SAAB 
Credit to Farm Operators 
The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank has been providing crop pro-
duction credit, short and intermediate-term, to the farm operators 
since it began its operation in 1964. However, it has not completely 
displaced merchants, individuals, and brokers who still loan money 
to farmers, frequently at very high interest rates. At present, only 
5 percent of farmers in the Kingdom have received credit through the 
SAAB {33, p. 121). 
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Delinquency related to non-repayment of SAAB loans has been and 
still is one of the major problems facing the institution. The trend 
for loan delinquency over the 1964/65 to 1977/78 period is shown in 
Table I. The amount of delinquent loans changed from a low of 6.5 
percent in 1964/65 to a high of 34 percent in 1973/74. As of 1977/78, 
the delinquency rate was 22 percent. 
Defaults to formal credit agencies may result from a lack of 
credit-worthiness on the part of the small farmer, inappropriate farm 
plans, loans too small to raise production significantly, reduction in 
the family farm labor force through death or marriage, or other prob-
lems at the farm level. On the other hand, it may simply be due to 
the fact that farmers are not penalized for failure to repay {19, p. 
31 ) . 
Default is a cost to the credit institution, but to society it 
is a transfer payment in the sense that default does not consume 
additional resources. However, the benefits of that transfer are not 
decided by government and are often most inequitably distributed. To 
the lender, default is a cost and there is a trade-off for the insti-
tution between administrative costs and default. The more carefully 
the institution scrutinizes the applicants, supervises the use of 
loans, and pursues delinquents, the lower the default rate but the 
higher the administrative costs (26, p. 11). 
It was indicated that SAAB provides interest-free production 
credit to farm operators. However, there is a real opportunity 
Year 
1964/65 
l..96.:i/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1963/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 . 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
TABLE I 
AMOUNT OF SHORT AND INTERMEDIATE-TERM CREDIT AND AMOUNT OF CREDIT 
FOR SAAB AGRICULTURAL LOANS FROM 1964 to 1978 
Short-:'erm Int.armediate- Tot.:::.l Short and Amount Amount 
Intenoediate- Collected Credit Term Credit Term Credit Due 
(SR.1000) (SR.1000) (SR.lOOO) (SR.lOOO) (SR.1000) 
13:.000 4,253,598. 4,389,598 1,5l.5 1,-+17 
294,&6.:. 3.632,561. 8,~27,~25 4,225 3,Joi9 
1,082,700 12,099,900 13,182, 6:JO 8,151 6,318 
1,542,0JJ lU,477,8CO 12,019,S00 11,328 9,183 
1,676,311 12.,300,784 13,877,095 16,939 12,994 
3,003,854 13,127,273 16,136,127 21,136 18,295 
2,575,222 1:.,05l,406 1(),627,628 20,427 17,449 
2,265,666 14,292,441 16,558,107 23,184 19,204 
2,916,2~3 16.6 77.234 19,593,526 30,220 23,220 
2.~4~,710 32,759,C'JS 3{., 303.305 27,449 18,118 
7,181,6)0 133,323,743 !.45,505,438 55,354 37,594 
8,243, 773 261,1.69,393 269,433,166 118.243 32,343 
17,288,098 472,550,263 4.39,838,361 NA. ::-iA. 
43,713,34::. 541,954,927 53!1,668,268 180,377,444 123,585,432 
So~rce: Saudi Arabian Agricu1t~ra1 Bank Annual Report 1964-78. 
Amount 
Delinquent 
(Percent) 
6.[,7 
20.26 
22.-+9 
18.94 
23.29 
13.5t 
14.60 
17.17 
23.16 
33.99 
32.08 
30.36 
NA. 
21.80 
CX> 
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cost of using the funds for credit rather than in some other invest-
ment program. Credit programs are costly and in a successful pro-
gram the benefits must exceed the costs. Among the costs are admin-
istrative costs, supervisory·costs, opportunity costs on funds 
invested, and default costs (26, p. 11). 
In trying to provide credit services to farm operators, SAAB 
faces the following major problems: 
1. Saudi Arabian agriculture is dominated by a complex of very 
small farms of about three hectares and medium size units of about 
20 to 30 hectares. The farms are not classified according to physical 
and/or economic size. Loans to recipients are almost entirely based 
on their farm size and subjective judgments of loan analysis. The 
larger the size of the farm, the more funds the farm operator is gen-
erally able to obtain from the SAAB. It is believed that larger farms 
are more efficient and have higher income potential than the smaller 
farms. 
The income generating potential of a farm, however, is not only 
related to physical area or its land quantity, but also on the level 
of technology in use. Therefore, a criteria for defining small farms 
should use both physical size and size of the income stream. An addi-
tional criteria is the income potential of the unit as related to 
access of technology and other operating inputs (27, p. 9). 
Therefore, because of lack of a selection criteria, SAAB's credit 
analysts find it difficult to assess the farm operators actual need 
and to evaluate their capacity to repay loans. 
2. The SAAB's employees, including loan committee members, have 
little contact with farming and marketing operations and are not fully 
10 
aware of the farmer borrowers• problems. ·Consequently, loan commit-
tee members have great difficulties in appraising earning potential, 
timeliness and dispersement of credit needs, and other factors related 
to loan repayment. This frequently results in high loan delinquency 
rates among SAAB farmer borrowers. 
3. The SAAB employees do not use farm enterprise budgeting and 
cash flow analysis in constructing a farm financial plan. Profita-
bility of credit use and credit repayment are subsequently more di-
fficult to determine and lead to higher delinquency rates. 
4. There is a need for well trained and motivated personnel with 
enough skills to improve the quality of the SAAB portifolio of loans 
and loan management at the branches and sub-branches. 
5. There is a lack of awareness of the need for an educational 
program in farm financial management for clients (analagous to farm 
production and marketing management). 
6. There is a need for a grading system differentiating clients 
at any given point in time, as to their credit worthiness. Such a 
system establishes a basis for policy that provides a real incentive 
for a client to move upward through a small farmer approved credit 
rating system. What seems needed is a strong system of incentive that 
provides rewards (and penalties to both agency personnel and clients 
(27' p. 61). 
7. There is a lack of coordination between the SAAB and exten-
sion activities. Supervision of credit is not provided on the assump-
tion that technical assistance is provided by the Ministry of Agri-
culture through its extension agents. 
11 
Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to evaluate and document 
the nature and causes of small farm operator borrowers• difficulties 
in repaying intermediate and short-term crop production loans obtain-
ed from the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank. The study includes the 
following specific objectives: 
1. Analysis of the organizational and procedural structure of 
SAAB with respect to agricultural credit and loan repayment. 
2. Analysis of the small farm operator borrowers• financial, 
farm and social characteristics with respect to loan repayment. 
3. Quantification of the relationship between loan delinquency 
and hypothesized economic, social, financial management and credit 
institution policies using a postulated farm production and financial 
management model. 
4. Analysis of credit impact on use of farm production inputs 
and farm incomes in the farm production and financial management 
model. 
5. Analysis of SAAB policy alternatives in reducing loan delin-
quency rates and improving farm incomes. 
Hypotheses to be Tested 
It is hypothesized that loan delinquency rates are related to 
factors such as: 
1. Credit institution policies and procedures such as 
timeliness of credit and size of annual payments. 
2. Farm resource base, such as crop land cultivated. 
3. Farm and family financial management efficiency 
(management of borrowed funds and farm family 
living expenditures). 
4. General agricultural profitability (level of net 
farm income generated by use of credit). 
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It is further hypothesized that farm financial management is an 
interdependent system including farm production, farm income, family 
financial management and institutional credit policies. 
Methodology 
Objective one is achieved through an evaluation of SAAB lending 
policies and procedures in light of present theory and knowledge of 
agricultural credit and finance. 
Objective two is achieved through a tabular analysis of a random 
sample of SAAB credit files and farm questionnaires in two different 
areas, Hufuf and Kharj. The stated objective is to be achieved by 
systematically analyzing (1) the farms• characteristics in terms of 
size and income generating potential, and {2) the farm operators• 
characteristics pertaining to economic, social, and financial manage-
ment having a direct and indirect effect on the delinquency rate. 
Data from the farm questionnaires and credit files are used to 
formulate appropriate regression models for testing hypotheses one 
and two and achieving objectives three and four. Delinquency rate 
will be analyzed first using a single equation regression model for 
the purpose of exploring the underlying hypothesized relationships be-
tween delinquency rate and the independent variables. Further analysis 
of the delinquency rate and impact of credit on farm capital and hence 
on value of farm output will be done using a farm production and farm 
financial management interdependence system. For the latter ap-
proach a two stage least square (2SLS) model will be used to test 
the hypothesized relationships. 
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Results from the proceeding objectives and results of the reduced 
form of the financial management independence system are used to 
analyze SAAB policy alternatives. 
CHAPTER II 
MEANING AND SCOPE OF AGRICULTURAL FINANCE 
Agricultural finance is the economic study of alternative ways 
of financing agricultural production. It relates to both the macro 
and micro aspects of financing capital requirements of the agricul-
tural sector. The macrofinance aspects pertain to financing agricul-
ture in the aggregate. Since the amount of capital available in the 
total economy is limited, macrofinance is concerned primarily with 
(1) the amount of capital to be allocated to agriculture, (2) the terms 
and conditions under which capital is made available, and (3) the way 
in which capital is used to balance production, achieve economic effi-
ciency, and/or achieve other policy goals (26, p. 4). 
Lending institutions play a dominant role in macrofinance, par-
ticularly in the first two of these aspects. The government plays a 
direct role by establishing lending institutions, directing loan pro-
grams, and assisting farm programs in general. The government also 
plays an indirect role through legislation and, in turn, through super-
visory agencies which give overall guidance to lending institutions 
with reference to the amount loaned, quality of loans which are ac-
ceptable, and loan terms (26, p. 4). 
Micro aspects of agricultural finance pertain to the individual 
farm firm. It includes those parts of farm management which relate 
to acquisition and use of capital in the farm business. The acqui-
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sition phase involves determining the sources of capital and the 
amount to be obtained from each source. It also involves the terms 
and conditions under which the capital is obtained. The use phase 
involves allocating the limited supply of capital available between 
the farm household and the business; i.e., determine the amount of 
capital available for use in the business. The problem then is to 
determine where and how to use the capital available to the business 
so as to maximize income (26, p. 4). 
The scope of this study is limited to the evaluation of effective 
use of short and intermediate-term credit and repayment of loans. 
Therefore, the macro aspect of agricultural finance will not be dealt 
with in this study. In the following sections a theoretical review 
pertaining to the micro aspects of financing capital requirements 
of the agricultural production sector are presented followed by dis-
cussions on sources of credit, lending policies and loan procedures. 
Theory of Agricultural Finance 
Views of Credit 
Four views of credit include that of the (1) economist, (2) credit 
institution, (3) creditor, and (4) debtor. 
The economist views credit largely as an instrument which makes 
possible a flow of goods to producers, businesses and households. 
Usually it would be impossible, or at least inconvenient in the ex-
treme, for the individual or corporation to pay in full for goods and 
services when they are received. Often the manufacturer can pay for 
raw materials only after he has sold finished products. Likewise, the 
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wholesaler may not be able to pay for goods until after he has sold 
them to the jobber; or the jobber, until he has made sales to the re-
tailer; or the retailer, until he has made deliveries to consumers 
(40, p. 36). Consumers, likewise, use credit to make purchases based 
on expected future income. 
Credit institutions look upon credit as a commodity to be bought 
and sold. It is in a sense their stock in trade. Such credit insti-
tutions include commercial banks and investment companies (40, p. 36). 
Credit may be defined by the creditor in terms of confidence in 
' 
the debtor and ~ayment for the use of capital. An individual trusts 
his capital only to those in whom he has confidence. The creditor 
must ordinarily think that those who become indebted to him have both 
ability and willingness to repay (39, p. 36). The creditor is also 
interested in what he can get for the use of his money (interest). 
To the debtor, credit is that which allows him to obtain, upon his 
promise to repay in a certain way at a definite future date, the use of 
capital owned by others. The amount of credit the debtor possesses 
depends primarily upon three things: first, the value of the property 
or other assets he owns; second, certain personal characteristics 
which he possesses such as integrity, thrift, and business acumen; and 
third, what can be done with credit to increase farm production and 
improve income (40, p. 36). 
Capital Formation and Accumulation 
Capital is not easily defined, in part because of continuing de-
bate among economists. However, it is stated that "the proper scope 
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of capital theory is the elucidation of the causes and consequences of 
acts of saving and investment'' (41, p. 421). As in most definitions 
of capital, the implication is that capital represents durable goods 
saved from consumption for the purpose of adding to future production. 
Capital is also seen as the accumulated stock of real wealth, which 
covers land as well as produced goods. Saving and investment thus add 
to the stock of capital. Credit differs from capital in that it re-
presents only one means of obtaining control over durable goods or 
other assets. 
At the micro level capital refers to the productive assets of a 
firm, including real estate, machinery, livestock, inventories, and 
cash balances. This concept is consistent with the general connota-
' . tion of 11 capita1:izing 11 a business, which refers to the acquisition of 
all its productive assets rather than just its plant and equipment. 
Over time, with capital becoming more important relative to labor in-
puts, increasing attention has been focused on the processes of capi-
tal formation and accumulation (40, p. 421). 
Obtaining Control of Capital 
To become established as a farm operator, the possession and use 
of some minimum amount of land, labor, capital and managerial ability 
is required. The passing of each farm generation results in a trans-
fer of the management and the control of farm units to a new genera-
tion of farm operators. The prospective new operator is faced with 
the problem of obtaining possession of the necessary factors of pro-
duction (41, p. 5). 
Changes in farm technology have been rapid and extensive. An 
economic farm unit today generally requires a higher investment in 
livestock and machinery, and larger amounts of current operating 
expenses than was true 20 years ago. In addition, the use of more 
mechanical power and equipment has greatly increased the capital 
investment required. 
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From the individual farmer•s standpoint, a major problem will be 
how he can obtain control of sufficient capital to be successful 
(42, p. 1542). 
Since the central concern of this chapter of the study is with 
the financing of the individual farm firm, the effect of capital 
management on growth of the farm firm is explored. Capital manage-
ment affects the rate of firm growth, through leverage, and the vul-
nerability of the firm, through liquidity. Capital accumulation 
constitutes a major form in which farm earnings occur and a major 
drain upon farm liquidity. A farmer may earn at a satisfactory rate, 
accumulate an equity in assets, and yet suffer from a low level of 
disposable income. On the other hand, to divert income from capital 
accumulation to consumption purposes may so retard the farm firm 
growth rate as to jeopardize his ability to survive in the dynamics 
of a capital-using agriculture. Such is the puzzle that faces most 
farmers in today•s agriculture (7, p. 1055). 
Levered Growth. It is common to measure growth of the firmeither 
by increments in rate of income flows or in equity of the firm. The 
normative ideal would be a composite that reflects the increment to 
utility of the firm operator. Equity seems to be a reasonable welfare 
proxy for the operator who owns assets of the firm, either totally 
or subject to debt. It may not be for the operator who leases a 
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substantial fraction of the.firm•s assets. For the latter, equity 
may be more plausible if it includes non-farm assets as well as farm 
assets. Having selected equity as the growth measure, it seems more 
convenient to define leverage, L, as the ratio of debt, D, to equity, 
E, where E is the difference between the value of assets, A, and D 
( 7' p. 1 056}. 
where 
Let the increment in equity be given by: 
g = ( rA - i D} ( 1 - t) ( 1 - c} ( 1 } 
r = rate earned on assets in the firm, net except for interest 
in taxes, 
i = rate paid on debt, 
t = rate paid in taxes on returns, and 
c = rate spent on consumption out of firm earnings. 
It is convenient to express growth g~ as the annual percentage 
change in equity, given by: 
where 
g~ = [L(r - i} + r] K, 
L = D/E, the chosen measure for leverage, and 
K = (1 - t) (1 -c), the percent of earnings remaining after 
consumption and taxes. 
This g~ is determined by r and L, given the rates of consumption, 
taxation, and interest. 
Limitations of Equity Growth Model. There are three apparent 
limitations of the levered growth model presented above (7, p. 1058). 
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1. As incomes increase it is likely that the tax rate, t, will 
increase. On the other hand, the rate of consumption expenditures 
may well decrease. Hence a constant value may reasonably approximate 
the combined effects of r and t. 
2. The model represents a firm with constant scale at alterna-
tive combinations of debt and equity. Empirical evidence suqgests 
that constant returns may be a good approximation over a wide range 
of production conditions. But it probably is not safe to assume r 
constant for some larger sizes implied by higher values of L. 
3. The concept of leverage does not include costs other than 
interest. But to exchange credit for loans (that is, to increase L) 
entails a loss of liquidity. Held in reserve, unused credit provides 
liquidity with which to meet the effects of an unfavorable event in 
production or marketing. 
Credit-Liquidity and Equilibrium. Liquidity is an attribute of 
the financial organization of the firm. The value of a firm is con-
ceived to be the amount that could be obtained from sale of the firm 
as a complete aggregate. The sale of assets within the firm will in. 
general reduce the value remaining in the firm by as much as or more 
than receipts from the separately sold assets. If the cash required 
from separate sale equals exactly the loss in firm value, one 
concludes that the assets are perfectly liquid. For those assets 
whose sale would contribute less to cash than to reduction of remain-
ing firm value, the assets are less than perfectly liquid. So con-
ceived, assets can be arranged in terms of their contribution to the 
liquidity of the firm (7, p. 1058). 
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Many assets of the firm are not incorporated into the firm's 
asset structure in expectation of separate sale. Yet they can be used 
as a partial basis for credit through exchange of a part of the bundle 
of property rights of a loan. This is the part to which we have as-
signed the concept of credit. Credit may depend on more than the col-
lateral value of the firm's assets, but it is reasonable to assume 
that assets contribute to 1 i qui dity in the form of "credit" as well as 
in the form of potential sale (7, p. 1058). 
Just as the concept of leverage lacks an explicit cost associated 
with use, liquidity lacks an ex~licit return associated with its use. 
Leverage operates as a multiplier with respect to the marginal value 
product of resources added to the firm. If the marginal value pro-
duct is positive, no explicit limit terminates the addition of fi-
nanced assets. But if liquidity is valuable to the firm, increasing 
debt relative to equity reduces credit left to finance capital assets 
or operating expenses in the future, or to meet unforseen financial 
problems. It is reasonable to argue that as credit is reduced, re-
maining units of credit acquire successively higher values. That is, 
credit is used at a cost that increases as debt increases, even though 
the rate of interest may remain constant over wide ranges of credit 
use. Liquidity and leverage are concepts of central importance in 
the financial management of the farm and credit is an important com-
ponent of a firm's liquidity (7, pp. 1058-1059). 
An equilibrium in credit-use is depicted in Figure 1. Incre-
ments to costs or returns from credit use are shown on the vertical 
axis, units of credit or debt on the horizontal axis. The curve label-
ed i describes increments to loan costs from added units of debt. Its 
costs 
or 
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Figure 1. Firm Equilibrium in the Use of Credit 
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slope reflects the presumption that the farmer faces higher-cost loan 
sources as his debt increast!S. The quantity, p, is the value ascribed 
by the farmer to a unit of credit held in reserve. Its slope reflects 
the presumption that the value of credit increases as successive units 
of credit are absorbed by loans (7, p. 1059). 
Credit in the Production Organization of the Firm 
In context of the theory of production, it is argued that the 
equilibrium conditions traditionally used by economists must be modi-
fied to provide criteria for optimization of resource use by the firm. 
Important modifications are associated with liquidity attributes of the 
firm organization. Credit, defined as borrowing capacity, constitutes 
an important source of liquidity as well as from interest charges on 
loans. Modifications are suggested in the relevant optimizing criteria 
relating to the firm to account for liquidity losses associated with 
borrowing (4, p. 507). 
Each firm has a financial component as well as non-financial com-
ponents. The financial component includes claims held and debts owed, 
values reported in a balance sheet of the firm. A less evident part 
of the financial component is liquidity of the firm: access to finan-
cial assets and terms on which such access may be gained. Profit-
seeking managers are willing to pay for liquidity in more or less 
tangible terms. The most tangible, perhaps, is found in insurance. 
The second is in choices that favor liquid relative to illiquid 
assets and flexibly managed debts relative to inflexible debt commit-
ments. A third is in reservation of "credit" defined as the capacity 
to borrow. Unused credit, like balance sheet assets that are liquid, 
constitute a reserve of liquidity that can be called upon to counter 
the effects of failure in expectations. Though not included in the 
balance sheet, liquidity has value (4, p. 507). 
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Therefore, this section will outline the effects of liquidity 
value, in the form of "credit", on production organization of the 
farm firm. A brief outline of the theory of production organization 
will be presented and then followed by the implication of the theory 
for incorporating credit as means of financing inputs used in the pro-
duction organization of the firm. 
The Theory of Production Organization. To simplify the discus-
sion which follows, we assume a production function with two variable 
resources and one constant input. The hypothetical production func-
tion in its functional form is the following: 
(1) 
Let y be a single-value continuous function with continuous first 
and second order derivatives, defined for non-negative values of 
y (output) and x1 (input). The quantities y and x1 are rates of 
flow per unit of time and the constant positive input xf. The level 
of y with respect to x1 and x2 is influenced by the value of xf and 
the technology used in production. The rate at which x1 substitutes 
for x2 is given by 
S = _dx2 
dx1 
(2) 
which is economically relevant only where dx2/dx1 (and dx1/dx2) ~ 0. 
The locus of points where dx2/dx1, dx1/dx2 = 0 are "ridge lines." 
The ridge lines bound the economically relevant area of the produc-
• 
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tion surface mapped with isoquants. 
Let the cost of production be given by 
c = p1x1 + p2x2 + b (3) 
where p. is the price of x. and b the cost of xf. We define an 11 iso-1 1 
cost 11 line as the locus of input combinations that can be bought for 
a given outlay. Specifying c as a parameter, 
co = p1x1 + b (4) 
we solve for 
co - b p2 
xl + x2 pl pl 
and 
co - b pl ( 6) X = xl 2 p2 p2 
The first term on the right side of (5) and (6) defines maxima of 
x1 and x2, respectively, that can be bought at outlay C0 • The ratio 
p1/p2 defines the slope of an iso-cost line. On the assumption that 
the price of input is constant for quantities bought for all inputs, 
the iso-cost line is straight as between all pairs of inputs. 
The output, y, is maximized, given C0 , on the condition, 
(7) 
Since y and C0 are parameters, both can be shifted. A locus of points 
generated by (7) is called an expansion path with respect to x1 and 
x2, with the special property that it defines cost-minimizing combina-
tions of xi for given levels of y. It can be expressed as an implicit 
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function: 
(8) 
for which (7) is satisfied. 
Among other uses, (8) can be used to appraise resource organiza-
tion in terms of "efficiency", since it traces a path of maximum eco-
nomic efficiency, as defined above. A combination of x1 , x2 that 
fails to meet condition (8) is thus judged to be less than efficient 
(4, pp. 508-509). 
Based on the relevant optimizing criteria relating to the firm 
outlined in this section, the effect of credit-use on production 
equilibria of the firm will be outlined. 
Financing Inputs. We retain the simplifying assumption that the 
firm is a pure competitor in the purchase of x1 and x2. The purchase 
of x1 and x2 must be financed with loan funds. Hence, the optima 
specified in (7) must now be specified: 
(9) 
where Fi is the marginal cost of finance for each unit of X;· If the 
ratio F1/F2 equals the ratio p1;p2 there is no change in points of 
efficiency, in the sense of departure from the expansion path. There 
may, of course, be a failure to reach an optimum rate of output, de-
pending on whether or not the expected lender response to total loan 
requests constrains the final production organization (4, p. 509). 
Assume that the lender is expected to favor x2 over x1. The 
discrimination can take either of two forms. The rate of interest 
may be lower on a loan to finance x2 than it is on a loan for x1. In 
27 
this case, the consequence is clear. The numerator in the right-hand 
tenn of (9) increases relative to the der10mindtM, thu-; increasing the 
value of the t·ight-hand term.: 'l must tw l'edured l'elativP to 'z· lhf' 
more likely lender response,, however, is more subtle. Suppose that 
the lender charges the same effective rate of interest, whatever the 
use of funds. But the loan limit to finance x1 is less than the loan 
limit to finance x2. That is, credit of the firm is absorbed at a 
rate that is greater for x1 than it is for x2. If we assume that 
credit remaining unused has a value greater than zero, F1 exceeds F2 
and the optimum quantity of x1 will be reduced relative to x2 (4, 
p. 509). 
In Figure 2, the cost of producing yo is minimized with x~ and 
x~ when it is assumed that the effect on credit is the same per unit 
of either_ input. os1, traces the path of cost minimizing combina-
tions on this assumption. On the other hand, should the farmer expect 
lenders to favor x2 over x1, the expansion path will steepen (see 
for example, os2). The path of cost-minimizing combinations will 
reflect different combinations of x1 and x2 in equilibria. The cost 
of producing y0 will be increased from C0 to c1. 
Similar results hold in the allocation of resources among com-
peting uses. Given that product y1 and y2 are each produced optimally 
(that is, on expansion paths, respectively), it can be shown that in-
puts common to both products are optimally allocated between the pro-
ducts when 
( 1 0) 
dx2 
slope""---
dx1 
' 
x: 
1 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
Figure 2. Effects of.Finance Cost-Minimizing Combi-
nations of x1 and x2 
28 
29 
where p1 and p2 are prices of y1 and y2, respectively. If the firm is 
a pure competitor in the sale of products, the slope of the 11 iso-
revenue11 line. deftned by ttw rlqht "hh• lit (Ill), h ~ uHPdanL 
The rather limited optimum can be extended easily by accounting 
for the marginal cost, with respect to output, of inputs specific to 
each product: 
(11) 
where c1 and c2 are marginal costs, with respect to output, of in-
puts specific to production of y1 and y2. respectively. Equation (11) 
specifies an optimum allocation of all resources: those specific as 
well as those common to y1 and y2. 
Suppose that (a) the firm is dependent upon loan funds to finance 
the expansion of y1 and/or y2 and (b) available lenders discriminate, 
favoring y2 over y1• That is credit absorbed to finance y2 is less 
than credit absorbed to fina~ce y1. Under these conditions, an op-
timal ~llocation of variable:inputs between y1 and y2 requires 
dy2 pl - cl ± Ll 
- dyl = P2 - c2 ± L2 
( 12) 
where Li is a general term, expressing the cost to the firm asso-
ciated with credit absorbed in borrowing in terms of output. This 
cost is associated with loss of liquidity occasioned by borrowing. 
Again if credit held in reserve is worth anything greater than zero, 
y2 will be increased relative to y1 (4, p. 510). 
It can be concluded that an optimal response of the borrowing 
firm to lender preferences generates a production reorganization that 
is suboptimal if a market-oriented theory of the firm is taken as the 
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source of criteria for optimality (4, p. 512). An exception is noted 
if lender prefrrences happen.to arrord with market preferences. That 
is, should F1/F2 equal p1/p2, lenth.,r preferences would not affect. thP 
slope of the iso-cost function and hence would leave the optimally ad-
justed production organization on expansion path as1 (Figure 3). 
Similarly, in the case of resource allocation, y1 and y2 would be 
produced along as1 (Figure 3) if L1/L 2 happened to equal (pl - c1)/ 
( P2 - c2) • 
Little research has been done to discover lender preferences, 
yet the available evidence suggests that there is little relation 
between market preferences and lender preferences. Nor do lenders 
appraise expectations in the same terms as borrowers. Presumably, 
the latter are influenced by relative contributions of alternatives 
to net income (and determinant thereof). Evidence suggests that 
lenders favor loans that are self-liquidating or asset-generating or 
both. Neither characteristic necessarily coincides with market pre-
ference or borrower preference (4, p. 512). 
Resource Efficiency. It was shown in the previous section that 
the optimum combinations of resources and products will differ from 
optima based on the price ratios when differences in financing costs 
are included. It was suggested that the relevant optimum, in terms of 
social optimizing, will include all differences in the real cost of 
financing, including risk. Deviation from this optimum can be caused 
by (1) lender attitudes based on a lack of knowledge of personal pre-
ference which leads to responses not supported by differences in the 
real cost of financing, and (2) erroneous farmer expectation of lender 
Figure 3. Effects of Finance Costs on Profit-
Maximizing Allocations of Resources 
betNeen y1 and y 2 
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response. Such a simple matter as helping lenders understand the 
nature and detail of the farm business in the community and helping 
farmers sense and understand lenders• attitudes might well shift re-
source use towa~d greater efficiency (7, p. 1063). 
Furthermor£, the heavy reliance on liberal financing to promote 
sales of some farm inputs might lead to a misallocation of resources. 
Farmers might substitute a more costly input for a cheaper (but equal-
ly effective) one solely because the terms of financing are much more 
favorable. As a consequence, farmers may be able to obtain more (and 
possibly cheaper) financing for these inputs than for lower price 
substitute inputs (7, p. 1063). 
In the foregoing discussion, the role of credit in contributinq to 
capital formation and the extent it affects the production organiza-
tion of the farm firm has been outlined. Therefore. it is worth-
while to give further insight about the scope of agricultural finance 
in theory as well as practice. The remaining part of this section is 
devoted to presenting the theoretical principles used by the formal 
credit institutions as bases in extending credit to the farmers. 
Based on the presentation of these principles, the SAAB lendinq poli-
cies and procedures will be evaluated in the chapter immediately fol-
lowing. 
The next section documents the considerations related to the farm 
and farm operators• characteristics upon which the formal lenders, in 
general, base their decision before granting loans, (in addition to the 
security required). These considerations include returns, repayment 
capacity, and risk bearing ability of the loan applicants which are 
referred to as the three R's of credit. In addition to the three R's, 
·"' l 
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there are other related factors such as character, capacity, and 
capital (equity or net worth) which are referred to as the three c's 
of credit. Also, to evaluate ttw ,,dequdq l'f ,.i\plt,11 i'\1\d tlw level 
of perfonnance, the formal lenders make use of financing ratios which 
relate items on the operator borrower's financial statement and help 
to evaluate credit worthiness and repayment capacity. 
Bases Used in Extending Credit to Farmers 
In addition to the security required by the lenders to extend 
credit to farmers, there are other considerations that are related 
to the farm and farmers characteristics upon which the lenders base 
their decision before granting loans. These considerations are re-
ferred to as the three r's: returns, repayment capacity, and risk 
bearing ability. 
The first r, returns, refers to the most profitable amount of 
credit which can be used in the business, while the other two r's 
indicate restrictions or limitations which may be necessary in some 
cases for the loan to be sound. Every loan should pass the three 
tests: 
1. Will it produce sufficient returns to cover the costs? In 
other words, will it pay to borrow the money? 
2. Will the borrower have sufficient repayment capacity to 
repay the loan as provided in the note and mortgage? A loan may be 
profitable, but the farmer still may not be able to make the payments 
as they come due. 
3. Does the farmer have ri sk-bea ring ability to carry the risk 
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and uncertainty involved in using the credit? 
These three questions should be considered by the farmer as he 
makes plans for using credit~ and by the 1 ender a11d bn1't"'OW~t· toqether 
as the loan application is studied. The loan should not be made un-
less both the borrower and lender can answer all three questions in 
affirmative., A negative answer to question 1 indicates the loan will 
be unprofitable, in which case there is no point in using the credit. 
A negative answer to either question 2 or 3 indicates the loan may 
break down, and a loan should never be made with this probability in 
the picture (26, pp. 98-99). 
The Three C's of Credit and Their Relations 
to the Three R's of Credit 
In terms of the three c 's of credit, the pri nci pa 1 factors to be 
taken into consideration in analysing use or extension of credit are: 
l. Character .. Character consists of those mental and moral 
qualities which identify an individual. A high sense of what is mor-
ally right, honesty, integrity, fairness, responsibility, trustworthi-
ness and industrious are qualities of fine character. When those 
qualities combine to make an individual conscientious 
concerning his debts, he has credit character. Char-
acter, undoubtedly, also has a bearing on returns and 
repayment capacity, that men of high character often 
are outstanding in business affairs. However, as will 
become evident as they are analyzed, returns and repay-
ment capacity are the results primarily of economic 
relationships. This is true if risk-bearing ability is 
comprised of intangibles, of which character is the 
pri rna ry component ( 26, p. 1 00). 
2. Capacity. Capacity, as one of the three c's of credit, siq-
nifies the ability to pay when debt is due. Capacity is a function of 
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income, since payments usually depend upon income rather than upon 
savings. However, income alone does not indicate capacity. Income 
may already be so committed to existing obligations that it adds 
little to capacity (26, p. 100). 
3. Capital. Capital, for purposes of the three C 1 S of credit, 
refers to the equity or net worth of an individual or business. It 
represents the a~surance that funds are available to pay the loan if 
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character and capacity should prove inadequate. Capital is represent-
ed by assets which a lender might seize as payment of the debt. Capi-
tal comprises one of the basic cornerstones of risk-bearing ability in 
the context of the three r 1 s of credit. However, it is only one of 
the aspects of risk-bearing ability (26, p. 100). 
Every applicant for a loan is asked to furnish information re-
garding his financial position. He should prepare a statement which 
shows: 
(a) an itemized list of all he owns--land, livestock, 
equipment and other assets; 
(b) an itemized state of all his debts; and 
(c) a statement showing his net worth, which is the 
difference between total assets and debts. 
The lender uses this statement to answer a number of questions 
about the borrower: How much capital does the applicant control? How 
much ownership does he have in his assets? Are there debts that may 
interfere with the prompt payment of the loan being applied for? Does 
the applicant have property which could be quickly sold for cash to 
pay current expenses and debts (known as quick assets)? Has the appli-
cant been going forward or backward financially in recent years? 
(11, p. 11). 
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Using Financing Ratios 
To evaluate the adequacy of capital and the level of performance, 
various financial statement items can be related to each other. This 
is best accomplished by calculating appropriate and meaningful basic 
ratios. Such ratios are helpful in following the financial trend 
through the years and in comparing the operation under analysis with 
similar ones. Numerous ratios can be calculated, but not all of these 
ratios will prove useful, since there is a wide variation in invest-
ments and operating programs utilized by the many types of farms that 
exist. A banker should examine the various ratios and adopt those 
meaningful to him. Bankers are urged to guard against overloading the 
the analysis with ratio calculations. However, it is usually best to 
utilize more than just one ratio, since one alone may not reflect the 
true picture. The following basic ratios are often found useful in 
agricultural credit analysis (2, pp. 90-91). 
Debt to Net Worth 
Total Debt 
Net Worth 
_ Creditor•s risk in relation 
- to that of owner 
The creditor•s contribution to capital as compared to that of 
the borrower is represented by this ratio. A figure of less than 1.0 
indicates that the owner•s net worth exceeds the amound of the borrow-
ed funds. In contrast to other basic ratios, a lower figure is de-
sirable. Generally, the borrower should have more money invested 
than the creditors. There are exceptions, however, such as cases in 
which the farm is being purchased on contract. In such instances the 
debt to net worth is usually extremely high; yet no undue hardship 
exists with respect to repayment ability. 
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Performance Ratios. These ratios relate the operation to the 
financial position by using both profit and loss statement and finan-
cial statement information. Performance ratios have become increas-
ingly important as a result of the narrowing of profits. The ratios 
used should be sensitive to change in performance. 
1. Gross Receipts to Total Assets 
Gross Receipt = Turnover of Assets Total Assets 
This ratio reflects the effectiveness of the use of assets. The 
higher the ratio, the greater the turnover of assets, maximizing the 
opportunity to produce profit. 
2. Profit to Total Assets 
Profit 
Total Assets = 
Profitability of all 
resources utilized 
In this ratio the percentage utilized on all invested resources 
is indicated. A high, or a trend toward a higher, percentage is 
desirable. Factors involving unusual adjustments in asset evaluation 
or profit calculation (such as high depreciation allowances) must be 
considered in interpreting the ratio. 
3. Debt Servicing to Gross Receipts 
Debt Servicing 
(Annual Principal and Interest) 
Gross Receipts 
= Proportion of receipts 
needed for debt serv-
icing 
This ratio indicates the debt-servicing drain on total income. 
An operation with high proportion of its total receipts earmarked 
for debt servicing will experience financial pressure, which in turn, 
will affect both the operation of the business and family living 
standards. 
Use and application by SAAB of the principles of agricultural 
finance are explored and outlined in the chapter that follows imme-
diately. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SAUDI ARABIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK . 
The rapid economic development of Saudi Arabia durinq recent 
years has its roots in the economic as well as social changes of the 
last decade. Population growth and inflow of manpower were important 
factors contributing to increased demand for food stuff in the King-
dom. · Rising demand for food induced Saudi farmers to increase farm 
production within their capacity and productivity constraints. To · 
increase production, farm operators, in part, were constrained by 
limited capital. Farm incomes were not sufficient to meet the goal 
of satisfying farm household consumption needs and have a surplus 
for investment in farm machinery and equipment and other factor in-
puts. Furthermore, financial institutions did not lend funds to 
agricultural producers primarily due to the high risks involved. 
Sources of Credit in Saudi Arabia 
Sources of agricultural credit in Saudi Arabia can be classified 
in three general groups: (1) individuals, (2) merchants and dealers, 
and (3) government lending institution (SAAB). 
Individuals 
These include retired farmers, close relatives, landlords and 
individuals not related to the farmer. These individuals are an 
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important source of credit used by farmers. 
Individuals vary widely in terms of dependability as a source 
of credit. Some constitute a dependable source. However, as a group, 
they are considered to be a comparatively undependable source of 
credit. Individuals often need their funds for family living or other 
purposes in difficult times, just at the time when the farmer often is 
also in great need of funds (26, p. 499). 
Merchants and Dealers 
Merchants, dealers, processors, and othertypes of middlemen 
comprise the original source for agricultural credit. They provide 
the farm operators with short and intermediate-term credit. 
Sales promotion usually is the primary reason why merchants and 
dealers extend credit to farmers. It facilitates sales of feed, fer-
tilizer, and other supplies, particularly when these items are deliv-
ered and the farmer is not at hand to make payment. It also helps in 
selling items when large amounts are involved. Machinery dealers 
often extend credit to help close a sale. As purchased inputs become 
increasingly important in operation of the farm business, the amount 
of merchant and dealer credit used probably increases. This is likely 
for two reasons: first, credit extension is a natural by-product of 
the merchant's primary line of business, and use of such credit is 
convenient for the farmer; second, the continued use of a substantial 
amount of merchant-dealer credit in agriculture suggests that both 
creditors and debtors benefit mutually from its use (26, p. 394). 
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Government Lending Institutions 
The major objective for developing government agricultural lend-
ing institutions is to meet the small farm operators• credit needs 
and improvement of farmers• income and welfare. They provide a pack-
age of services including technical assistance, inputs, marketing 
serVices and credit. However, government agricultural credit programs 
in most of the least developed countries have thus far fallen short 
of achieving the objective of promoting increased agricultural pro-
duction, income, and welfare, and at the same time repayment of bor-
rowed funds from income generated by use of credit. 
·One of the major reasons contributing "to the failure of most 
of the credit institutions, in general, is that they have complicated, 
cumbersome, and time consuming procedures which results in delays in 
approval and in loans not being made available when required. Issuing 
of loans may take weeks if not months in most agricultural institu-
tions. 
Quite apart from the fact that most agricultural credit institu-
tions follow excessively rigid and time consuming procedures for pro-
cessing loan applications, a number of other shortcomings ranging 
from corruption, political interference and favoritism bar their 
successful operation (29, p. 4). 
Another common problem faced by most of the agricultural credit 
institutions in the developing countries is the repayment problem. 
Most experience low rates of repayment (27, p. 5). 
A major reason for generally low rates of repayment is that most 
of the loans are made without any technical analysis of the borrowers• 
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farming operations. Also, lack of effective follow-up on use of loans 
has resulted in the diversion of agricultural loans to other uses. 
Shortage of trained staff and poor office management is another major 
problem hindering the successful operation of government credit insti-
tutions {29, p. 5). 
Considering institution characteristics, high loan repayment 
·problem and lack of trained staff, as outlined in the foregoing sec-
tion, contributes to the failure of most of the agricultural credit 
institutions in the developing countries and SAAB is no exception. 
In the following section, SAAB lending policies, procedures, and 
other factors hindering its effort in reaching the farm operators with 
its services and collecting loans are evaluated. 
SAAB 
SAAB, as a government credit institution, was implemented with 
the following objectives: {1) to provide the Saudi farm operators 
with ad~quate capital to increase domestic farm production, and 
{ 2) improve farm income sufficient 1 y for the farm opera tor borrowers 
to be able to meet their family needs and repay the government loans. 
SAAB has been in operation since 1964, however, SAAB has thus far 
fallen short of achieving the anticipated increase in domestic agri-
cultural production, provision of adequate credit, and improving farm 
income. 
One of the major factors contributing to the problems faced by 
the SAAB is that its lending operation is undermined by complicated, 
cumbersome, and time consuming procedures. 
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Other factors contributing to the unsuccessful effort by SAAB 
to extend sound credit and collect loans is the lack of well-trained 
credit analysts that are able to analyze in a technical sense the 
borrower's farming operations. Lack of effective supervision and poor 
office management at the branches and offices also are limiting fac-
tors hindering the successful lending operation of SAAB. 
In relation to extending credit to farmers, it is important to 
look into the policies of the lender. Are the credit terms adopted to 
the needs of the agricultural producers? Are repayment schedules fit-
ted to the earnings of the farm and capacity to repay? Is the period 
of the time for which loans are made adjusted to the length of the 
time required to complete the operation being financed? Do the loans 
call for large amounts coming due at any one time, or are payments 
spread over a reasonable income period? (11, p. 8). 
The policy toward borrowers during hard times also is important. 
Will the lender permit the deserving borrower to carry loans during 
the temporary periods of 1 ow income? Wi 11 the 1 ender extend further 
credit when unusual conditions make it impossible to repay on sched-
ule? If the policies of a prospective lender fall short of satis-
factory in any of these areas, it may pay to shop elsewhere even 
though the lender offers other tempting inducements (11, p. 8). 
However, in contrast to the essentials for a sound lending policy 
of the formal lender outlined above, SAAB structure and lending pol-
icies and procedures are outlined in the following section. 
Structure of SAAB 
The structural framework of SAAB is made up of the main office 
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in Riyadh, the capitol of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The main 
office is headed by the director general and three deputies in charge 
of technical affairs, financial affairs and personnel. At the main 
office, there is also the board of directors responsible for setting 
policy and reviewing the SAAB activities. The SAAB is decentralized 
into branches and offices located in the major agricultural areas in 
the kingdom to make credit readily available to the farm operators. 
SAAB•s Effort in Supplying Credit 
The SAAB has opened 11 branch banks and 52 sub-branch banks 
throughout the Kingdom to make credit available to an increasing 
number of farm operator borrowers, but there is still room for im-
provement. Farm operator borrowers coming to a small branch of the 
SAAB to apply for a loan usually have to wait for several hours and 
sometimes days. When it finally is their turn, the farm operator 
borrowers are obliged to provide, in the presence of a great number 
of other persons including other farmers and bank staff, all the per-
sonal information regarding their families, prior debts, income, etc., 
which are needed to fill out the loan application. 
As indicated previously, the SAAB currently provides credit to 
farm operator borrowers without an interest charge, but there are 
other costs that the borrower incurs in obtaining credit, including 
the time and cost for travel to and from the bank. It often is ne-
cessary for the farm operator borrower to make several trips before 
his loan is approved and made available. 
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Purpose, Size and Terms of Loans 
The bank makes two types of loans. Short-term or seasonal loans 
are made to farm operators to meet crop production, harvesting and 
marketing costs. These are granted for a period not exceeding 12 
months and are to be repaid after crops are marketed. Short-term 
loans may vary in amount depending upon their purposes. 
Intermediate-term loans are made for purchase of farm machinery 
and equipment, livestock, improvement of irrigation systems, vehicles 
for marketing agricultural products, and for establishing enterprises 
allied to agriculture. Such loans are normally made for a period of 
three to five years. The size of the loan depends either on the size 
of the farm operation or on the loan purpose and the collateral 
offered as security. 
Lending Procedures 
Short-term or seasonal loans are made according to estimated 
budgets prepared by the farm operator applying for the loan with or 
without assistance of the field representative. Since nearly all 
of the farm operators are illiterate and none of them keep farm re-
cords, loans are often based on wild guesses. As a result, the size 
of the loan granted is often either much smaller or much larger than 
the amount that can be used effectively. 
The procedures followed,by SAAB in evaluating short and inter-
mediate-term loan requests are as follows. The farm operator applies 
for the loan at the nearest SAAB branch or sub-branch. At that time, 
the field representative filJs out an application form and an appoint-
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ment is made for the field representative to visit the farm. When 
the field representative visits the farm, he evaluates the farm•s po-
tential to determine whether the loan request meets the needs of the 
loan purpose and the repayment capacity of the farming operation. 
Finally, a report is prepared by the field representative and sub-
mitted to the SAAB branch or sub-branch•s loan committee for action. 
Sub-branch managers, branch managers, director of credit depart-
ment, and the deputy general director for technical affairs are auth-
orized to approve loans not exceeding SR. 100,000, SR. 200,000, SR. 
250,000 and SR. 400,000, respectively. The general manager of the 
SAAB has the authority to approve a loan up to SR. 500,000. Appli-
cations for loans exceeding this limit have to be approved by the 
board of directors. 
When an intermediate-term loan is approved the funds are not 
given directly to the applicant since the loan is specified to be 
made in kind. The money is paid by the bank to the contractor after 
the work is completed as specified or to the dealer for farm machin-
ery or equipment. By following this procedure the bank is the pur-
chaser of the item agreed upon. 
Short and intermediate-term loans are given in phases according 
to their purposes: 
Short-term Loans. These loans are given in cash following loan 
approval, and according to the following schedule: (1) A loan not 
exceeding SR. 20,000 is advanced in full. (2) A loan of more than 
SR. 20,000 but not exceeding SR. 50,000 is given in two installments; 
the first is advanced following loan approval and the second is 
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advanced after 50 percent of the purpose is implemented based on the 
field follow-up report. (3) A loan ranging between SR. 50,000 and 
100,000 is advanced in three equal installments; the first, following 
loan approval; the second, after completion of 50 percent of the pur-
pose; and the third after 80 percent of the purpose is completed. 
(4) A loan exceeding SR. 100,000 is given in four equal installments 
(35, pp. 16-17). 
Intermediate-term Loans. Loans for subsidized and non-subsidized 
farm machinery and equipment are given following loan approval and 
availability of the item desired by the applicant. 
Loans for a large scale specialized commercial project such as 
poultry and dairy are advanced as follows: 20 percent after loan 
approval; 40 percent after 30 percent of the project is completed; 20 
percent after 70 percent of the project is completed; and 20 percent 
after 100 percent of the project is completed (35, p. 19). 
Credit Policies 
Interest Rate. Charging interest on borrowed funds is prohibited 
by Islam. The SAAB made a three percent per annum charge on loans for 
in kind purchases until 1974 as nominal commercial profit for adminis-
tration of borrowed funds .. No charge was made on cash loans. The 
charge was called commercial profit because the SAAB paid the dealer, 
who then turned over possession of the item to the farm operator in 
the presence of the SAAB's representative. 
In early 1974, this commercial profit charge was abolished on 
all farm loans advanced by the SAAB. The reason for eliminating the 
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coiTI11ercial profit payment was to help farm operators acquire the need-
ed capital to increase agricultural production at zero cost. 
Eligibility for Loans. To be eligible for a loan, an applicant 
has to be a farm operator, herdsman, or owner of an enterprise allied 
to agriculture. Failing that, he must be in a position to employ a 
competent manager to look after the operation. Loans for tractors, 
hay-harvesting machinery and combines are granted to individuals or 
groups who may lease these pieces of equipment or provide custom 
service to other farm operators. 
Security of Loans. The SAAB accepts collateral or the signature 
of a cosigner as security. For short and intermediate-term loans, the 
borrower pledges to the bank real estate, such as land and buildings, 
or obtains the signature of a cosigner on the loan. The assets offer-
ed as collateral must be registered as free-hold. On-farm family resi-
dence cannot be used as farm loan collateral. Loans secured by real 
estate cannot exceed 70 percent of the value of the real estate holdings. 
The cosigner must provide the SAAB with a written statement from 
the head or the Ameer of the Village verifying that his financial stand-
ing is satisfactory and that he is capable of repaying the loan incase 
the farmer defaults. If the cosigner is a government employee, he has 
to furnish a written statement from the Ministry or the institution in 
which he works. In case of default, he is liable for repayment of the 
loan or payments will be deducted from his salary until the loan is re-
paid in full. As a rule, SAAB will not accept as a cosigner a borrower 
from SAAB who himself has a loan secured by a cosigner. 
Farm machinery and equipment or growing crops or products in 
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storage cannot be used as collateral to secure loans from the SAAB. 
Farm machinery and equipment are not accepted as collateral by SAAB, 
but in a way they are used indirectly as collateral. This machinery 
and equipment cannot be sold or used for different purposes until the 
loan is fully repaid. If the borrower defaults on the loan, the bank 
can repossess the machinery or equipment for which the loan was made. 
Repayment of Loans. Short-term loans are scheduled to be repaid 
in one installment when the crops are marketed. Intermediate-term 
loans are paid in installments as specified in the loan agreement. A 
bad repayment record may deprive the borrower from future financing 
and/or the recall of the loan. Farm machinery and equipment may be 
repossessed by the bank if the borrower fails to make the payments as 
agreed upon. 
When a major agricultural disaster occurs, the bank's management 
can amend repayment terms to fit the circumstances involved. In case 
o~ default or delay in making payment, and if the SAAB's field repre-
sentative's report indicates the farm operator borrower has the capac-
ity to repay either from his net farm income of off-farm income but 
fa i1 s to do so, the farm opera tor borrower is pressured through the 
local authority for the delinquent payment on the outstanding bal-
ances. If the borrower will not repay the loan, then on loans that 
have a cosigner, the cosigner is asked to repay the loan. The SAAB 
has never taken possession of any real estate offered as collateral 
on delinguent loans. 
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Evaluation of SAAB 
In contrast with the principles (three r 1 s and three C 1 S) used in 
extending credit commonly used by formal agricultural lending insti-
tutions in other developing countries as guidelines for extending 
sound credit, SAAB lending policies are primarily based on subjective 
value judgment. Farm operator credit worthiness and repayment capac-
ity are evaluated mainly based on the size of land holding and the 
security offered by the formal applicant. 
It is indicated that short-term credit is not extended to the 
farmer applicant based on cash flow analysis and according to the 
actual need. Also, size of crop land cultivated is the basic criteria 
used by SAAB credit analysts for extending intermediate-term credit. 
This method of evaluating credit needs ignores income generating 
potential of the farm units and other important farm and farm oper-
ator characteristics that are important indicators of the applicant 1s 
credit worthiness and repayment capacity. 
Since credit terms are fixed at one and five years respectively 
for short and intermediate-term loans extended by SAAB, credit may 
not be adjusted to the length of time required to complete the oper-
ation being financed. 
Also, for successful lending operations, financial planning 
provides better guidance for decision making by both the credit 
analysts and farm operator borrowers. By use of a financial plan, 
the operator borrowers can anticipate as accurately as possible the 
credit needed to finance the farm enterprises. 
A basic requirement for developing farm financial plans is a 
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general indication of how much capital the farmer has presently. 
With this general indication, plans can then be developed for ob-
taining needed additional funds. The specific amount to be used will 
depend upon the profitability of using capital, the terms and condi-
tions involved in acquiring capital, and the amount of risk the 
family can carry (31, p. 55). 
One method which helps assure that funds will be available to 
make loan repayments when they come due is to budget use and repay-
ment of credit. The objective is not to determine the amount of 
credit it will pay to use, but rather recording in a systematic man-
ner when the credit will be needed during the year and when funds 
will be available to repay the loan. The budget also shows cash in-
come and expenses of the farm business by months, together with a 
total for each item for the year. Family living expenditures also 
are shown by month for the year. On the basis of this data a cash 
surplus or deficit is derived each month and for the year (36, 
p. 180). 
The advantages of a budgeted loan can be summarized as follows: 
1. It provides an opportunity for the lender and the borrower 
to review and analyze the entire business operation together. In 
this analysis, the lender has an opportunity to study the business 
and the farmer, and to determine how the financing institution might 
be of greatest assistance. The farmer has an opportunity to discuss 
various aspects of the business and of financing with the lender. 
Together, they can analyse the amount of capital which can be pro-
fitably and safely used, and where it should be used within the 
business (31, p. 182). 
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2, A budgeted loan provides assurance that funds will be avail-
able to carry out business operations. With a budgeted loan the lend-
er gives an overall commitment of funds which the financing institu-
tion will provide during a given period. Without such an assurance 
the farmer may be unable to obtain credit to carry out plans under-
way (31, p. 183). 
In contrast to the discussion pertaining to financial planning 
and cash budgeting outlined in the proceeding section, SAAB credit 
analysts do not make use of the cash budget in evaluating the borrower 
applicant•s credit worthiness, repayment capacity, and dispersement 
of loans, Lack of awareness of the usefulness of cash budgeting is 
one of the reasons contributing to improper selection of the repay-
ment plan and terms of loans most suitable to the farmer. 
Previous Credit Evaluation Studies 
Analysis of an interview of 58 farm borrowers who had loans 
from SAAB in the Riyadh, Al-Quassim and Taif areas showed that some 
of the major reasons for overdue payments were low farm productivity 
due to limited operating resources, partial loss of crops because of 
floods and frost-damages, and an inadequate supply of irrigation 
water. Nearly 31 percent of the farm operators in the study said 
they did not repay loans on the due dates because they were not able 
to obtain a large enough loan to buy enough inputs to improve pro-
ductivity of their farm lands. The partial loss of crops due to 
natural calamities was the reason 22 percent of the farm operators 
did not make a loan payment. Seventeen percent gave as their reason 
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an inadequate s~pply of irrigation.water. Another nine percent of 
the farm operators failed to make payments on time because crops 
were marketed later than originally planned when the loan was taken 
out and the repayment date scheduled (38, p. 34). 
Of the farm operators, 23 percent indicated that they gave a 
higher priority to repaying other loans before repaying SAAB loans. 
They pointed out that they needed these other sources where they 
could obtain credit without delay and inconvenience. There may also 
be a lack of incentive for some farmers to repay SAAB loans because 
of the no interest charges or no penalty enforcements. The bank has 
not, through any legal process, taken any of the real estate pledged 
as collateral for nonrepayment of loans (38, p. 34). 
An agricultural credit study was made by the Saudi Ministry of 
Agriculture in 1974 in the area of Riy~dh and Al-Quassim. Infor-
mation was obtained by interviewing farm operators who had loans 
from the SAAB. The study indicated that the amount loaned by the 
SAAB perfarmwas inadequate relative to the amount of land culti-
vated per farm. It was estimated that the average amount loaned was 
slightly above SR. 31 per dunom. The study also concluded that the 
five-year limit for loan repayment should be increased. 
Another study was made by Dr. J. A. Hopkin for the SAAB. The 
·purpose of this study was to calculate the SAAB's services to farm 
operators and its operational efficiency. The two main divisions 
of the report submitted to the SAAB's Board of Directors were recom-
mendations for improving (1) operational efficiency and (2) effective-
ness of the bank (23, p. 6). To improve short-term efficiency the 
bank should (1) fill all positions with the best qualified men avail-
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able from all sources, (2) have the services of the SAAB be more 
closely linked and coordinated with those of the Ministry of Agri-
culture, (3) make changes in standard operating procedures to reduce 
the number of loan application forms and farm visits per year from 
new loan requests, and (4) simplify the loan approval procedures to 
avoid delay so farm operator borrowers can obtain credit when needed. 
The study also indicated that for credit to be more effective 
the bank should (1) develop cash flow budgets as a basis for making 
operating loans to farmers, (2) strengthen and expand the banks' 
training progra~ at all levels, and (3) allcicate greater resources 
to research and planning with in-house staff and through the use of 
consultants. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING 
LOAN DELINQUENCY 
In Chapter I, current Saudi Arabian agricultural conditions and 
the apparent causes for low agricultural productivity were outlined. 
The government•s initiative in establishing SAAB to provide farm 
operators with needed capital to increase farm production and improve 
income and hence repay the government loans was evaluated. It was 
pointed out that SAAB•s primary function is to provide interest-
free loans and collect the loans when due. However, over the past 
years of operation, SAAB has fallen far short of achieving the stated 
objectives. Low rate of loan repayment is one of the problems faced 
by SAAB. The most apparent important factors contributing to low 
repayment of loans are related to the farm and farm operator charac-
teristics and to institutional factors related to SAAB. 
Furthermore, the role of credit in farm capital formation and 
accumulation as it affects farm firm liquidity, income and repayment 
capacity based on the principles of agricultural finance was summar-
ized in Chapter II. The concept of farm capital formation and accum-
ulation, and levered growth provide the basis for measuring the im-
pact of credit on increasing farm productivity and growth, which in 
turn improves income and the walfare of farmers. Since increasing 
farm income is one of the primary objectives on which the credit 
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program was implemented, then loan repayment should be closely linked 
with income generated from using credit. In this regard, farm in-
come is one of the important determinants of the loan repayment prob-
lem. 
Therefore, the purpose of this section is to systematically 
analyse the impact of net farm income and other selected variables 
attributed to the farmer borrowers• nonrepayment of production loans 
obtained from SAAB. 
Default consists of failure of borrowers to conform to contrac-
tual obligations. Default is not the sole criterion by which success 
of the program should be judged. Default can arise from a conscious 
choice of the borrower or from a misunderstanding of his contractual 
obligations. He may choose not to repay because he rejects the pro-
gram and hence does not expect to participate in the future. He also 
may default because he expects the program will not be continued. 
The latter reason is plausible when the program contains features 
likely to cause the program to be culturally rejected (6, p. 11). 
Default also can arise from factors external to the client (e.g. 
weather, prices, illness). Should default from these sources be dis-
missed? There are attractive features in the concept of converting 
loans into an income transfer, especially those that materialize from 
factors over which the borrower has no control. For clients in the 
lowest income class(es), a strong case could be made on equity grounds 
if not on efficiency grounds. However, there are two problems with 
this concept: (1) large defaults can jeopardize the continuation of 
any credit program that has progressed beyond a pilot stage; (2) to 
forgive indebtedness once contracted may seriously damage any educa-
tional value derived from developing skills in financial manage-
ment and also is not a good example for other borrowers. An impor-
tant financial management skill is the honoring of debt obligations 
{6, p. 11). 
Factors Affecting Delinquency 
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Important factors affecting delinquency are the following: finan-
cial management of the farmer borrowers; social organization and fam-
ily characteristics; profitability of credit use; credit institution 
policies and regulations; informal sources of credit; misuse of cred-
it funds; attitudinal conditions favoring non-repayment; and varia-
bility of income. 
Financial Management 
Financial behavior is a part of economic behavior of which the 
latter consists of choosing and managing alternatives in production. 
Financial management interacts with other economic behavior. The 
interaction is especially significant for the small farmer. He 
must solve problems of cash flow and risk management without an 
appreciable volume of production. He may be only marginally orient-
ed to the market. The cash flow problem arises from seasonal deficits 
and surpluses inherent in the biological characteristics of farming. 
In addition to predicted deficits, he must consider unpredicted fail-
ures in growing conditions, disease, markets, personal health, etc. 
Risks are generated by the uncertain biology of farming, by uncertain 
markets and by unplanned household events. With a low volume of cash 
flow he must find a basis in reserves with which to meet both the 
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predicted deficits and the unpredicted adversities (1, p. 3). 
Requirements of the household cannot be ignored in the organi-
zation of the small farm. The degree that the small farmer is a sub-
sistence farmer, crop inventories to meet food requirements of the 
household are as important as cash flow requirements to meet oper-
ating expenses of the firm. The subsistence character of small farms 
enforces the need to incorporate consumption with production require-
ments in any serious consideration of economic behavior in general 
and financial behavior in particular (1, p. 3). 
Owing to limited income generating abilities, limited net worth 
and small volume of cash flows, small farm operations depend on gov-
ernment credit institutions, friends, relatives and private money-
lenders as sources of financing production, marketing and consumption. 
Financing Production. The small farmer's dependence on high cost 
informal lending has a severe direct affect on production choices. 
Other than for loans from friends and relatives, the small farmer fre-
quently pays the moneylender an interest rate that is much higher than 
that charged by the formal moneylenders. Such rates impose severe re-
quirements on rates of return to investment capital thus excluding 
many alternatives that otherwise would be economically feasible for 
him as well as for the economy of his country. Even important improve-
ments in technology may fail to generate payoffs that reach the 50 per-
cent to 100 percent levels (1, p. 3). 
Financing Marketing. Large seasonal variations in product prices 
are commonly observed in less developed countries. These variations 
comprise one of the most visible characteristics of the small farmer's 
59 
economic environment. But his requirement in cash flow, often includ-
ing a repayment commitment to his lenders, deny him the chance to gain 
from seasonal price appreciation. The moneylender requires the small 
farmer to repay at harvest. He may even commit the small farmer to 
repay in kind. Thus, the moneylender may acqutte a crop inventory 
which permits him to gain in seasonal price appreciation in addition 
to the high rate of interest extracted from the small farmer. He also 
reduces the risk of default by controlling the small farmer's market-
ing (1, p. 4). 
Financing Consumption. In the organization of small farms it is 
difficult and perhaps unrewarding to separate the household from the 
firm--consumption, as commonly understood, from production. Input re-
quirements for the household are just as demanding as are inputrequire-
ments for the firm. Here, too, there are not only the predictable de-
ficits and surpluses already noted, but also unpredictable events. 
Weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies are very real requirements as 
viewed by many traditional small farmers (1, p. 4). 
Social Organizations and Family Characteristics 
Kinship structures affect farmer behavior in a number of ways. 
They will partially or wholly define his access to land and other 
productive resources; they will define many of the financial respon-
sibilities he must meet to maintain his membership; they will par-
tially or wholly define his relative power within the society. In 
addition, his kin group may provide a significant informal source of 
credit (19, p. 9). 
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The family farm is also directly affected by the natural growth-
cycle characteristic of the family. A man with several grown sons 
living at home has an advantage in food (and cash crop) production 
over a young family that must support children who provide only margin-
al amounts of labor. Marriage patterns also partially determines the 
size of the family group which in turn directly affects the productive 
capacity of the family farm unit. Men who are able to obtain more 
wives will be in a better position to increase production (yet more 
11modern 11 men are supposed to be monogamous). These various factors 
together affect the productive and competitive position of the family 
firm at any particular time and they shape the limits within which a 
farmer plans his agricultural activity. He cannot operate an opti-
mally large unit when his children are young; similarly, he must re-
trench his production once they are full-grown and leave the house-
he 1 d ( 1 9 , p . 8) . 
Since this study only includes family farms, it is essential to 
understand the fundamental differences between subsistence and com-
mercial farms or, more specifically, differences between a family farm 
firm and a profit-making firm. 
The goal of a family farm is to provide subsistence for all its 
members and to ensure their well-being as far as possible. Therefore 
it will utilize family labor even if the productivity of any member 
falls below the cost required to provide subsistence. With the re-
sources available, the family farm firm will maximize total output, 
but will not necessarily maximize profit since the latter might re-
quire reduction of the work force so that the marginal net productiv-
ity of each unit of labor would be greater than zero. In order to 
61 
promote profit, some members of the family would probably have to be 
excluded in the same way that a profit-making enterprise reduces its 
work force if the profit margin begins to fall (19, p. 6). 
Profitability of Credit 
Profitable Technology. No public credit program for small 
farmers will lead to additional output unless the farmers are willing 
and able to borrow from the fnstitution, to use the borrowed funds 
primarily for productive purposes and to repay the loan. Before a 
small farmer will borrow for productive purposes, he must be informed 
of the investment opportunity and be convinced the expected yield 
justifies the additional risk (26, p. 10). 
Agricultural credit will be ineffective without technology which 
is profitable to the farmer. Technology in farming is simply the way 
things are done. A given technology implies a given set of inputs or 
factors of production. Thus, .. traditional technology .. means the par-
ticular way the traditional inputs of land, labor, seed, hand imple-
ments, oxen, organic fertilizer, and water are combined and used. 
11 New technology'' is no more than a new set of inputs or factors of 
production which are different from the traditional set. That is, at 
least one factor has been added, dropped or changed in some way. New 
technology has also been classified as biological, chemical, or me-
chanical innovations (30, p. 3). 
To be profitable, the increase in the value of the output result-
ing from the investment must be more than the increase in the input 
costs. It has been widely held that large doses of credit are needed 
to facilitate rapid technological change in agriculture, but, again, 
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this presupposes that such profitable investment alternatives do, 
in fact, exist for the farmer. What evidence is there to support this 
assumption? (39, p. 3). 
In a technical sense, it is not credit but the physical inputs of 
fertilizer, seeds, labor, etc., which are responsible for the increase 
in output. Where the conditions of success for a credit program for 
small farmers are not met, alternative programs--subsidies for inputs, 
price supports for output, more extension services, or even credit to 
the marketing system rather than the small farmer--may be capable of 
raising the welfare of small farmers at considerably lower costs than 
a credit program (26, p. 13). 
Farm Size. Farm size can be defined in terms of either or both 
of the following factors: its physical size and its economic size. A 
farm with a small area can be the source of relatively high levels of 
income. Conversely, an extensive size farm may be a poor income pro-
ducer. The income potential of a farm, however, is not only related 
to physical area or its land quality, but also to the level of tech-
nology in use and the level of administrative skill of the farm oper-
ator. A criteria for defining small farms could use both physical 
size and size of the income stream. An additional criteria should be 
that of the income potential of the unit as related to the question of 
access to technology and other operating and facilitating inputs. The 
range of farm 11 sizes 11 covers, therefore, from the large area, good 
resource quality, high income level farms to small area, low resource 
quality, very low income level farm. In between one finds differing 
levels of size, degrees of access to technology and inputs and, as a 
partial result, differing levels of income and/or income potential. 
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On the 11Small 11 side of the distribution, there will be a continuum of 
small farm types. A clearer typology within this continuum is obtain-
ed by introducing a concept of economic viability. A farm unit can 
be considered economically viable when it can operate as a reasonably 
profitable economic enterprise with unhindered access to technology 
and other operational and facilitating inputs and within a price 
system which reflects the true scarcity value of productive factors 
and outputs. Combining these criteria gives us three basic types of 
sma 11 fa rrns : 
a. Those which are already operating reasonably 
profitable enterprises, 
b. Those which have the potential to become 
profitable if access to technology and in-
puts are possible, and 
c. Those with such poor resources that not even 
improved access or new technology would make 
them profitable. 
By definition, small farms and farmers in category (b) will re-
quire very special ·types of solutions that go well beyond access to 
credit. Farmers in groups (b) and (c) can be broadly categorized as 
subsistence farmers (18, pp. 3-4). 
Economic theory suggests that economies of size may even be pre-
sent in small farm agriculture (27, p. 17). This general hypothesis 
will be further tested to explore the relationship between size of 
farm and the level of delinquency rate and the response of farm out-
put to farm size of the farmer borrowers. 
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Credit Institution Policies and Regulations 
Credit agencies operate as only one element of the government's 
banking programs, which is to say that they generally lack autonomy 
and must be responsive to pressures originating outside their organi-
zation. In some cases, the credit agency is dependent upon particular 
ministries or departments for supporting activities. For example, 
credit tied to the introduction of new farming practices may require 
coordination between the credit agency and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and this coordination may simply be unachievable because of ministe-
rial rivalry, interbureaucratic ill will, or the like (19, p. 16). 
Lending institutions are frequently created to provide credit to 
small farmers. These organizations may experience severe recuperation 
problems and have trouble avoiding becoming purveyors of welfare. In 
cases where they function well they seem to reach a ceiling or at 
least a leveling off of their operations well short of reaching the 
majority of the potential clientele. The leveling off process is 
attributed to various internal and external constraints such as shor-
tage of personnel, limited land held by and limited clientele access 
to markets (17, p. 4). 
The major factors hypothesized to have direct negative impact 
on loan repayment are the degree of structural complexity of the 
lending institution for loan application, processing and approval; 
and terms of credit. 
Structural Complexity. Many small farm operator borrowers are 
unable to understand the procedures involved in securing a loan and 
complain of the excessive red tape and complexity of the procedures. 
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Complexity also produces delays which have highly detrimental 
effects given the fanner's need for timely acquisition of inputs and 
the increased risk to which delays subject him (17, p. 4). 
Even though SAAB as a government development credit institution 
provides interest free loans to the farm operators, there still are 
true costs to the borrowers which usually are not accounted for by the 
credit analyst or the loan committee members. The true costs to the 
farm operators of official credit include travel costs, loss of working 
days and other non-monetary costs. The applicants may find it neces-
sary to make repeated trips to the main bank or its branches and 
offices to negotiate the loans. Bureaucracy, red tape, and delay are 
directly related to the inefficiency of the credit system in meeting 
the need of farmers. Credit may be given too late to be useful, leav-
ing the farm operator borrowers in debt without means of repayment. 
Terms of Credit and Size of Payments. Other important factors 
hypothesized to have direct effects on delinquency are the terms and 
size of annual payments. Terms of credit obtained from SAAB are in-
flexible. They are fixed at five equal payments for intermediate cred-
it and one single payment for short-tenn loans to be repaid in one 
year regardless of the size of the loan. The payments usually are not 
linked to the marketing period or cash flow needs of the farmenterpris-
es. In some cases the farm operator borrowers mah look at alternative 
sources of credit for securing additional funds to make payments toSAAB. 
Informal Sources of Credit 
There are important reasons why a fanner might actually prefer 
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informal sources of credit over that offered through formal credit 
institutions. Informal sources of credit seem to share a number of 
characteristics that make them appealing to the small farmer and at 
the same time differentiate them from formal credit programs. In-
formal sources tend to be relatively flexible and free of red tape or 
complicated procedures. The creditor is generally well-known to the 
borrower and often has additional ties of relationship to the farmer. 
The source of credit is nearby, loans are unsupervised, and the farmer 
has more control over the size of loan he can obtain. The lender 
knows his credit worthiness, and is usually prepared to give the loan 
when the latter needs or want is (19, p. 29). 
In case of emergencies,.the local lender is very likely aware of 
the situation and can adjust the conditions of the loan accordingly. 
The formal credit program would generally not make any allowances for 
family emergencies such as illness, funerals or weddings, as these are 
seen as consumption items (19, p. 30). 
Since moneyle·nders are important sources of financing the farm 
enterprises and the farm family needs, the farmers will be reluctant 
to repay the formal lender first in order not to jeopardise his chance 
for new credit from the local moneylenders. 
Attitudinal Conditions Favoring Non-Repayment 
Farmers who do not repay loans despite their apparent ability to 
repay fall into this category~ The consideration of government funds 
as grants rather than loans and therefore a lack of commitment to re-
pay is the general factor creating this attitudinal characteristic. 
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This cause is generally closely linked with defects in the credit or-
ganizational structure (36, p. 6). 
Variability of Income Caused by Fortuitous 
and Seasonal Factors 
The farmer in this category is unable to repay his loan in a 
particular season owing to a short-fall in production due to total 
or partial crop failure; loss of the crop by theft, fire or other 
hazard; a sudden fall in prices; or unmarketability of the produce. 
In such cases the postponement or rescheduling of the payment would 
take care of this problem. This is essentially a seasonal problem and 
there is a probability of such occurrences in every farm enterprise 
(36, p. 5). 
In the foregoing discussion, factors affecting loan delinquency 
briefly documented in a conceptual framework. However, as suggested 
in the discussion, deliquency cannot be evaluated independently of 
the farm and family financial management decisions, farm production, 
capital formation and resource use. A brief outline of a postulated 
interdependent farm credit system is presented in the following sec-
tion. 
An Interdependent Farm Credit System 
The flow of investment funds from SAAB, other sources of credit 
(merchants, moneylenders, and farm family savings) and their use for 
farm production or consumption pruposes is presented in a structural 
interdependent system (Figure 4). This system attempts to show the 
relationships and continuous interactions of the exogenous and 
FAMILY LIVING 
EXPENSES 
OTHER SOURCES OF 
CREDIT 
Figure 4: Structure of the Farm Credit Interdependent System 
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endogenous forces affecting farm operator decision making in the 
farm production process. 
Financial Management 
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The farm operator borrowers seek credit in this analytical frame-
work from SAAB and other sources such as moneylenders, merchants and 
brokers. Credit obtained from SAAB is allocated by the borrowers for 
acquiring production inputs providing that credit is given when it is 
needed. If credit is not given at the time when it is most needed, 
it may be diverted for farm family consumption purposes. Credit ob-
tained from other sources can be used for either production or con-
sumption purposes. 
The farmer borrowers as decision makers are striving for the 
satisfaction of various goals. These goals may be competitive, com-
plementary, or independent. 
Goal orientation of the farm families could be grouped into four 
major areas: living standard; farm ownership; leisure-children; and 
credit-using, risk-taking behavior. Living standard is interpreted 
as the desire for current income to provide a satisfactory level of 
consumption. Farm ownership refers to the desire to own land and 
accumulate net worth. Leisure-children is interpreted as the desire 
for leisure time and a family. Credit-using, risk-taking behavior is 
the willingness to sacrifice security or accept risk in the farm oper-
ation in order to achieve other goals. The relative importance of 
these goals is influential in determining what alternatives (for exam-
ple, farm organization, land purchase, off-farm work) a farm family 
will consider (30, p. 491). 
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Farm Production 
Credit as it is obtained is used directly as an input in farm 
production. It facilitates the means to acquire machinery and equip-
ment, facilities, feed, fertilizer, labor and other factor inputs re-
quired for production. Figure 4 indicates that credit obtained for 
production purposes is classified into short and intermediate-term 
credit. Short-term credit is used to meet the requirements of hired 
labor costs and variable capital costs (feed, seeds, fertilizer and 
fuel). Intermediate-term credit is for purchasing durable capital 
items (machinery and equipment and facilities). These resources are 
allocated among farm enterprises to maximize farm production and in-
crease income. 
Farm production output is consumed by the farm household or mar-
keted. The cash received from the sale of farm output is used to 
repay the loans from SAAB and other sources after deducting operating 
and living expenses. If the farm operators are able to generate high 
enough income to meet all their expenses including repayment of their 
loans, the remaining is either saved to meet the farm family require-
ments or reinvested in the farm enterprises. Income from off-farm 
employment is also used for consumption, farm capital investment or 
repaying loans as supplements to farm income. 
If the farmer borrowers are able to make their payments in full 
and on the due dates, they will be eligible for new loans from either 
SAAB or other sources of credit. However, if the borrowers default, 
they will be classified as delinquent and denied new loans. 
71 
Institutional Management 
The government credit institution (SAAB) was established to make 
capital available to the farm operators as cheaply as possible and 
with favorable terms. But due to organizational and structural de-
fects, SAAB has not yet been able to provide the farm operator borrow-
ers with adequate credit and under favorable terms. Farm operators 
still seek substantial borrowed funds from nongovernment sources and 
generally at high costs. The end result is frequently overloading the 
farm operators with more high debt and burden of repayment. The con-
sequences are deterioration of the farm operator 1 s financial position 
which in turn increases the delinquency rate. 
Bureaucracy and red tape are the main factors for delay in loan 
processing and approval. Delay may force the farm operator applicants 
to turn to the other sources of credit. If credit is given too late 
to be used for the production period, the borrowers may use it either 
for consumption purposes or investment in non-farm enterprises and 
funds that may or may not be readily available when the loans mature. 
Therefore, timeliness of credit is an important factor affecting de-
linquency rate. 
Terms of credit are another important factor affecting delin-
quency rate. If the size of annual payment is too large relative to 
income generated from the purposes for which the loans were given, the 
farmer borrowers may not be able to repay the loan. To minimize de-
linquency rate, the annual payment must be scrutinized relative to the 
income generating potential of the farm enterprises and the borrowers 1 
repayment capacity. 
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Control variables that are hypothesized to affect delinquency 
rates are farm operator borrowers financial management ability to 
acquire the needed capital and combine the available resources effi-
ciently to increase production and improve income; borrowings from 
other credit sources; size of annual loan payment; timeliness of 
credit; family living expenses; and timeliness of credit. 
The conceptually interdependent model discussed above will be 
further systematically determined in the following chapter. The re-
lationship between loan delinquency and hypothesized economic, social, 
financial management and credit institution policy instrument vari-
ables will be quantified using a postulated farm production and finan-
cial management model. 
CHAPTER V 
TABULAR ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM SAMPLE OF 
SAAB FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS 
The following section summarizes the information obtain in per-
sonal interviews with farm operators borrowing from the SAAB. The 
sample included 42 farm operators who had loans in 1978-79 from SAAB 
in two areas of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Hufuf and Kharj. 
Farm Characteristics 
Size of Farm 
The average size of farm operated by those interviewed in the 
study was 133 dunoms and ranged from 78 dunoms in Hufuf area to 188 
dunoms in Kharj (Table II). The ranqe of size amonq all farms in the 
study was from 10 to 1,000 dunoms. 
Land Utilization 
The main crops grown by farm operators in the study were pasture 
and animal feeds, vegetables, citrus fruits, dates, and grains such as 
wheat and grain sorghum. 
An average pf 44 dunoms or 33 percent of the land in farms was 
used for agricultural production (Table III). An average of 21 dunoms 
or 16 percent of the land area in the farm was used to produce pasture 
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TABLE II 
SIZE OF FARM FROM A SAMPLE OF SAAB FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS 
IN TWO AREAS OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 
Hufuf Kharj Both Areas 
Item Unit No. % No. % No. % 
Farm Size (Dunom): 
10-40 Farm 14 67 6 28 20 48 
41-70 II 1 4 5 24 6 14 
71-90 II 2 10 1 5 3 7 
Over 90 II 4 19 9 43 13 31 
Total 21 100 21 100 42 100 
Average Size of All Farms Dun om 78 188 133 
TABLE III 
LAND UTILIZATION FROM A SAMPLE OF SAAB FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS 
IN TWO AREAS OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 
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Hufuf Kharj Both Areas 
Item Unit Avg. % Avg. % Avg. % 
Land Cultivated: 
Permanent Crops Dun om 16 21 26 14 21 16 
Rotational Crops II 23 29 23 12 23 17 
Total 39 50 49 26 44 33 
Land Not Utilized 39 50 139 74 89 67 
Total Land in Farms 78 100 188 100 133 100 
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and animal feeds, grains and permanent crops such as dates and citrus 
fruits. Twenty-three dunoms or 17 percent of the land area in the 
farm was used for vegetables and other rotational crops. 
Characteristics of the Farm Operators 
Age and Education 
The average age of the farm operators was 51 years in the Kharj 
area and 45 years in the Hufuf area (Table IV). Only 28 percent and 
33 percent of the farm operators had any formal schooling in the Hufuf 
and Kharj areas, respectively (Table IV). The high illiteracy rate 
makes it difficult to develop programs to teach farm operators improv-
ed farming practices and the use of appropriate modern technology. 
Little direct use can be made by the farmers of any published agri-
cultural information and new findings in relation to improved seeds 
or farming techniques. 
Farm Management 
None of the farm operators in the study area kept written farm 
records (Table IV). This is not surprising since such a high percen-
tage are illiterate. This illiteracy results in not having historical 
records on which to base management decisions and to provide accurate 
information for loan application and for financial planning ·and manage-
ment. 
Loan Supervision 
Of the farm operators who had loans from the SAAB, 14 percent in 
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TABLE IV 
AGE, TENANCY AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS FROM A S~LE 
OF SAAB FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS IN TWO AREAS 
OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 
Item 
Age Distribution of Farm Oper-
ators in Years: 
20-40 
41-70 
Avg. Age of Farm Operators 
No. of Farm Operators Who 
Read and Write 
No. of Farm Operators 
Owning Farm 
No. of Farm Operators Keep-
ing Written Records 
No. of Farm Operators With 
Off-Farm Income 
No. of Farm Operators Vis ted 
by Extension Workers 
Unit 
Farms 
II 
Years 
Farms 
II 
II 
II 
II 
· Hufuf 
No. % 
12 57 
9 43. 
45 
6 28 
16 76 
0 0 
15 71 
3 14 
l<harj 
No. % 
5 24 
16 76 
51 
7 33 
19 90 
0 0 
15 71 
2 10 
Both Areas 
No. % 
17 40 
25 60 
48 
13 31 
35 83 
0 0 
30 71 
5 12 
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the Hufuf area and 10 percent in the Kharj area had agricultural exten-
sion workers visit their farms during the 1978-79 crop year (Table 
VII). Visits by the agricultural extension workers to these farms 
were limited to spraying chemicals for protection against insects and 
plant diseases. Farm operators who were visited in both areas of 
study were only visited an average of once a year by extension workers. 
Off-Farm Income 
Of all the farm operator borrowers in the study, 71 percent in 
both the Hufuf and the Kharj areas had some off-farm income (Table IV). 
Family and Hired Labor Characteristics 
There was an average of 13 farm family members, including the 
operator, who were dependent on each farm. This number varied from 
15 in the Hufuf area to 10 in the Kharj area (Table V). Of the farm 
family members dependent on the farm, only about 10 percent worked 
on the farm. The remaining 90 percent were either children still in 
school, disabled, too old to work, or worked off the farm. 
The farm operator's family was not able to supply all of the 
farm labor needed. All farm operators in the study areas hired addi-
tional labor. These farm operators hired an average of five additional 
farm workers per farm, usually for the entire cropping season. There 
was an average of 6.3 workers per farm including both the hired and 
family laborers (Table V). 
TABLE V 
FAMILY STRUCTURE AND FARM LABOR CHARACTERISTICS FROM A SAMPLE 
OF SAAB FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS IN TWO AREAS 
OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 
Hufuf Kharj Total 
Item Unit No. % No. % No. % 
Family Members Depending 
on the Farm: 
4-10 7 33 13 62 20 47 
11-20 9 43 6 28 15 36 
21-35 5 24 2 10 7 17 
Avg. No. of Family Mem-
bers Per Farm Persons 15 10 13 
Avg. No. of Family Mem-
bers Working on Farm Persons 1.8 0.8 1.3 
Farms with Hired Labor 
(Workers): 
1-5 Farm 15 72 15 72 30 72 
6-10 Farm 5 23 3 14 8 19 
11-20 Farm 1 5 3 14 4 9 
Avg. No. of Workers Per 
Farm Workers 4 6 5 
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Farm Income and Expense Characteristics 
Farm Income 
The average total gross farm income varied from SR. 140,927 in 
Hufuf to SR. 159,854 in Kharj (Table VI). Receipts from livestbck 
were relatively more important in Hufuf than in Kharj. 
Net Farm Income 
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In estimating net farm income, charges for farm machinery, equip-
ment and building depreciation and family labor expenses were not esti-
mated and consequently are not included with the other farm expenses. 
Thus for all farms, total annual farm expenses were under-estimated 
{Table VI). The average net farm income for the farm operators includ-
ed in the study was SR. 47,736 and SR. 53,521 in the Hufuf and the 
Kharj areas, respectively {Table VI). The variation in average net 
farm income was m~inly the result of the difference in the average 
amount of farm land cultivated per farm in the two respective areas. 
Off-Farm Income 
Average off-farm income at SR. 90,071 per farm for the borrower 
from the SAAB in the Kharj area was slightly over two times as large 
as in the Hufuf area (SR. 38,719). Nearness of this area to a large 
metropolitan area with greater off-farm employment opportunities was 
the reason for higher off-farm income in the Kharj area. The average 
off-farm income earned by farm families in Hufuf is 80 percent of 
their net farm income versus 168 percent for farm families in Kharj 
(Table VI). 
TABLE VI 
FARM INCOME, EXPENSES, AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
FARM A SAMPLE OF SAAB FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS 
IN TWO AREAS OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 
Item Hufuf Kharj Both Areas SR. SR. SR. 
-------
Avct'agc Gross ]:'arm Income: 
Receipts from Rut.ationnl Crops 29 ,40S 35,738 32,571. 
Receipts from Permanent: Ct'ops 20,810 48,738 34,775 
Receipts frm.1 I.ivt>stock 69,886 49,031 .>9,458 
Average Value of Pt·oduc t s Consumed on l'arm 20,826 26,347 23,587 
---
----
Total Gross :Farm Inco;ne 140,927 159,854 150,391 
Average Operating Expenses: 
Hired Labor 53,415 50,010 51,712 
Repair a.nd Maintenance 2,463 4,138 3,301 
Fuel and Lubrication 3,233 16,458 9,846 
Seeds 2,927 6,448 4,688 
Fertilizer 21,803 15,227 18,515 
Transportation (Marketing) 9,350 14,0;,2 11,701 
Total Operating Expenses 93,191 106,333 99,763 
Average Net Farm Income 47,736 53;521 50,628 
Average Off-farm InconH' ~J.2 _2.Q_,071_ 641395 
Average Total Fami.iy Income 86,455 143,592 115,023 
Average Family Livjne Expenses 47,117 52. 97l 50,044 
Avera~:c Family Net Income After Living 
Expenses 39,338 90,621 64,979 
Average Family Net Fnrm Incomt- per 
Dunom Cultivated ] • 224 1,849 1,477 
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Farm Loan Characteristics 
Loans from SAAB 
An average of 29 percent of the farm operators in the study areas 
had loans between SR 1,000 and Sr. 20,000, 38 percent had loans be-
tween SR. 20,001 and Sr. 50,000, and the remaining 33 percent had 
loans between SR. 50,001 and Sr. 300,000. Overall the average loan 
size per farm operator from the SAAB was SR. 44,163 {Table VII). The 
average amount borrowed from the SAAB varied from SR. 39,244 in the 
Kharj area to Sr. 49,082 in the Hufuf area. The average size of an-
nual loan payments was SR. 15,605 in the Hufuf area and SR. 14,390 in 
the Kharj areas {Table VII). 
The average amount of SAAB loans per dunom cultivated was SR. 
1,409 and Sr. 934 in Hufuf and Kharj, respectively. 
Time Lag for Loan Approval 
An average of 57 days elapsed between the time loan application 
was made by the farm operator at the SAAB until the day the loan was 
obtained {Table VII). In contrast, it took only an average of two 
days to obtain loans from other sources such as merchants, dealers, 
brokers and individuals. Delay in the loan approval was the result 
of bureaucratic complications in processing loan applications and 
legal documents. 
Loans from Other Sources 
In addition to borrowing from SAAB, farm operators obtained 
credit from other sources such as dealers, merchants, brokers, and 
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TABLE VII 
AMOUNT OF LOANS, TIME LAG FOR LOAN APPROVAL, AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
FROM A SAMPLE OF SAAB FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS 
IN TWO AREAS OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 
Item 
Distribution of Farms by Size of 
Intermediate-Term Loan (SR.): 
1,000-20,000 
20,001-50,000 
50,001-300,000 
Average Size of Intc:nlcdlate 
Term Loan 
DistriuuLion of Farms by Si"e of 
Shot"t-Tcrm J.oan (SR.): 
0-10,000 
10,001-30,000 
Average Size of Short-Term Loan 
Avera;:,e Size of All Loans From 
SAAB 
Average Size of Annual Loau Pay-
ment 
Average Amount of All loans From 
SAAR per Dunom Cultivated 
Average Time Lag fo1· I.onu Ap-
proval 
Average Amount of Loans From 
Other Sources 
Average Total Borrowiny, 
Average Total Borrowin~ per Dunom 
Cultivated 
Unit 
J..'arms 
Farms 
Farms 
SR. 
Farms 
Faru1s 
SR. 
SR. 
SR. 
SR. 
Days 
SR. 
SR. 
SR. 
Jlufuf 
No. % 
7 33 
6 29 
8 38 
49,082 
18 86 
3 14 
5,883 
54,965 
15,605 
1,409 
57 
45,100 
100,000 
2,566 
Kharj 
No. % 
5 
10 
6 
39,?.44 
19 
2 
6,542 
45,786 
14,390 
934 
58 
55,095 
100,881 
2,059 
90 
10 
Total 
No. % 
12 29 
16 38 
14 33 
44,161 
37 83 
5 12 
6,213 
50,376 
14,998 
1,1115 
57 
50,098 
100,474 
2,284 
individuals. The average amount borrowed from other lenders in the 
sample farm operators for the 1978 crop season was SR. 45,100 and 
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SR. 55,095 in the Hufuf and the Kharj areas, respectively (Table VII). 
The cost of borrowed money from the merchants, dealers, brokers, and 
individuals ranged up to 30 percent annual interest charge whereas 
loans from the SAAB are interest free. This indicates that funds 
given by the SAAB were either not adequate or terms of the loans were 
not appropriate. As was indicated in the previous discussion, charg-
ing interest on borrowed funds is prohibited by Islam. However, mer-
chants and dealers do charge interest on borrowed money for purchase 
of capital items such as machinery and equipment. Interest charged 
by merchants or dealers is frequently not stated in the agreement, but 
hidden in the purchase price of the item sold to farm operators. As 
an example, a farm operator borrows SR. 1,000 from a merchant. The 
farm operator will sign a note that he borrowed SR. 1 ,300. The mer-
chant may also require real estate or personal property as collateral. 
Advantages of private money lenders over SAAB frequently include 
unsecured loans, absence of red tape, funds readily available under 
flexible conditions, and private handling of transactions. The onerous 
nature of the credit terms frequently outweigh these advantages so 
that private credit, all things considered, is generally not a good 
credit source. Prohibition against making unlawful charges for.inter-
est is not enough to protect farm operators from possible exploita-
tion by the private moneylenders. 
Total Borrowing 
The overa l1 average tota 1 borrowing from SAAB and other sources 
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by farm operators in the study was SR. 100,474. Average total borrow-
ing was SR. 100,065 in the Hufuf area and SR. 100,881 in the Kharj 
area (Table VII). 
Loan Repayment and Loan Delinquency 
Characteristics 
Only 24 percent of the sample of farm operators who borrowed from 
the SAAB in the Hufuf area made their loan payments in full on the due 
dates in 1978-79. In the Kharj area, there were 28 percent who made 
the payments on time (Table VIII). The average size payment was SR. 
31,364, and SR. 15,823 in the respective areas, Hufuf and Kharj 
(Table VIII). Farm operators as a percent of total operator borrow-
ers who failed to make any partial loan payments on due dates were 
76 percent in the Hufuf area and 72 percent in the Kharj area (Table 
VIII). The average loan payment due was SR. 10,680 and SR.· 13,816 in 
Hufuf and Kharj respectively (Table VIII). 
The average length of time payments was overdue for delinquent 
borrowers was 223 days for the two areas. This varied from an average 
of 281 days in the Hufuf area to 1.62 days in the Kharj area (Table 
VIII). One of the major reasons for overdue payments was loss of 
crops due to adverse weather conditions such as frost. A total of 
23 farms was affected by bad weather conditions and the average value 
of crop loss was 52.5 percent. 
To compare an average delinquent and nondelinquent farm operator, 
the average annual operating expenses per dunom cultivated was SR. 
2,284 for the nondelinquent and SR. 2,024 for the delinquent farm op-
erator borrowers from the SAAB (Table IX). Average investment in rna-
TABLE VIII 
LOAN REPAYMENT AND LOAN DELINQUENCY CHARACTERISTICS FROM A SAMPLE 
OF SAAB FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS IN TWO AREAS 
OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 
Item Unit Hufuf lharJ Total 
No. % No. % No. 
No. of Fa=mers who repaid Full 
Amount on or Before Due 
Dates Farms 5 24 6 28 11 
Average Size of Payment SR. 31,364 15,823 22,890 
No. of Far~ero whc Failed to 
l'.a<:c A."'ly Pa;uent on Due 
Da~es Farms 16 76 15 72 31 
Averat;e Size of Par:::cnt ~e SR. 10,680 13,816 12,197 
Distr~oution of Fares with 
Ov.:;rdu.a Loar.s (Days): 
4-9() Fare:$ 4 19 6 29 10 
9:-::oo Far:::s 1 5 1 5 2 
::n-~co Fa=s 11 42 8 38 19 
Avera;;e Length of Til:le Payment 
Was Overdue Days 261 162 223 
No. o: Fa~~ Affected by Ad-
verse W..ather Conditio~s Fanr.s 16 76 7 33 23 
Average Value of Crop Loss 
Per Fan:~ Percent 53 52 52.5 
% 
26 
74 
24 
5 
45 
55 
--
(X) 
0'\ 
TABLE IX 
COMPARISON OF COST AND RETURN DATA FOR NONDELINQUENT AND DELINQUENT 
FARM OPERATOR BORROWERS FROM A SAMPLE OF SAAB BORROWERS 
IN TWO AREAS OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 
· Nondelinquent Delinquent 
Borro·..:ers Borro...,ers 
Hufuf Kharj Total Hufui Kharj 
Average Variable Expenses par Dunow. SR. 2,652 1,958 2,234 2,312 1,836 
Average Invc~tc:cnt in Machinery and Ec;,ui?zr.ent SR. 4,299 2,103 3,056 3,011 3,603 
Average Value of Cro? Co:"lsu:ncd on Far-:1 per Du:1o:11 SR. 335 766 495 633 437 
Average Gro;;s ::"ar::-. R.ec~:p:~ per Duno::1 SR. 5,844 2,677 4,502 352 558 
Average Gross Farm Income Per Duno:11 SR. 6,179 3,443 4,997 985 995 
Ave rag,. ~et Faro Incaoc per Dunce SR. 3,527 1,485 2, 712 -1,327 -841 
Average :a:1d ~ti1ized per Farn Duno::l 50 66 68 35 43 
Average Ar.lount :Sorrowed free s;-~ per Dunom SR. L,335 735 1,425 1,019 3,315 
Average Amount Borrowed fro::~ Other Source$ per Dunom SR. 500 73 257 1,468 .2.366 
Average Total Borrowing per Dunoc SR. 2,535 acs 1,682 2,487 5,681 
Total 
2,024 
3,539 
539 
487 
1,026 
-998 
38 
2,167 
:4.,015 
3,070 
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chinery and equipment per dunom cultivated was SR. 3,056 and SR. 3,539 
for nondelinquent and delinquent farm operator borrowers, respectively 
(Table IX). Nondelinquent borrowers had an average net farm income of 
SR. 2,712 versus an average net farm income of SR.-998 for delinquent 
borrowers. The lower average net farm income resulted from lower av-
erage gross farm income per dunom earned by the delinquent farm oper-
ators as compared to the nondelinquent borrowers. Nondelinquent 
borrowers had somewhat larger farms with an average of 68 dunoms versus 
38 dunoms for the delinquent borrowers (Table IX). The average amount 
of funds borrowed per dunom from SAAB was larger for nondelinquent 
borrowers, SR. 1 ,425, than for delinquent borrowers SR. 1 ,055. How-
ever, the average total amount borrowed per dunom cultivated was larqer 
for the delinquent borrowers, SR. 3,070, than for the nondelinquent 
borrowers, SR. 1,682 (Table IX). 
CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE 
LOAN DELINQUENCY MODEL 
In a foregoing discussion, the most important factors hypothe-
sized to affect repayment of agricultural credit were enumerated. 
This section will develop an analytical model to explore the delin-
quency problem faced by SAAB. Hypotheses connecting delinquency rate 
and associated factors will be tested. Within the framework of this 
analysis, only quantifiable variables will be used. The non quanti-
fiable variables such as misuse of funds, attitudinal conditions 
favoring nonrepayment and variability of income caused by fortuitous 
and seasonal factors will not be included in estimating the delin-
quency rate model due to the inavailability of sufficient information 
in the survey data. 
This section will model the behavior of the farm operator borrow-
ers who had production loans from SAAB using two different approaches: 
(1) ordinary least squares and (2) an interdependent system approach 
(two stage least squares). The specification of the postulated models 
will be first applied to the Hufuf area and then tested on the Kharj 
area. The two areas, Hufuf and Kharj, will be combined to test the 
structural stability between the two areas. The structural stability 
test will indicate whether the estimated delinquency rate model using 
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ordinary least squares and two stage least squares have the same in-
tercepts and slopes. 
Loan Delinquency Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) Model 
In this section, the OLS model is used to predict and analyse the 
hypothesized relationships between delinquency rate and associated 
variables. 
Source of Data 
The analysis employs cross-section data including 42 farm oper- · 
ators who had loans from SAAB. The data was obtained from adminis-
tered farm questionnaires and SAAB credit files from two regions in 
Saudi Arabia, Hufuf and Kharj area. 
The Dependent and Related Explanatory 
Variables 
Delinquency rate, as measured by the number of days payments are 
past due, is hypothesized to be a function of net farm income per 
unit cultivated (dunom}, size of annual payments, family living expen-
ditures, off-farm income, amount borrowed from other sources, time-
liness of credit and the size of farm. The hypothesized relation-
ship can be summarized implicitly by the following functional rela-
tionship: 
DELRATE = f(NFID, AP, FAMEXPC, OFINC, TCRED, TAREAC) 
where DELRATE = Number of days payments past due; 
NFID =Net farm income {SR. 1 ,000): to be negatively 
related to delinquency rate; 
AP1 = Size of annual payments in SR. 1 ,000 {0.2 times 
intermediate-term SAAB loan+ 1.0 times short-
term SAAB loan + 0.5 times loans obtained from 
other credit sources): to be positively related 
to delinquency rate; 
FAMEXPC = Family living expenditures plus value of farm 
output consumed by the farm household (SR. 1 ,000): 
to be positively related to delinquency rate; 
OFINC =Off-farm income (SR. 1,000): to be negatively re-
lated to delinquency rate; 
TCRED =Timeliness of credit, time consumed for loan appli-
cation processing and approval (days): to be 
positively related to delinquency rate; and 
TAREAC =Total crop land cultivated (Dunom): to be nega-
tively related to delinquency rate. 
Criteria Used in Evaluating the 
Regression Results 
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Three criteria are used.in evaluating the regression equations: 
1. Does the sign of the estimated regression coefficient tend to 
support or reject the hypothesized effects. 
1ThP weiqhts 0.2, 1.0, and 0.5 indicate the expected annual pav-
ment of intermediate-term, short-term, and amount borrowed from other 
sources respectively. 
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2. Is the magnitude of the regression coefficient large enough 
relative to its standard error to support the hypothesis that the re-
gression coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
3. Does the R2, the overall F-test value, the standard error of 
the estimate and an examination of the residuals indicate that the 
model can be used for accurate prediction. 
Empirical Results 
The empirical results from the estimated delinquency rate model 
using 11 0LS 11 approach for Hufuf and Kharj areas are presented in Tables 
X and XI. 
Hufuf. The results of the estimated regression indicate that the 
net farm income (NFID) (in SR. 1 ,000 per dunom) is inversely related 
to the delinquency rate (number of days payments are past due) and the 
regression coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 
probability level. This implies that the higher the level of net farm 
income, the lower the delinquency rate. This result is consistent 
with that obtained from the tabular analysis discussed earlier in the 
study. The tabular results indicated that the average net farm in-
come per dunom was SR. 1,448.00 and SR. -1,664.00 for nondelinquent 
and delinquent farm operator borrowers, respectively. 
Size of annual payment is positively related to delinquency rate. 
The estimated coefficient of this variable is statisticallysignificant 
at 0.01 probability level. The level of annual payment is related to 
the size of short-term, intermediate-term, and other borrowings. The 
higher the size of loan, the higher the size of annual payment. 
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Family living expenditures variable is positively related to the 
delinquency rate. However, the regression coefficient is not signif-
icant at the 0.10 probability level. The low income farmer with high 
family living expenditures will find it difficult to improve the well 
being of his family and at the same time be able to repay loan funds. 
Off-farm income is negatively related to the delinquency rate and 
its regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 
0.05 probability level. Farm operator borrowers who have off-farm 
employment or other sources of income such as rents from real estate 
are in better financial position to meet their repayment responsibil-
ities. Income generated from off-farm activities is used to supple-
ment farm income in meeting farm family needs, farm investment and 
1 oan repayment. 
Timeliness of credit (number of days consumed in processing and 
approving the loan) is positively related to delinquency rate but its 
regression coefficient is not statistically different from zero at 
the 0.10 probability level. .The result indicates that bureaucratic 
complications and red tape may be important factors contributing to 
delinquency rate. Results obtained from the tabulated analysis pre-
sented earlier in the study indicated that the average time lag for 
loan approval was 57 days. 
Size of crop land cultivated is negatively related to delinquency 
rate and its regression coefficient is statistically different from 
zero at the 0.01 probability level. In essence, borrowers operating 
larger farms have higher income generating potential to repay their 
crop production loans than borrowers operating smaller units. The 
results indicate that economies of size may exist in the sense that 
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additional crop land provides more income for debt repayment, family 
consumption, and other needs. 
Kharj. The same hypothesized model was also tested on the Kharj 
area. The results indicate that the level of net farm income per 
dunom is negatively related to delinquency rate and significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 0.01 probability level (Table XI). 
The results also indicate that family living expenditures plus val-
ue of farm output used up for farm family consumption, and timeliness 
of credit are positively related to delinquency rate (Table XI). Nei-
ther variable, however, is significant at the 10 percent probability 
1 evel. 
Off-farm income and total crop land cultivated are negatively re-
lated to delinquency rate and significantly different from zero at the 
0.20 and 0.02 probability levels, respectively. The results obtained 
from estimating delinquency rate for the Kharj area are found to be 
consistent, in general, with those of the Hufuf area in terms of the 
hypothesized relationships. However, annual payment is negatively 
related to delinquency for the Kharj region although the coefficient 
is not significantly different from zero. 
Other results of the delinquency rate model are noted by the 
magnitudes of the estimated regression coefficients. The results in-
dicate that for a SR. 1,000 increase in net farm income per dunom, 
number of days payments past due will decrease by about 31 and 50 days 
for the Hufuf and the Kharj area, respectively. A SR. 1,000 increas0. 
in family living expenditures plus value of farm output consumed by 
the farm family will increase the delinquency rate by about 2.00 days 
for the Hufuf area and about 0.70 days for the Kharj area. 
The coefficient of off-farm income is ~ubstantially higher for 
r 
. 
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the Hufuf area i:han for the Kharj area. A SR. 1,000 increase in off-
farm income decreases delinquency rate by about 2.7 days in the Hufuf 
area and about 0.14 for the Kharj area. The difference in the magni-
tude of the coefficients indicate that farmer borrowers in the Hufuf 
area are able to use larger portions of their off-farm income to sup-
plement farm income in repaying SAAB loans than farmer borrowers in 
the Kharj area (Tables X and XI). 
Farm size has a larger effect on delinquency rate in the Hufuf 
area than in the Kharj area. One dunom increase in crop land culti-
vated will decrease delinquency by about 2.6 days in Hufuf compared 
to 1.4 days in Kharj (Tables X and XI). 
The hypothesized delinquency models explain 62 and 74 percent of 
the variation for the Hufuf and the Kharj areas, respectively. 
Application of the Model to the Pooled Data 
The postulated delinquency model was tested on the pooled data 
for the Hufuf and Kharj areas. But based on the structural stability 
test, results indicate that there is a significant difference between 
the two areas in terms of their characteristics that are related to 
the farms and the farm operator borrowers. Therefore, the farm and 
farm operator characteristics are apparently structurally different 
between the two areas. The results of the test imply that delinquency 
rate problems and lending policies for each area should be assessed 
and evaluated in different perspectives. 
Up to this point, the relationship between delinquency and the 
hypothesized variables has been explored and empirically determined. 
TABLE X 
DELINQUENCY RATE MODEL FOR THE HUFUF AREA, 
1978/79, USING OLS APPROACH 
DELRATE = 219.5815 - 31.1699 NFID*** + 0.5392 AP* + 1.9631 FAMEXPC 
(91.70) (10.28) (0.27) (1.47) 
- 2.6847 OFINC** + 1.1783 TCRED - 2.5982 TAREAC*** 
(0.91) (0.74) (0.86) 
R2 = 0.6244 
F(5, 16) = 3.88** 
96 
Note: DELRATE = Delinquency rate measured in days payments past due. 
NFID = Net farm income per dunom measured in SR. 1,000. 
AP = Size of annual payment measured in SR. 1,000. 
FAMEXPC = Farm family living expenditures measured in SR. 1,000. 
OFINC = Income from off-farm employment and real estate meas-
ured in SR. 1,000. 
TCRED = Timeliness of credit, time lag for processing and ap-
proving loans measured in days. 
TAREAC = Total crop land cultivated measured in dunoms. 
*Significance test at 10 percent probabiliyt level 
**Significance test at 5 percent probability level 
***Significance test at 1 percent probability level 
Standard errors of the regression coefficients in parentheses. 
The figures in parentheses beside the F-statistic are degrees of free-
dom of the F-statistics. 
TABLE XI 
DELINQUENCY RATE MODEL FOR THE KHARJ AREA, 
1978/79, USING OLS APPROACH 
DELRATE = 194.04 79- 49.5413 NFID*** - 0. 4513 AP + 0. 7022 FAMEXPC 
(53.13) (11.17) (0.48) (0.49) 
- 0.1442 OFINC + 0.2382 TCRED - 1.3644 TAREAC** 
(0.10) (0.45) (0.53) 
R2 = 0.7385 
F(6, 14) = 6.57*** 
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Note: DELRATE = Delinquency rate measured in days payments past due. 
NFID = Net farm income per dunom measured in SR. 1,000. 
AP "" Size of annual payment measured in SR. 1,000. 
FAMEXPC = Farm Family living expenditures measured in SR. 
1,000. 
OFINC = Income from off-farm employment and real estate meas-
ured in SR. 1,000. 
TCRED = Timeliness of credit, time lag for processing and ap-
proving loans ~easured in days. 
TAREAC = Total crop land cultivated measured in dunoms. 
*Significance test at 10 percent probability level 
**Significance test at 5 percent probability level 
***Significance test at 1 percent probability level 
Standard errors of the regression coefficients in parentheses. 
The figures in parentheses beside the F-statistic are degrees of free-
dom of the F-statistics. 
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The results are consistent with what was expected. However, delin-
quency in. the foregoing dicsussion was analyzed by using a single 
equation multiple regression model and independent of the farm pro-
duction activities. To provide further insight, a farm credit inter-
dependent system is postulated to evaluate loan delinquency relative 
to farm production, farm and family financial management, and credit 
policies. 
Farm Credit Interdependent System 
The advantage of the farm credit interdependent system is that 
it links loan delinquency with the level and usage of the financial 
resources obtained through loans and the farm and family resource 
management and production processes. Credit given to farm operators 
is used to acquire farm resources which are combined in the production 
process to increase farm output and generate income. Part of the gen-
erated income is used to meet the farm family needs, part is used to 
repay loans and another part is either saved for unforeseen contin-
gencies or reinvested in the farm enterprises. The following section 
will focus on developing the farm financial interdependent system 
means of a simultaneous equation system. Two Stage Least Square 
{2SLS) will be used to estimate the model. 
The farm credit interdependent model consists of a system of 
eight equations: 
1. Farm machinery and equipment demand, 
2. Farm facilities demand, 
3. Hired labor demand, 
4. Farm variable capital demand, 
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5. Farm production function, 
6. Loan delinquency, 
7. An identity equation for net farm income, and 
8. An identity equation for total farm durable capital. 
Equations 1-4 permit the examination of the impact of credit on 
the demand for factor inputs by the farm operator borrowers. 
The production function equation describes the technical rela-
tionship between the combined farm resources and the attainable level 
of output. 
The loan delinquency equation reflects the management and finan-
cial ability of the producers in combining financial and physical re-
sources to maximize production and improve farm income. 
The identity equations are an accounting of net farm income and 
total farm durable capital. 
The relationships stated above establish intuitively the simul-
taneous interaction between the financial management and production 
of farm output. Therefore, in the following section a more formal 
model is developed. 
Classification of the Variables 
1. The Endogenous Variables 
a. Gross farm receipts (GFR): value of farm output. It in-
cludes receipts from the sale of cash crops such as vegetables 
and animal feeds; permanent crops such as dates and citrus fruits; 
livestock; and value of farm output consumed by the farm house-
hold. The value was measured in terms of Saudi Riyals (SR. 
1 '000). 
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b. Farm machinery and equipment (MACEQ): value of farm 
machinery and equipment such as irrigation engines, pumps, vehi-
cles, etc. (SR. 1 ,000). 
c. Farm facilities (FACIL): value of farm facilities such 
as irrigation canal systems, water storage, office space, and 
animal shelters (SR. 1 ,000). 
d. Hired labor (LCOST): total value paid to hired labor on 
farms (SR. 1 ,000). 
e. Farm variable capital (VCAP): includes all expenses for 
fertilizer, seeds, fuel and lubrication, and marketing and trans-
portation costs (SR. 1 ,000). 
f. Net farm income per dunom (NFID): equals gross farm re-
ceipts plus value of farm output consumed by the farm household 
minus current operating expenses and cost of hired labor (SR. 
1 '000). 
g. Loan delinquency (DELRATE): number of days loan payments 
past due. 
h. Total farm durable capital (TCAP): equals sum of farm 
machinery and equipment and facilities (SR. 1,000). 
2. The Exogenous Variables 
a. Total area cultivated (TAREAC): includes the total crop 
land cultivated for cash and permanent crops measured in terms of 
dunoms. Land resources are assumed exogenously determined by 
institutional and cultural factors. Government policies deter-
mine size of land parcel for new settlements and inheritance 
customs determine land distribution. 
b. Intermediate-term credit (INTOB): includes the amount of 
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intermediate-term credit obtained from SAAB plus additional cred-
it obtained from other credit sources (SR. 1 ,000). 
c. Short-term credit (SHOB): includes the amount of short-
term credit obtained from SAAB plus additional funds obtained 
from other credit sources (SR. 1 ,000). Government policy also 
determines amount of short-term credit available. 
The amount of funds obtained from other sources of credit was 
added to intermediate and short-term credit since the data do not 
permit distinguishing terms of the borrowed funds. There is no indi-
cation of the proportions of informal credit used for intermediate 
and short-term purposes. 
d. Fafuily labor (FLAB): family members employed full time 
on the farm (work days per year). 
e. Wage rate (WAGE): wage rate paid by farm operators to 
farm hired labor and measured in terms of (SR. 1 ,000) per work-
ing day. Labor markets are assumed to be competitive ·with farm 
operators paying the opportunity cost of labor. Strong labor 
demand exists in the nonagricultural sectors, particularly in 
the petroleum sector. 
f. Family living expenditures (FAMEXP): farm family living 
expenditures per year plus farm output produced and consumed 
(SR. 1,000). FAMEXP is highly correlated with size of farm 
household and the latter is assumed to be exogenously deter-
mined. 
g. Off-farm income (NFINC): total annual earnings from 
off-farm employment and rent from real estate (SR. 1 ,000). 
h. Annual loan payment (AP): annual loan payment is com-
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puted as one-fifth of the SAAB intermediate-term loans plus all 
of the SAAB short-term loans plus one-half of the total amount of 
funds farm operators obtained from other sources of credit. Gov-
ernment policy can be used to influence loan payment terms. The 
terms of credit obtained from SAAB are presently one and five 
years for short and intermediate-term credit, respectively. How-
ever, funds obtained from other sources are generally repaid 
within an average of two years. 
i. Timeliness of credit (TCRED): number of days consumed to 
process, evaluate and approve the loans. Government procedures 
can be changed to improve timeliness of credit. 
The Postulated Models 
The following eight equations describe the farm credit interde-
pendence system. Endogenous variables are underlined in the equations. 
GFR = f (TCAP, LCOST, VCAP, TAREAC) (1) 
MACEQ = F ( LCOST, FLAB, I NTOB, TAREAC) ( 2) 
FACIL = f (NFID, INTOB, NFINC) (3) 
TCAP = MACEQ + FACIL (4) 
LCOST = f (FLAB, SHOB, WAGE, TAREAC) ( 5) 
VCAP = f (NFID, TCAP, SHOB, NFINC, TAREAC) (6) 
NFID = [GFR - LCOST - VCAP] : TAREAC (7) 
DELRATE = f (NFID, AP, FAMEXPC, NFINC, TCRED, TAREAC) (8) 
By examining the six behavioral equations and the two identity 
equations making up the system, it can be seen that each equation in 
I 
question contains a common explanatory variable with other equations 
in the system. Since the primary objective of the system is to 
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examine the impact of credit (short and intermediate-term credit) on 
farm production and hence on loan delinquency transmitted through the 
acquisition and use of factor inputs, then simultaneity exists in the 
system. In this case, the estimation procedure cannot be considered 
within the framework of single equations. 
Heady and Dillon point out that if the production relationship 
is in fact a unflateral casual relation with output dependent upon a 
number of predetermined input variables, the single equation model is 
logically appropriate. Under such circumstances, the least squares 
multiple regression procedure provides the best estimates of the pro-
duction function parameters. However, the production relationship may 
be but one of a number of simultaneously determined relationships in-
volving output and inputs, and other variables, not as dependent and 
independent variables but as mutually determined variables. If the 
economic, biological, or physical relationships relevant to the pro-
duction process dictate that such is the case, then ideally, the para-
meters of the production relationship should be estimated in terms of 
the complete set of simultaneous equations in which the production 
relation is embedded (22, pp. 137-138). 
Recalling that one of the crucial assumptions of the method of 
OLS is that the explanatory variables are either non-stochastic or, 
if stochastic (random), should be distributed independently of the 
stochastic disturbance term. If neither of these conditions are met, 
then, the least-squares estimators are not only biased but also incon-
sistent. That is, as the sample size increases indefinitely, the 
estimators do not converge to their true (population) values. Thus, 
consider the following hypothetical system of equations: 
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(1) 
(2) 
where y1 and y2 are mutually dependent, or endogenous variables and 
x1 an exogenous variable and where u1 and u2 are the stochastic dis-
turbance terms. The variables y1 and y2 are both stochastic. There-
fore, unless it can be shown that the stochastic explanatory variable 
y2 in (1) is distributed independently of u1 and the stochastic explan-
atory variable y2 in (1) is distributed independently of u1 and the 
stochastic explanatory variable y1 in (2) is distributed independently 
of u2, application of the classical OLS to those equations individual-
ly will lead to inconsistent estimates {9, p. 336). 
The following section will describe the analytical procedures of 
the hypothesized model developed by means of the two stage least 
squares (2SLS) technique. 
Estimating the Farm Credit Interdependent 
System by Means of (2SLS) 
This section will present the 2SLS technique to estimate the 
hypothesized interdependent system described in the foregoing section. 
Necessary Conditions for (2SLS). In order to estimate the system 
of equations using 2SLS, pre-estimation identification properties of 
the model are necessary to determine if (2) the system is complete, 
and (b) the system is overidentified. 
By satisfying a and b, the use of 2SLS is justified. By complete-
ness, it is meant that the endogenous variables can be determined 
uniquely if the errors, exogenous variables and structural paramenters 
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are known. In our interdependent system model, there are eight inde-
pendent equations and eight endogenous variables. Therefore, the 
system is complete. 
Identification by definition means that the structural parameters 
can be determined uniquely if the errors, exogenous variables and en-
dogenous variables are known (42, p. 189). 
For a system of G equations and G endogenous variables, the fol-
lowing rules of thumb can be used to decide whether a given equation 
is identified or not. Let D be the number of predetermined variables 
appearing in the system but not in the equation at hand; and H the 
number of endogenous variables that appear in the equation being stud-
ied. The given equation is over-identified if D > H 1; just-iden-
tified if D = H- 1; and under-identified if D < H- 1 (22, p. 139). 
Applying the identification to the hypothesized model in this 
study it can be determined whether the model is just-identified, over-
identified or under-identified. 
For the first equation: 
D* = 8, H* = 4, H* - 1 = 3 + D* > H* - 1 (over-identified) 
For the second equation: 
D* = 6, H* = 2, H* - 1 = 1 + D* > H* - 1 (over-identified) 
For the third equation: 
D* = 7, H* = 2, H*- 1 = 1 + D* > H*- 1 (over-identified) 
For the fourth equation: 
D* = 9, H* = 3, H* - 1 = 2 + D* > H* - 1 (over-identified) 
For the fifth equation: 
D* = 5, H* = 1, H* - 1 = 0 + D* > H* - 1 (over-identified) 
For the sixth equation: 
D* = 6, H* = 3, H* - 1 = 2 ~ D* > H* - 1 (over-identified) 
For the seventh equation: 
D* = 7, H*- 4, H*- 1 - 3 ~ D* > H*- 1 (over-identified) 
For the eighth equation: 
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D* - 4, H* - 3, H* - 1 = 1 ~ D* > H* - 1 (over-identified) 
Since the pre-estimation identification properties of the model 
were examined and the system found to be over-identified, the struc-
tural coefficients can be estimated by two stage least squares (2SLS). 
2. Assumptions of 2SLS (22, p. 139). 
a. No errors of observations in the variables. 
b. Only errors in the equations are permitted. 
c. The expected value of the error term in each equation 
should be zero, and 
d. The error term in a given equation should be independent 
of the predetermined variables in the equation and should 
not be autocorrelated. 
The Production Function 
The neoclassical production function will be applied to deter-
mine the technical relationship between the level of farm output and 
the associated factor inputs used by farm operator borrowers. Econom-
ic theory is used to identify the important variables in explaining 
the allocation of factor inputs used in the farm production process. 
For the SAAB farm operator borrowers it is hypothesized that total 
farm durable capital (TC~P), hired labor (LCOST), farm variable capi-
tal (VCAP) and total area cultivated (TAREAC) are important in deter-
mining farm production: 
GRF = f (TCAP, LCOST, VCAP, TAREAC) 
1. Assumptions of the Production Function 
a. Output, capital, land and labor are all perfectly 
homogeneous units. 
b. Capital and labor are fully employed, i.e. there 
is no slackness in the production process, and all 
the factors of production are effective in pro-
duction. 
c. The most efficient technology is employed, i.e. 
greatest output is obtained from given factor 
inputs. 
d. Other regional characteristics such as agglomer-
ation and spatial dimensions are assumed to be 
non-existent or unimportant. 
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These assumptions are very restrictive. While output and capi-
tal can usually be evaluated in terms of their real values, farm labor 
force is usually measured in terms of the number of people available 
to work. This simple count generally does not adequately measure the 
actual labor input nor the quality of the labor force (21, p. 59). 
Cost of hired labor is used in this study to more nearly reflect actu-
al quantity and quality of labor inputs. The following section ad-
dresses the problem of using values rather than physical units of out-
put and input. 
2. Limitations from Using Values Rather than Physical Quantities. 
The main difficulty faced in this analysis is the lack of appropriate 
quantity data for farm output a~d some of the explanatory input vari-
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ables. The use of value rather than quantity data leads to little 
bias in the results if cross sectional relative price differences are 
not 11 too large 11 (20, p. 420). 
For this study, these differences are expected to be small for 
most of the commodity prices. These differences are expected to be 
limited to transportation costs which are relatively low within each 
area included in this study since all farm operators have access to 
the same local market. Distance to market can be used as a proxy for 
price differences due to transportation costs and will be tested in 
the empirical models. 
Cost of hired labor is used as a proxy variable for actual labor 
inputs in the production function. It is felt that this measure more 
nearly reflects actual quantity of labor and quality of labor inputs. 
The study areas are relatively small regions with highly competitive 
labor markets. Family labor inputs are small relative to hired labor 
and are indirectly accounted for in the hired labor demand function. 
Input Demand Functions 
In this section demand equations for factor inputs will be pre-
sented. The demand functions in question include: (1) farm machinery 
and equipment, (2) farm facilities, (3) farm hired labor, and (4) farm 
variable capital. 
Farm Machinery and Equipment Demand. · It is hypothesi zed that 
demand for farm machinery and equipment is a function of hired farm 
labor, family labor, amount of intermediate-term credit available 
from the financial sector, and amount of crop land at the producers 
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disposal. The relationship can be expressed by the following func-
tional form: 
. MACEQ = F (LCOST, FLAB, INTOB, TAREAC) 
Farm Facilities Demand. It is hypothesized that demand for farm 
facilities is a function of internal investment made out of farm in-
come, amount of intermediate-term credit obtained from the financial 
sector, and off-farm income. The relationship is expressed by the 
following functional form: 
FACIL =' f (NFID, INTOB,' NFINC) 
Farm Hired Labor Demand. It is hypothesized that farm hired la-
bor demand is a function of the amount of short-term credit available 
from the financial sector, farm family labor, wage rate, and total 
crop land cultivated. The relation is expressed by the following 
functional form: 
LCOST = f (SHOB, FLAB, WAGE, TAREAC) 
Farm Variable Capital Demand. It is hypothesized that the demand 
for variable capital is a function of internal investment made out of 
farm income, short-term credit available from the financial sector, 
off-farm income, total farm durable capital, and total crop land cul-
tivated. T.he relationship is expressed by the following functional 
form: 
VCAP = f (NFID, SHOB, NFINC, TCAP, TAREAC) 
Loan Delinquency Function 
The same functional relationship is hypothesized for loan delin-
quency in the farm credit interdependent model as hypothesized for 
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the OLS model discussed previously. However, net farm income is now 
considered an endogenous variable along with loan delinquency in the 
following functional form: 
DELRATE = ~ (NFID, AP, FAMEXPC, NFINC, TCRED, TAREAC) 
Empirical Results by Means of (2SLS) 
It was hypothesized that loan delinquency is directly linked to 
the production processes of the farm enterprise and the farm operators 
financial management. This is to be evaluated in a farm credit inter-
dependent system by means of two stage least squares. The postulated 
model is expressed by a system of eight jointly determined equations: 
six behavioral equations determining input demands, farm production 
and loan delinquency, and two identity equations determining total 
durable farm capital and net farm income. 
In this section, the estimated equations of the interdependent 
system wi 11 be presented .. Results of the 2SLS estimates of the model 
applied to the Hufuf area will be discussed, followed by the discus-
sion of the results obtained by applying the model to the Kharj area. 
Results for the Hufuf Area 
Empirical results for the six behavioral equations of the system 
for the Hufuf area are presented in Table XII. 
Machinery and Equipment Demand. The formulation of this model 
was based upon hypothesized negative relationships with hired farm 
labor and family labor and positive relationships with intermediate 
term credit and total crap land cultivated. The results of the 2SLS 
model estimation tend to bear out these hypothesized relationships. 
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TABLE XII 
ESTIMATED INPUT DEMANDS, PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND DELIQUENCY RATE 
EQUATIONS OF THE FARM CREDIT INTERDEPENDENCE SYSTEM (2SLS), 
HUFUF AREA, 1978/79 
MACEQ a 9.4592 - 1.8068LCOST* - 0.0977FLAB + 1.2615 INTOB*** 
(0.79) (0.94) (0.24) (0.68) 
+ 1.1501TAREAC* 
(0.68) 
2 R = 0.6312 
F(4, 16) = 5.93*** 
FACIL = -33.1981 + 10.6828NFID*** + 0.6866INTOB*** + 2.0856NFINC*** 
(30.24) (0.91) (0.22) (0.48) 
R2 = 0.8077 
F(3, 17) + 17.23*** 
LCOST = 39.8984 + 0.0318SHOB - 0.0230FLAB** + 178.2744WAGE** 
(11.37) (0.~4) (0.01) (70.72) 
+ 0.2722TAREAC** 
(0.12) 
2 R = 0.6102 
F(4, 16) = 5.48*** 
VCAP = 22.7348 + 9.4892NFID***- 0.0659TCAP** + 0.2016SHOB*** 
(9.02) (1.94) (0.03) (0.07) 
+ 0.2149NFINC + 0.3101TAREAC** 
(0.12) (0.12) 
R2 = 0.8052 
F(5, 15) = 9.01*** 
GFR = -94.6372 + 0.0276TCAP + 0.7350LCOST** + 2.6361VCAP*** 
(25.57) (0.04) (0.31) (0.37) 
+ 3.3970TAREAC*** - 0.0213TAREAC2*** 
(1.07) (0.01) 
R2 = 0.9186 
F(S, 15) a 23.08*** 
DE'LRATE • 218.9346 - 30.4354NFID** + 0.5183AI' + 1.0745F.M1EXPC* 
(82.88) (12.56) (0.57) (1.23) 
- 2.6722NFINC*** + 1.1681TCRED* - 2.5927TAREAC*** 
(0.82) (0.60) (0.77) 
R2 = 0.6597 
F(6, 14) = 3.61** 
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TABLE XII (Continued) 
NOTE: MACEQ = Farm machinery and equipment measured in SR. 1,000.00 
FACIL = Farm facilities measured in SR. 1,000.00 
LCOST Q Cost of farm hired labor measured in SR. 1,000.00 per 
man-day per year. 
VCAP = Farm variable capital measured in SR. 1,000.00 
GFR • Total farm output measured in SR., 1,000.00 
DELRATE = Delinquency rate measured in number of days loan 
paymens past due 
INTOB = Amount of intermediate term credit from SAAB plus 
loans obtained from other sources of credit meas-
ured in SR. 1,000.00 
TAREAC = Total crop land cultivated measured in dunoms. 
NFID = Net farm income per dunom measured in SR. 1,000.00 
NFINC = Income from off-farm employment and real estate 
measured in SR. 1,000.00 
SHOB = Amount of short-term credit from SAAB plus loans ob-
tained from other sources of credit measured in 
SR. 1,000.00 
FLAB = Farm family labor measured in man-days per year. 
VCAP = Total farm variable capital measured in SR. 1,000.00 
WAGE = Wage rate paid to farm hired labor measured in SR. 
1,000.00 per man-day 
TCAP = Total farm durable capital items measured in SR. 
1,000.00 
TCRED = Timeliness of credit, time lag for processing and 
approving loans measured in days. 
AP • Size of annual payments in SR. 1,000.00 (0.2 times inter-
mediate-term SAAB loan + 1.0 times short-term SAAB loan 
+ 0.5 times loans obtained from other credit sources 
*Significance test at 10 percent probability level 
**Significance test at 5 percent probability level 
***Significance test at 1 percent probability level 
l 
The figures in parentheses beside the F-statistic are degree of 
freedom of the F-statistics. 
The proce2ures used for computing the corrected standard errors, 
F and R are presented in Appendix C. 
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The coefficient for hired farm labor indicates that a SR. 1.00 
increase in value of hired labor will decrease investment in farm 
machinery and equipment an average of SR. 1.81. Similarly, a one 
dunom increase in total crop land cultivated (TAREAC) will increase 
the investment in farm machinery and equipment by an average of 
SR. 1,150. The results are consistent with the hypothesized relation-
ships. Both value of hired labor and total crop land cultivated are 
significant at the ten percent probability level (Table XII). 
The coefficient for the intermediate-term credit (INTOB) indi-
cates that at SR. 1.00 increase in INTOB will increase the invest-
ment in farm machinery and equipment by SR. 1.26. The estimated 
partial coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01 proba-
bility level (Table XII). The corrected R2 is 0.63 and the F- sta-
tistic has a significance level at the one percent probability level. 
Farm Facilities Demand. Farm facilities demand (FACIL) specifies 
hypothesized positive relationships with net farm income per dunom 
(NFID), intermediate-term credit, and off-farm income (NFINC) (Table 
XII). 
The coefficient for NFID indicates that a SR. 1.00 increase in 
net farm income per dunom on the average will increase the level of 
investment in farm facilities by SR. 10.68 (Table XII). The coeffi-
cient is significantly different from zero at the one percent proba-
bil ity 1 evel. 
The coefficient for intermediate-term credit indicates that a 
SR. 1.00 increase in INTOB will increase investment in facilities by 
SR. 0.69. The coefficient is significant at the one percent probabil-
ity level. 
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The coefficient for off-farm income has a significant coefficient 
at the one percent probability level. The result indicates that a 
SR. 1.00 increa1e in NFINC will increase inJestment in facilities by 
SR. 2.09. The result indicates that NFINC is an important source for 
financing farm facilities (Table XII). 
The corrected R2 is 0.82 and the F-statistic has a significance 
level at the one percent level. 
Hired Farm Labor Demand. The hypothesized relationships are that 
hired farm labor is positively related to level of short-term credit 
and total crop land cultivated (TAREAC). LCOST is expected to be 
negatively related to family labor (FLAB) since as the number of family 
farm workers increase they substitute for hired labor. An increase in 
the wage rate (WAGE) would be expected to decrease the demand for 
hired labor. However, since labor demand is measured in value of 
labor used, an increase in the wage rate can be interpreted as an in-
crease in cost of labor. The final result is an empirical question 
to be answered by the data. 
The coefficient on SHOB is positive but not significant at the 
five percent probability level. However, the result indicates that a 
SR. 1.00 increase in SHOB is associated with an increase in value of 
labor used by SR. 0.03. This would indicate that SHOB is not an im-
portant means for financing hired labor (Table XII). 
The coefficient on FLAB confirms the hypothesized negative 
relationship between CLOST and FLAB and with a coefficient statisti-
cally significant at the five percent probability level. The result 
indicates that an increase ofoneman-day per year of FLAB will de-
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crease the value of hired labor employed by about SR. 23.00. 
The coefficient for WAGE variable is positively related to the 
value of hired labor used and is significant at the five percent prob-
ability level. The results indicate that a SR. 10.00 increase in WAGE 
will increase the value of hired labor employed by SR. 1,783 (Table 
XI I). 
The coefficient for total crop land cultivated (TAREAC) indicates 
that the larger the size of farm, the more labor is needed for crop 
production and the higher the value of hired labor. A one dunom in-
crease in cultivated crop land increases the value of hired labor by 
SR.272. The TAREAC coefficient is significant at the five percent 
probability level. 
The corrected R2 is 0.61 and the F-statistic has a significance 
level at the one percent level. 
Farm Variable Capital Demand. It is hypothesized that the demand 
for farm variable capital is positively related to net farm income 
(NFID), short-term credit (SHOB), and off-farm income (NFINC). All of 
these variables are associated with financing variable capital needs. 
The coefficient for NFID is very significant at the one percent level 
of probability. The result indicates that a SR. 1.00 increase in NFID 
is associated with an increase in variable capital equal to SR. 9.49. 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient and the high significance 
level indicate the apparent importance of NFID in financing farm vari-
able capital (Table XII). The estimated coefficient for SHOB is sig-
nificant at the one percent probability level. The result indicates 
that a SR. 1.00 increase in SHOB will increase VCAP by SR. 0.20 
(Table XII). Although the NFINC coefficient is positive it is not 
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significant at the 10 percent probability level. 
It is hypothesized that VCAP is negatively related to total farm 
durable capital (TCAP) which includes farm machinery and equipment 
plus facilities and thus is a substitute for variable capital. The 
coefficient for TCAP is negative and significant at the five percent 
level of probability. The result indicates that a SR. 1.00 increase 
in the amount of TCAP will decrease the amount of variable capital by 
SR. 0.07. This implies that the higher the level of investment in 
farm machinery and equipment and facility, the lower the current farm 
expenses (Table XII). 
The corrected R2 is 0.805 and the F-statistic has a significance 
at the one percent probability level. 
Production Function. In the estimated production function equa-
tion, the result indicates that total farm capital (TCAP) is positively 
related to the level of farm output measured in terms of value (SR. 
1 ,000). However, the coefficient is not significant. An increase of 
SR. 1.00 in LCOST will increase the value of output (GRF) by an average 
of SR. 0.74. This implies that farm operators with enough cash to hire 
more labor may be able to increase farm production and hence income 
(Table XII). 
The coefficients for cultivated crop land (TAREAC) and its squared 
term (TAREAC2) are significant at the one percent and five percent 
probability level, respectively. The results indicate that a one dunom 
increase in total cultivated crop land will increase the value of farm 
outputs by SR. 3.40. However, this increase will be smaller the larger 
the increment of land added (diminishing return to land) due to the 
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negative sign of the TAREAC2 coefficient (Table XII). The corrected 
R2 is 0.92 and the F-statistic is significance at the one percent 
probability level. 
Loan Delinquency. Before presenting the results for the 2SLS 
loan delinquency model, it is worthwhile to recall that the same form-
ulation was used for the OLS model presented earlier. The parameter 
estimates for both estimation procedures are similar and, in general, 
conform to a prior expectation. 
For the 2SLS model, the coefficient of the net farm income per 
dunom (NFID) has the expected sign and is significant at the five per-
cent probability level. The association is still strong, although the 
significance is slightly less than for the OLS model. An increase of 
SR. 1,000 in NFID will decrease the delinquency rate by an average of 
30.44 days. The coefficient is very comparable to that obtained by 
OLS method discussed previously in the study. The estimated coeffi-
cients for NFID are 30.44 and 31.17 usi~g 2SLS and OLS, respectively. 
For comparison purposes see Tables X and XII. 
The relationship between the delinquency rate and farm family 
living expenditures is as hypothesized. FAMEXPC is positively related 
to DELRATE. A SR. 1,000 increase in farm family living expenditures 
will increase DELRATE by about 1.1 days. The FAMEXPC coefficient is 
significant at the ten percent level of probability. The result im-
plies that FAMEXPC is an important variable affecting the delinquency 
rate. The FAMEXPC variable should not be ignored when appraising the 
farm operator borrowers' repayment capacity (Table XII). 
The coefficient for off-farm income conforms with the expected 
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relationship. NFINC is negatively related to DELRATE. The result 
indicates that a SR. 1,000 increase in NFINC will decrease DELRATE 
by about 2.67 days. The estimated coefficient is significant at the 
one percent probability level. 
The variable for annual payment (AP) is positively related to 
DELRATE. However, it is not significant at the ten percent probability 
level. The result indicates that a SR. 1,000 increase in annual pay-
ment is associated with an increase in DELRATE of about 0.52 days. 
AP as a policy instrument variable should be further scrutinized with 
the farm operators• income earning potential. 
Timeliness of credit, TCRED, is another policy instrument vari-
able. The relationship is consistent with what was expected. The 
coefficient for TCRED indicates that a one day delay in obtaining 
credit due to red tape and bureaucratic complications is associated 
with an increase in DELRATE by about 1.17 days. The TCRED coefficient 
is significant at the ten percent probability level. 
The coefficient for total crop land cultivated (TAREAG) indicates 
that a one dunom increase in TAREAC will decrease DELRATE by about 
2.59 days. The relationship is as expected. The variable is signifi-
cant at the one percent probability level. The TAREAC variable and 
its associated coefficient indicates the importance of economies of 
farm size in increasing the farm operators• income and hence repayment 
capacity (Table XII). 
Results for the Kharj Area 
Before discussing the empirical results for the Kharj area, it 
should be pointed out that the same interdependent model applied to 
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the Hufuf area was tested on the Kharj area. However, the hypothe-
sized explanatory variables for the input demand functions and the 
production function did not adequately explain the Kharj farm credit 
interdependent system. Although most of the hypothesized relation-
ships held true, there were some inconsistencies in signs and a gen-
eral reduction in statistical significance for the individual coeffi-
cients and the overall regression statistics compared to the Hufuf 
system. Results of that application are presented in Appendix B. 
Since the Hufuf area farm credit interdependence model cannot be 
applied to the Kharj area, an alternative model is developed. The 
postulated Kharj interdependent system equations are presented below: 
Production Function 
GFR = f(TCAP, FLAB, VCAP, TAREAC, WEATH) 
Input Demand Functions 
MACEQ = F (LCOST, FLAB, INTOB) 
FACIL = f(NFID, LCOST, NFINC, TAREAC) 
LCOST = f(TCAP, WAGE, TAREAC) 
VCAP = f(TCAP, SHOB, NFINC, TAREAC) 
Identity Equations 
NFID = (GFR - VCAP LCOST) -.- TAREAC 
TCAP = MACEQ + FACIL 
Loan Delinquency 
DELRATE = f(NFID, AP, FAMEXPC, NFINC, TRED, TAREAC) 
where the endogenous and the exogenous variables are as defined in the 
previous section. The endogenous variaples in the system have been 
underlined. 
The pre-estimation identification properties of the models were 
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examined and the system is found to be overidentified. The above post-
ulated system for the Kharj area is estimated by two stage least 
squares (2SLS) discussed previously. 
For presenting the results of the estimated models for the Kharj 
area, input demand functions will be discussed first, then followed 
by the discussion of the production function and the loan delinquency. 
The results of these models are presented in Table XIII. 
Machinery and Equipment Demand. It is hypothesized that the 
level of MACEQ is negatively related to value of hired labor (LCOST) 
and farm family labor (FLAB) and positively related with land size 
(TAREAC). 
The coefficient for LCOST indicates a negative relationship but 
the coefficient is not significant. These results do indicate, how-
ever, that FLAB and LCOST may substitute for MACEQ. One day of FLAB 
may substitute for SR. 96 of MACEQ and Sr. 1.00 of LCOST may substitute 
for SR. 0.38 of MACEQ. 
The coefficient for INTOB indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between INTOB and the level of MACEQ. The result indi-
cates that a SR. 1.00 increase in INTOB will increase MACEQ by SR. 
0.88. The estimated coefficient is significant at the one percent 
probability level. This implies that INTOB is an important variable 
for the acquisition of farm machinery and equipment. The positive 
relationship between MACEQ and INTOB is also consistent with what was 
expected (Table XIII). 
The R2 is 0.32 and the F-statistic is not significant at the ten 
percent probability level. 
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TABLE XIII 
ESTIMATED INPUT DEMANDS, PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND DELINQUENCY RATE 
EQUATIONS OF THE FARM CREDIT INTERDEPENDENCE SYSTEM (2SLS), 
KHARJ AREA, 1978/79. 
MACEQ = 104.4013** - 0.3837LCOST - 0.0962FLAB + 0.8822INTOB*** 
(47.88) (0.79) (0.07) (0.25) . 
R2 a 0.3165 
F(3, 17) • 2.97 
FACIL m -44.4609 + 23.6926NFID** + 3.2275LCOST*** + 0.057NFINC 
(28.84) (8.72) (0.55) (0.05) 
+ 1.2332 TAREAC*** 
(0.33) 
R2 • 0.7031 
F(4, 16) + 7.80*** 
LCOST • -24.9821* + 0.0882TCAP** + 785.8267WAGE*** + 0.4535TAREAC*** 
(14.37) (0.03) (224.43) (0.09). 
R2 = 0. 7219 
F(3, 17) • 11.36*** 
VCAP = -13.7368 + 0.0408TCAP + 0.2588 SHOB*** + 0.0303NFINC 
(13. 74) (0.04) (0.07) . (0.02) 
+ 0.8037TAREAC*** 
(0.13) 
R2 • 0.8305 
F(4, 16) • 16.64*** 
GFR • 45.4738** + 0.0766TCAP - 0.0625FLAB*** + 0.5388VCAP** 
(20.22) (0.07) (0.02) (0.41) 
+ 1.9016TAREAC*** - 0.00013TAREAC2 - 100.4501WEATH** 
(0.18) (0.002) ( ) 
R2 .. 0.9171 
F(6, 14) = 30.41*** 
DELRATE .. 219.6408*** - 61.0628NFID*** - 0.4847AP + 0.5879 FAMEXPC*** 
(51.22) (13.55) (0.41) (0.18) . 
- 0.176NFINC** + 0.1352TCRED** - 1.2729TAREAC** 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.51) 
R2 .,. 0.7350 
F(6, 14) • 6.05*** 
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TABLE XIII (Continued) 
NOTE: MACEQ a Farm machinery and equipment measured in SR. 1,000.00 
FACIL a Farm facilities measured in SR. 1,000.00 
LCOST =Cost of farm hired labor measured in SR., 1,000.00 
per man-day per year 
VCAP = Farm variable capital measured in SR. 1,000.00 
GFR ~ Total farm output measured in SR. 1,000.00 
DELRATE = Delinquency rate measured in number of days loan 
payments past due 
INTOB • Amount of intermediate-term credit from.SAAB plus 
loans detained from other sources of credit 
TAREAC • Total crop land cultivated measured in dunom. 
NFID • Net farm income per dunom measured in SR. 1,000.00 
NFINC = Income from off-farm employment and real estate meas-
ured in SR. 1,000.00 
SHOB ~ Amount of short-term credit from SAAB plus loans ob-
tained from other sources of credit measured in SR. 
1,000.00 
FLAB = Farm family labor measured in man-days per year 
VCAP = Total farm variable capital measured in SR. 1,000.00 
WAGE m Wage rate paid to farm hired labor measured in SR. 
1,000.00 per man-day 
TCAP • Total farm durable capital items measured in SR. 
1,000.00 . 
TCRED = Timeliness of credit, time lay for processing and 
approving loans measured in days 
WEATH = Percentage of value of crops loss due to adverse 
weather conditions such as damage to crops from frost 
AP = Size of annual payments in SR. 1,000.00 (0.2 times in-
termediate-term SAAB loans + 1.0 times short-term SAAB 
loan + 0.5 times loans obtained from other credit 
sources 
*Significance test at 10 percent probability level 
**Significance test at 5 percent probability level 
***Significance test at 1 percent probability level 
1 Corrected standard errors of the coefficients in parenthesis. 
The figures in parenthesis beside the F-statistic are degree of 
freedom of the F-statistics 
1Thz procedures used for computing the corrected standard errors, 
F and R are presented in Appendix C. 
Farm Facilities Demand. It is hypothesized that the level of 
farm facilities is positively related to the level of NFID, LCOST, 
NFINC, and TAREAC. The results of the estimated coefficients are 
consistent with the hypothesized relationships. 
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The coefficient of NFID has the expected positive sign and is 
significant at the five percent probability level. The results indi-
cate that a SR. 1.00 increase in NFID will increase value of FACIL by 
about SR. 23.69 (Table XIII). 
The coefficient for LCOST is positive and highly significant at 
the one percent probability level. A SR. 1.00 increase in LCOST will 
increase the value of FACIL by SR. 3.23. The result indicates that 
farm facilities and hired labor are complements. Hired labor is im-
portant for building farm facilities such as irrigation systems and 
other facilities that cannot be built by machinery power (Table XIII). 
The coefficient for NFINC indicates the hypothesized positive 
relationship with FACIL. The coefficient is not significant at the 
ten percent probability level. However, the result indicates that 
income generated from off-farm sources is having some impact in financ-
ing farm facilities (Table XIII). 
The coefficient for TAREAC indicates that a one dunom increase in 
TAREAC will increase FACIL by about SR. 1.233. The coefficient is 
significant at the one percent probability level. Farmers who operate 
large units need more facilities for irrigating additional cultivable 
land and storage facilities to store their farm products before trans-
porting them to the market (Table XIII). 
The corrected R2 is 0.70 and the F-statistic is significant at 
the one percent probability level. 
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Hired Farm Labor Demand. The coefficient for TCAP indicates the 
unexpected positive relationship between TCAP and LCOST. It is sig-
nificant at the five percent probability level. The result indicates 
that a SR. 1.00 increase in TCAP is associated with an increase of 
SR. 0.09 in LCOST. The positive relationship is probably due to the 
strong association between LCOST and the level of FACIL since TCAP is 
the sum of MACEQ and FACIL (Table XIII). 
The coefficient of WAGE has a positive sign and is consistent 
with the result for Hufuf. A SR. 10.00 increase in WAGE will increase 
LCOST by about SR. 7.859. The coefficient is highly significant at 
the one percent level. 
The coefficient of TAREAC has the expected sign and indicates a 
strong positive association between TAREAC and the amount of LCOST. 
It is significant at the one percent probability level. This implies 
that the larger the size of farm the more labor the farm operators 
employ (Table XIII). 
The corrected R2 is 0.72 and the F-statistic is significant at 
the one percent probability level. 
Farm Variable Capital Demand. The coefficient for TCAP indicates 
a complementary relationship with VCAP. The result indicates that a 
SR. 1.00 increase in TCAP is associated with a SR. 0.04 increase in 
VCAP. However, the coefficient is not significant at the ten percent 
probability level (Table XIII). 
The estimated coefficient for SHOB indicates a positive relation-
ship with VCAP and is highly significant at the one percent probabil-
ity level. The result indicates that SHOB is a very important extern-
al means for financing variable capital (Table XIII). 
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The coefficient of TAREAC is another important variable in ex-
plaining the variation in VCAP. The result indicates a positive asso-
ciation between VCAP and TAREAC and a coefficient that is statistically 
different from zero at the one percent probability level. A one dunom 
increase in TAREAC is associated with a SR. 8.04 increase in VCAP 
(Table XIV). The corrected R2 is 0.83 and the F-statistic is signifi-
cant at the one percent probability level. 
Production Function. In the production function equation, the 
coefficient for TCAP has the ~xpected positive sign. It is not signif-
icant, however, at the ten percent probability level. The result in-
dicates that as TCAP increases by SR. 1.00, GFR will increase by about 
SR. 0.08. This shows that TCAP has no statistical effect on the level 
of GFR (Table XIII). 
The coefficient for VCAP has the expected sign and is significant 
at the five percent probability level. The result indicates that a 
SR. 1.00 increase in VCAP is assotiated with a SR. 0.54 increase in 
GFR. Again, the significance of the estimated coefficient indicates 
the importance of variable capital in the farm production process 
(Table XIII). 
FLAB is a highly statistically significant coefficient in the 
KHARJ production function. However, the negative sign of the coeffi-
cient is contrary to expectations. One plausible explanation is that 
farms with more family labor tend to represent subsistence farming 
emphasizing low value food crops relative to higher value cash crops. 
The coefficient of TAREAC has the expected sign and is signifi-
cant at the one percent probability level. The result indicates that 
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the size of farm is important for increasing farm income (Table XIII). 
The weather variable (WEATH) is defined as the percentage of 
crop loss due to adverse weather conditions such as damage to crops 
from frost. The coefficient is negatively associated with the level 
of farm output and is significant at the five percent probability 
level. A ten percent estimated loss of crops due to adverse weather 
conditions is associated with a loss of SR. 10.05 in gross farm 
receipts. 
The corrected R2 is 0.92 and the F-statistic is significant at 
the one percent probability level. 
Loan Delinquency. The relationship between loan delinquency and 
the hypothesized associated variables generally conform to prior ex-
pectations with the exception of the annual payment (AP) variable. 
The negative sign is not expected but the coefficient is not statis-
tically different from zero at the 20 percent probability level. 
The most important variable explaining loan delinquency rate is 
the NFID variable. The NFID coefficient is negative and highly sig-
nificant at the one percent probability level. The relationship in-
dicates that as NFID increases by SR. 1 ,000, DELRATE will decreuse 
by about 61.06 days (Table XIII). 
The coefficient for FAMEXPC indicates a positive relationship 
with DELRATE and is highly significant at the one percent probability 
level. The result indicates that an increase of SR. 1,000 in farm 
family living expenditures is associated with an increase in DELRATE 
by about 0.59 days (Table XIII). 
Off-farm income (NFINC) is negatively associated with DELRATE. 
, 
'The coefficient is significant at the five percent probability level. 
The result indicates that farm operator borrowers may use part of 
their off-farm income to repay their loans (Table XIII). 
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The coefficient for timeliness of credit (TCRED) shows a positive 
relationship with DELRATE. The coefficient is significant at the five 
percent probability level. The result indicates that the importance 
of TCRED in influencing DELRATE cannot be ignored. Because each work-
ing day the farm operator spends off his farm may affect the level of 
farm production. The result indicates that a one day delay in obtain-
ing credit will increase loan delinquency by about 0.14 days (Table 
XIII). 
Total crop land cultivated, TAREAC, is negatively associated with 
DELRATE. The TAREAC coefficient is significant at the five percent 
probability level. The result indicates that as TAREAC increases by 
one dunom, DELRATE will decrease by about 1.3 days. The negative 
relationship also indicates the importance of economies of farm size 
in decreasing DELRATE (Table XIII). 
The corrected R2 is 0.74 and the F-statistic is significant at 
the one percent probability level. 
Before concluding the analysis of the farm credit interdependence 
system as estimated by means of 2SLS, it is important to indicate that 
the parameter estimates (Tables XII and XIII) in qeneral conform to a 
priori expectations. Not all of the estimated coefficient are statis-
tically acceptable relative to their standard error. Further, some of 
the demand equations, especially for the Kharj area, have few signifi-
cant coefficients but very significant F-statistics and high corrected 
R2. This may indicate that multicollinearity is still present. 
Multicollinearity is a phenomenon in which one column of the data 
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is highly correlated with another column or a linear combination of 
several columns of data. This would render the matrix (x'x) very 
small (where xis the observation matrix), and hence the inverse 
(x'x)-l very large. Since the t-statistics are directly proportional 
to the estimated coefficients and inversely proportional to the matrix 
(x'x)-l, the t-statistics will be exceptionally small. 2 
2rntrilligator, Econometric models, Techniques and Applications, 
pp. 151-156. 
CHAPTER VII 
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF LOAN DELINQUENCY 
Farm and farmer characteristics from a sample of SAAB delinquent 
and non-delinquent operator borrowers were analyzed by tabular means 
in Chapter V. A simultaneous equation (2SLS) approach was also used 
to analyze loan delinquency within a farm credit interdependent 
system. The empirical results and their economic implications were 
presented in Chapter VI. To provide further insights about loan delin-
quency and to provide for policy implications, a more complete analysis 
pertaining to the SAAB operator borrowers 1 characteristics is needed. 
To meet this objective, the reduced form of the estimated farm credit 
interdependent system developed in Chapter IV together with a dis-
criminant analysis classifying operator borrowers are presented. 
The reduced form of the estimated farm credit interdependent 
system is useful for determining the direct and indirect impact of the 
exogenous variables upon the endogenous variables. In other words, 
the reduced form indicates the unit change expected in an endogenous 
variable for a one-unit increase in the exogenous variable. 
Discriminant analysis is also applied to derive a linear combina-
tion of delinquent and non-delinquent farm operator borrowers who ob-
tained crop production loans from SAAB. The discriminant analysis 
will provide a method to determine credit quality and the farm oper-
ator borrowers 1 credit worthiness given their financial, social, and 
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farm resource characteristics. 
Reduced Form of the Farm Credit 
Interdependent System 
The reduced form to be presented in this section is developed 
using the structural coefficients estimated by the means of 2SLS in 
the farm credit interdependent system. The reduced form of the model 
is computed by reordering the structural models, isolating the endo-
genous variables from the constants and the exogenous variables and 
solving the system simultaneously for the endogenous variables in 
terms of the exogenous variables and constants. 
Reduced Form Model 
The reduced form model can be expressed symbolically as: 
AW = C + BX 
where A = matrix of the endogenous variable coefficients 
W = column vector of the endogenous variables 
C = column vector of constant terms 
B = matrix of the exogenous variable coefficients 
X = column vector of exogenous variables 
To express Was a function of the remaining variables, the A ma-
trix is inverted, and then postmultiplied by the corresponding rna-
trices: 
(Af1 (A) W = (Af1 C + (Af1 BX 
This matrix equation reduces to: 
W = (A)-l ~ + (A)-l BX 
In drawing implications from the empirical results obtained from 
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the reduced form of the farm credit interdependent system, data from 
the Hufuf and Kharj areas will be presented and analyzed. The analysis 
will parallel the dichotomy of economic understanding on the one hand 
and direct policy information on the other. 
The impact multipliers provide a basis for determining the expect-
ed direct and indirect impact on the endogenous variable from a one-
unit increase in the exogenous variable (i.e.,~~= A-lB). This 
provides insight into the important economic factors affecting the 
farm operator borrower•s fina·ncial and farm management decisions, and 
hence, the delinquency problem. 
Because net farm income per dunom (NFID) enters the reduced form 
in a non-linear fashion, the interdependent system model for both the 
Hufuf and the Kharj areas are developed by fixing the amount of crop-
land cultivated at three levels: the mean value, a high value, and a 
low value. The effects of farm size are, thus, entered in the analysis 
in this fashion. The reduced form models for the Hufuf and the Kharj 
areas are presented in Appendix B. 
Empirical Results of the Reduced Form 
Results of the impact multipliers are presented in Tables XIV 
through XIX. These results are in terms of the impacts on the endo-
genous variables listed to the left of the table for a one-unit change 
in the exogenous variables listed across the top of the table. For 
example, a SR. 1.0 change in short-term credit from SAAB (SACRED) is 
associated directly and indirectly with a SR. 0.8771 change in gross 
farm receipts (GFR) for farm operator borrowers in the Hufuf area with 
land holdings at the mean level of 39.07 dunoms (Table XIV). 
TABLE XIV 
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS FROM THE REDUCED FORM OF THE FARM CREDIT INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEM, 
WITH LAND FIXED AT THE MEAN VALUE (TAREAC = 39.07 DUNOMS), 
Endo~eno~s Units 
Variable~ 
CFR 
TCAP 
MACEQ 
FACIL 
!.COST 
(1000) 
:)? .. 
c: ,J·:·J) 
;;;~., 
(lGOO) 
.iR. 
(1 lOO) 
SR. 
(lvOO) 
SR. 
(lClOO) 
(d..:ys) 
SHC~t:D 
SiL 
(1000) 
0.5771 
0.5223 
0.0851 
-0.0567 
0.1428 
0.0319 
0.322.9 
-C.4068 
I:-iTCrt.ED 
SR. 
(1000) 
-0.43<i9 
-0.25J2 
l. 8 797 
1.26:!.5 
0.6182 
J 
-0.1847 
0.19-i9 
:lBOR 
Sli.. 
(1000) 
0.4422 
0.2720 
1. 9648 
::..2039 
0.7610 
0.03.!.9 
0.13&3 
-0.2119 
HUFUF AREA, 1978}79 
Exogenous Variables 
AP 
SR. 
(100:>) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.5134 
TCRED 
(days) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1..1682 
(.:lays) 
0.0015 
0.0170 
-0.0515 
-0.0561 
0.0046 
-0.0230 
0.0075 
-0.0132 
FA>!EXFC 
SR. 
(1000) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.9745 
NF"'::>:C 
SR. 
(1000) 
0.4393 
WAGE 
s~. 
(1000) 
157.5259 
0.2954 -34.2697 
2.1664 -331.4934 
0 -322.1240 
2.1564 -9.3693 
0 178.2744 
0.1.440 13.5213 
-2.9023 26.6927 
Constant 
Terms 
104.0359 
16.0966 
20.5612 
49.3584 
-28.7973 
5J.5336 
37.4057 
105.0965 
w 
N 
IMPACT 
Endogenous Unit 6 
Variables 
sc:. 
GFR (:!.000) 
S?... 
NFI (., ,'"' ·""·"'' 
.J._v \J :..J J 
SR. 
TCAP (1000) 
. S:<.. 
MACEQ c.ouo) 
SR. 
FACIL (lOGS) 
SR. 
LCOST (1000) 
SR. 
VCAP (lOCO) 
SR. 
DEL RATE (cays) 
TABLE XV 
MULTIPLIERS FROM THE REDUCED FORM OF THE FARM CREDIT INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEM 
WITH LAND FIXED AT THE HIGHEST VALUE (TAREAC = 167.00 DUNOMS), 
HUFUF AREA, 1978}79 
ExGgenous Variables 
SCi-iB.ED !NTCRED OBOR AP TCRED FLAB FAHEXPC NFINC WAGE 
SR. SR. SR. SR. SR. SR. SR. 
(j__JQG) c.:.ooo) (1000) (1000) (days) (days) (1000) (lOGO) (1000) 
0.6398 -0.3087 0.3311 0 0 -0.0071 0 0.2904 174.8065 
0.37}7 -0.1713 0.2024 0 0 O.Oll6 0 0.2022 -23.4621 
-0.0337 1. 9371 l. 903.', 0 0 -0.0554 0 2.0986 -323.6~.::6 
-0.057£. 1. 2615 :!..2039 0 0 -0.0561 0 0 -322.1240 
0.0~39 o.675o 0.696 c 0 0.0007 0 2.0986 -1.5016 
0.03:!.9 0 0.0319 0 0 -0.0230 0 0 178.2744 
0.23~1 -O.l.J74 0.0968 0 0 C.OJ43 0 0.0883 19.9943 
-0.0681 0.1312 -0.0369 c. 513/f 1.::.682 -0.0021 1.9745 -2. 70':11 4.27i'l 
Cor.stant 
Terms 
398.0676 
232.7935 
119.0073 
137.3066 
-18.2993 
85.3558 
179.9183 
171.6080 
w 
w 
TABLE XVI 
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS FROM THE REDUCED FORM OF THE FARM CREDIT INTERDE:PENDENT SYSTEM 
WITH LAND FIXED AT THE LOWEST VALUE (TAREAC -= 6. 00 DUNOMS), 
HUFUF AREA, 1978/79 
Endogenous Units 
Exoienous Variables 
SCHRED INTCRED OBOR ;.:p TCRED FLAB FA."{EX:pC NFINC WAGE Constant Variable& Sll. SR. SR. SR.. Sll. sa. sa. Taraa 
(1000) (1000) (1000) (1000) (days) (days) (1000) (1000) (1000) 
SR • . 
GFR. (.;.000) -J.3189 0.1382 -0.1808 0 0 ...,o.0374 0 -0.2370 236.0056 14.3. 7395 
SR. 
NFI (i-000) -0.2'258 0.1082 -0.1176 0 0 ...,0.0073 0 -0.1277 14.8130 31.3160 
SR. 
Tc.\P (1000) -0.4596 2.1407 1.6811 0 0 -0.0692 0 1.8584 -295.7494 49.0565 
S:<.. 
MACEQ (1000) -0.0576 1. 2615 1.2039 0 0 -0.0561 0 0 -322.1240 26.4965 
~?H 
i:.\CI ~. c .c.~Jl -0 -~·:.2·:.· J.d792 0 .:.. 773 0 0 -o.J:Jl 0 1. 8584 26.3746 22.5600 
SR. 
LCOST (1000) 0.0319 0 0.0319 0 0 -0.0230 0 0 178.2744 41.5316 
SR. 
VCAP (1000) -0.1251 0.0300 -0.0951 0 0 -0.0070 0 1.9745 42.9182 70,8919 
5:Z. 
DELRATE (days) 1.1451 -0.5487 0.5965 0.5184 1.1682 0.0372 1.9745 -2.0246 -75.1406 44.5249 
..... 
w 
~ 
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS 
WITH LAND 
Endogenous t.'nits SHCRttl nrtCRtD 
Variables SR. SR. 
(1000) (1000) 
SR. 
GFR (1000) c.:3.;.9 0.2.:.57 
SR. 
:-:n (' .·.- . ' .. vv -'j -C.:.!.70 -:J.l522 
SR. 
TCA? (ltiOO) -0.0765 1.0781 
s:<. 
MAC::Q (11'00) 0.0026 0.8457 
SR. 
FACIL (1000) -0.0791 0.2323 
SR. 
LCOST (1000) -0.0067 0.0951 
SR. 
VCAP (;.JOG) 0.::557 0.3028 
ll!l.ltll.TE (cl.,-.) &.1478 0.1921 
TABLE XVII 
FROM THE REDUCED FORM OF THE FARM CREDIT INTERDEPENDENT 
FIXED AT THE MEAN VALUE (TAREAC = 48.36 DUNOMS), 
KHARJ AREA, 1978}79 
Exosenoua Vartab1es 
OBOR AP TCitD FLAP FAMEXPC IfF INC WAGE 
SR. SR. (days) (days) SR. SR. SR. 
(1000) (1000) (1000) (1000) (1000) 
0.:!.138 0 0 -0.0789 0 0.0:226 238.676:7 
-0.::1351 0 0 -0.0575 0 -O.Ol59 -859.5025 
1 .. 1540 0 0 -0.1660 0 0.0639 2521.0119 
0.8431 0 0 -0.0906 0 -0.0022 -383.4682 
0.3115 0 0 ·-0.0754 0 0.0661 2804.4801 
0.1018 0 0 -0.0146 0 0.0056 999.3960 
o.o4n 0 0 -0.0068 0 0.0329 93.7773 
0.6443 ..0.4&47 O.US2 o.on.s 0 • .5879 -o.l~ 108,,2tJ8 
SYSTEM 
WEATH 
(%) 
-98.3437 
-103.0175 
-14.1633 
0.4793 
-14.6426 
-1.2492 
5.9229 
27.3jl1 
Cons tan~ 
Ie1.-..:s 
147.9~88 
129.3367 
96.5931 
99.9618 
-3.3687 
11.5703 
6.9918 
-321. 4-6e&· 
__. 
w 
0"1 
TABLE XVIII 
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS FROM THE REDUCED FORM OF THE FARM CREDIT INTERDEPENDENT S"tSTEM 
WITH LAND FIXED AT THE HIGHEST VALUE (TAREAC -= 230. 00 DUNOMS) , 
KHARJ AREA, 1978/79 
lxosenous V~ria~les 
Endogenous Unit& . SHCRED INTCRED OBOR AP TCRED P'l.AJ FAM!XPC NFINC WAGE WL\THD Constant 
Variables SR. SR. Sit. SR. (days) (days) SR. SR. SR. (X) Tei"'I8 
~1000) ~1000~ ~1000~ (100Cl (1000) (lOOO) (1000) 
SR. 
GFR (1000) 0.1378 0.2534 0.1156 0 0 -0.0759 0 0.0234 282.2471 -103.4862 609.7974 
SR. 
~::: (lLiOJ) 0.1H:9 -J.l545 -0.0357 0 0 -0.0584 0 -0.0162 -8i'2.9477 -101.4308 331.9508 
SR.. 
TCAP (1000) -0.0163 1.1563 1.1727 0 0 -0.1364 0 0.0721 2863.0393 -66.3274 924.0376 
SR. 
MACH (1000) 0.0006 0.8431 0.8425 0 0 -0.0916 0 -0.0024 -398.4275 2.2447 42.6935 
SR. 
FACIL (1000) -0.0169 0.3132 0.3301 0 0 -0.0448 0 0.0746 3261.1;668 -68.5721 881.3441 
SR. 
LCOST (1000) -0.0014 0.1020 0.1034 0 0 -0.0120 0 0.0054 1038.3828 -5.8501 160.8230 
S:l.. 
VCAP (1000) 0.2581 0.3060 0.0478 0 0 -0.0056 0 0.6332 116.8120 3.7946 117.0236 
DELRATE (days) 0.0316 0.0410 0.095 -0.4847 0.1352 0.0155 0.5879 -0.1718 231.7676 128.0767 -161.2591 
Endogenous 
Variable:; 
GFR 
~Fl 
TCAP 
1-'.ACH 
FACIL 
LCOST 
VCAP 
DELRAn: 
TABLE XIX 
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS FROM THE REDUCED FORM OF THE FARM CREDIT INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEM 
WITH LAND FIXED AT THE LOWEST VALUE (TAREAC = 9.00 DUNOMS), 
KHARJ AREA, 1978/79 
Exosenous Variables 
Units SCHRED INTCRED OBOR AP TCUD FLAB FAMEXPC NFINC 'WAGE 'WiAl'HElt 
SR. SR. ::lR. SR. (days) (days) SR. SR. SR. (%) 
(1000) ( 1000) (lOQO) (lGOO) (1000) (1000) (1000) 
SR! 
(1000) 0.1021 0.2070 0.1049 0 0 -0.0935 0 0.0186 19.7407 92.4069 
SR. 
(1CGO) -0.107.'3 -0.1402 -0.1324 0 0 -0.0529 0 -0.0147 -791.9535 80.4376 
SR. 
(: .)::_trJ) 
-0.3739 0.6649 1.0639 0 0 -0.3144 0 0.0228 200.2447 416.8253 
SR. 
(lOCO) 0.0128 0.8590 0.8.!;62 0 0 -0.0856 0 -0.0008 -303.3123 98.3145 
SR. 
(1000) -0.3917 -0.1714 0.2177 0 0 -0.2289 0 0.0236 508.5569 318.5108 
s~. 
(l000) -0.0334 0.0604 0.0938 0 0 -0.0277 0 0.0020 803.5243 15.8634 
s~. 
(1000) 0.2433 o.2o67 0.0434 0 0 -0.0128 0 0.0312 8.1700 -3.8941 
(cays) 0.7316 0.9502 0.2196 -0.4847 0.1352 0.3592 0.5879 -0.0766 5373.2463 -337.5683 
Constant 
Terms 
92.4069 
80.4376 
416.8253 
98.3145 
318.5108 
15.8634 
-3.8941 
-337.5683 
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For the analysis which follows, credit obtained and used for farm 
production by the farm operator borrowers is separated in two cate-
gories: intermediate-term credit (INTCRED) and short-term credit 
obtained from SAAB, and credit from other sources (OBOR). The objec-
tive of separating credit by source and purpose is to determine the 
policy impact of each type of credit on the factor inputs acquired and 
hence on the value of all endogenous variables. 
Hufuf 
Results of the impact multipliers for the Hufuf area are presented 
in Tables XIV through XVI. 
SAAB Short-term Credit. The short-term SAAB credit (SHORED) 
as was indicated earlier in the study is obtained by the farm operator 
for the purpose of financing farm variable capital and hired labor. 
In the input demand functions for hired labor cost (LCOST) and variable 
capital (VCAP), short-term SAAB credit was combined with the amount 
of credit borrowed from other sources (OBOR). The amount of SHORED 
and OBOR combined were designated as SHOB. The SHOB in the input 
demand functions for LCOST and VCAP were positively associated with 
the level of hired labor cost and variable control. The variable 
SHOB was significant in explaining the variation in VCAP but was not 
significant in the LCOST model. 
Based on the results of the reduced form with land holdings at 
the mean value, the direct and indirect impact of SHORED on LCOST and 
VCAP is positive. Accordingly, its impact on GFR and NFI is also 
positive. The direct and indirect impact of SHORED on DELRATE is 
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negative and hence consistent since the SHORED impact on NFI is posi-
tive. 
In terms of the magnitude of the impact multipliers, a SR. 1,000 
change in SHORED is associated directly and indirectly with a SR. 877.1 
change in GFR. 
The magnitudes and direction of the impact multipliers changed 
somewhat due to decreasing or increasing farm size. The most interest-
ing result is that the SHORED impact on the endogenous variables is 
highest with land holdings at the mean value. Changes of the direct 
and indirect multipliers in terms of magnitudes and direction can be 
determined from Tables XIV and XVI. 
SAAB Intermediate-term Credit. Intermediate-term credit from 
SAAB (INTCRED) was obtained by the farm operators for the purposes 
of financing and acquiring farm capital items such as machinery and 
equipment (MACEQ) and facilities (FACIL). The INTCRED was combined 
with credit from other sources as an explanatory variable in the MACEQ 
and the FACIL demand functions. The INTOB was positively associated 
with the level of MACEQ and FACIL and significantly different from 
zero at the one percent probability level in the input demand func-
tions. 
However, the results of the reduced form indicate that the direct 
and indirect impact multipliers of INTCRED, excluding credit obtained 
from other sources, has positive impacts on MACEQ and FACIL of SR. 
1.2615 and SR. 0.6182 respectively. But its impact on GFR and NFI is 
negative and hence positive on DELRATE. The positive and negative 
impacts of INTCRED on capital items and gross farm receipts can 
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possibly be explained in the following manner. Total capital items 
(TCAP) which is the sum of MACEQ and FACIL used as an explanatory 
variable in the production function, GFR, was not significant at the 
10 percent probabil1ty level although the association was positive. 
This result may indicate over-capitalization of the farm operation 
due to over-extending intermediate-term credit from SAAB and other 
sources to the operator borrowers in the study. Therefore, the 
negative direct and indirect impacts of the INTCRED on GFR and NFI 
and hence positive impact on DELRATE are logical and consistent with 
the previous results indicated above. 
When the land holdings increase from the mean to the higher value, 
it indicates that the larger the farm size the less impact INTCRED 
has on most of the endogenous variables (Tables XIV and XV). 
Other Borrowings (OBOR). The OBOR impact multipliers with land 
holdings fixed at the mean value are the largest for TCAP and GFR 
(excluding MACEQ and FACIL which sum to TCAP). A SR. 1,000 change in 
OBOR is associated with SR. 1,1965 and SR. 442 changes in TCAP and 
GFR, respectively. In the proceeding section, the combined effect 
I 
of INTCRED plus OBOR (INTOB) in the TCAP demand function was positive. 
However, TCAP was not important in explaining the variation in the 
production function model. Therefore, since the direct and indirect 
impact of INTCRED on GFR was negative but that of OBOR is positive, 
this may indicate that the positive association of TCAP with GFR in 
the production function was due mainly to the effect of OBOR on 
financing TCAP. 
One interesting result is that the direct and indirect impact 
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multiplier of OBOR on OELRATE is negative. The result indicates that 
a SR. 1,000 change in OBOR is associated with a -0.2119 day change in 
OELRATE. This negative impact of OBOR on OELRATE can perhaps be ex-
plained in that operator borrowers may repay their loans to SAAB in 
part from funds obtained from other sources of credit in cases of low 
farm income. 
Annual Payment (AP). In the estimated OELRATE models using both 
OLS and 2SLS, AP was positively associated with the OELRATE for the 
Hufuf area indicating that the higher the level of AP, the higher the 
delinquency. It was significant at the 10 percent probability level. 
The results of the reduced form indicates that the direct and 
indirect impact of AP on DELRATE is still positive and comparable in 
terms of magnitude with the partial regression coefficient in the OLS 
DELRATE model. However, the results show that AP has no effect on 
other endogenous variables in the reduced form model. 
The significance level and positive association of AP with 
DELRATE indicate the potential importance of AP in determining DELRATE 
and that AP should be closely linked with the income generating poten-
tial of the farm operations. 
Timeliness of Credit (TCRED). The TCRED direct and indirect im-
pact multiplier indicates no effect on the endogenous variables in 
the present model except for DELRATE. For a one day change in TCRED, 
DELRATE will change by about 1.17 days (Table XIV). In the DELRATE 
regression models, TCRED is positively associated with the number of 
days payments were past due. However, the coefficients were not sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 10 percent probability level. 
--- --- ----- -
------
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The effect of TCRED on DELRATE should not be ignored, however, when 
processing and evaluating the borrowers• loan applications since 
there is some effect on DELRATE. To minimize any impact of TCRED 
upon DELRATE, SAAB may need to improve its operational efficiency in 
processing and .approva 1 of l·oans. 
Family Labor {FLAB). Farm family labor measured in terms of 
man days has a positive direct and indirect impact upon GFR and NFI. 
A one day change in FLAB is associated directly and indirectly with 
SR. 1.5 and SR. 17 changes in gross farm receipts (GFR) and net farm 
income (NFI), respectively, when land holdings are held at the mean 
level of 39.07 {Table XIV). 
FLAB was deleted from the GFR production function because of very 
low level of significance. However, the positive direct and indirect 
impact upon GFR and NFI may be due to substitution effects between 
hired labor and family labor in the farm production process. 
FLAB direct and indirect impact upon MACEQ is negative whereas 
the impact is positive for FACIL. A one man-day change in FLAB is 
associated directly and indirectly with a SR. -56.1 and SR. 4.6 change 
in MACEQ and FACIL, respectively. The FLAB negative impact upon 
MACEQ indicates the substitution between family labor and the level 
of investment in machinery and equipment. The positive impact of 
FLAB upon FACIL indicates a complementary relationship in that opera-
tor borrowers may employ family labor for improving and/or construct-
ing irrigation systems and facilities for storing farm products. 
The FLAB multiplier indicates that a one man-day change in FLAB 
is associated with a SR. 23 change in hired labor costs {LCOST). The 
negative multiplier indicates the substitution effect between hired 
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and family labor. Operator borrowers with a large number of family 
members working on the farm may save labor costs by utilizing farm 
family labor for agricultural production and increase income by labor 
cost savings. FLAB also has a negative impact on DELRATE which is 
mainly the result of higher net farm income due to labor cost savings. 
A one man-day change in FLAB is associated with a -0.0132 day change 
in DELRATE. 
The impacts of FLAB on the endogenous variables in the model 
at the lowest and the highest levels of land holdings are presented 
in Tables XV and XVI. In general, the results indicate that the 
larger the size of farm, the less effect the FLAB has in increasing 
the value of farm output due to substituting machinery for labor. 
Family Expenditures Plus Home Produced and Consumed (FAMEXPC) 
The results of the direct and indirect impact multipliers of FAMEXPC 
indicate that a SR. 1 ,000 change in FAMEXPC is associated with a posi-
tive change of 1.98 days in DELRATE (Table XIV). 
It was indicated previously in this study that FAMEXPC is posi-
tively related to DELRATE and the partial regression coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent probability level. 
The magnitude of the FAMEXPC partial regression coefficient and the 
impact multiplier indicate the importance of FAMEXPC in determining 
delinquency rate. Therefore, family living expenditures and home 
produced and consumed farm output should be accounted for when evalu-
ating operator borrowers• repayment capacities. SAAB may have to 
consider providing operator borrowers with consumption credit when it 
is necessary to help in minimizing the delinquency problem. 
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The change rif the effect of FAMEXPC on the endogenous variables 
in the model at the lowest and the highest levels of land holdings 
as compared with the effect when land holdings are fixed at the mean 
is presented in Tables XV and XVI. 
Non-Farm Income (NFINC). The NFINC has its greatest positive 
impact on FACIL. The result indicates that a SR. 1,000 change in 
NFINC is associated with a change of SR. 2,166 in FACIL with land 
holdings fixed at the mean value. 
It was indicated previously that the average NFINC in the Hufuf 
area is SR. 38,7]9 (Table VI). Furthermore, the NFINC variable in 
the FACIL demand equation is positively related to FACIL and its 
partial regression coefficient is significantly different from zero 
at the one percent probability level. Recall that FACIL and MACEQ 
were combined and entered the production function as one variable 
(TCAP). The combined effect, however, was not significant in explain-
ing the variation in GFR. But the results of the impact multipliers 
indicate that the effects of NFINC on GFR and NFI are positive and 
hence its effect on DELRATE is negative. 
The positive effect of NFINC on NFI is due in part to its positive 
contribution in financing farm facilities and, hence, indirectly 
influences the level of GFR. 
The negative direct and indirect impact of NFINC on DELRATE is 
due to the indirect affect of NFINC on NFI and hence on DELRATE and 
the direct effect of NFINC on DELRATE as a source of SAAB loan repay-
ment. 
The results of the NFINC direct and indirect impact multipliers 
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with land holdings at the highest and lowest levels are presented in 
Tables XV and XVI. The results indicate the competitive relationship 
between farm and non-farm income at the low land holdings level where-
as this relationship may eventually change to complementary with land 
holdings approaching the mean level. Similarly, the complementary 
relationship decreases in terms of magnitude as the size of land hold-
ings moves upward above the mean level. 
Based on these results, it may be stated that non-farm employment 
may subsidize the farm operation up to certain limits. But as the 
size of farm increases, operator borrowers devote more time to manage 
~~ 
their farms in order to increase farm output. Failing to allocate 
sufficient time for management, farm production is likely to decrease 
at the expense of non-farm employment. 
Therefore, to minimize operator borrowers dependence on non-farm 
employment, farm productivity should be improved by providing adequate 
and effective credit with highly coordinated technical assistance 
oriented toward better financial and farm management skills. 
Kharj 
Results of the direct and indirect impact multipliers for the 
Kharj area are presented in Tables XVII through XIX. 
Short-term Credit (SHCRED). With land holdings fixed at the 
mean value, the results indicate that SHCRED has positive and negative 
direct and indirect impacts on GFR and NFI, respectively. A SR. 1,000 
change in SHCRED is associated with SR. 131.9 and SR. -117.0 changes 
in GFR and NFI, respectively (Table XVII). The negative impact of 
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SHCRED is due mainly to over financing of the hired labor costs by 
SHCRED which has a negative effect on NFI. 
The results also indicate that SHCRED has a positive effect on 
DELRATE. A SR. 1,000 change in SHCRED is associated with 0.15 days 
change in DELRATE. The positive effect on DELRATE may be attributed 
in part to the negative effect of SHCRED on NFI since NFI is nega-
tively associated with DELRATE, and possibly to misuse of SHCRED. 
The term misused refers to using SHCRED for consumption rather than 
farm production purposes. 
Changes in the impact multipliers due to varying land holdings 
can be noted in Tables XVIII and XIX. 
Intermediate-term Credit ( INTCRED). In the input demand functions 
for MACEQ and FACIL, INTOB which is the sum of INTCRED plus OBOR, was 
positively associated with the level of investment in farm machinery 
and equipment a~d facilities. The partial regression coefficient was 
statistically significant at the one percent probability level (Table 
XIII). Furthermore, the results of the production function indicated 
the positive association between GFR and TCAP, but was not signifi-
cant at the 10 percent probability level. Based on the regression 
results outlined above, the negative direct and indirect effect of 
INTCRED in NFI is not surprising. MACEQ and FACIL may be adding more 
to the costs of production than to gross receipts. 
The direct and indirect impact of INTCRED on the remaining endo-
genous variables in the models at different levels of land holdings 
can be detected by comparing the INTCRED columns in Tables XVII 
through XIX. In general, the magnitude of the impact multipliers of 
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of INTCRED increase with increasing land holdings with the exceptions 
of the multipliers associated with NFI and DELRATE. 
Other Borrowing (OBOR). Farm operator borrowers obtain additional 
funds from other sources of credit mainly for two purposes: financing 
factors of farm production, and to meet family requirements. The OBOR 
joint effect with SHCRED and INTCRED on factors of production was dis-
cussed in the previous sections in this study. 
However, the direct and indirect impact multipliers of OBOR in-
dicate that the largest effect is on MACEQ and FACIL. A SR. 1 ,000 
change in OBOR is associated with SR. 843.1 and SR. 311.5 changes in 
MACEQ and FACIL, respectively, with land holdings fixed at the mean 
level (Table XVII). The impact of OBOR on GFR is positive with a 
SR. 113.8 change in GFR for a SR. 1,000 change in OBOR. However, its 
impact on NFI is negative and consequently its positive impact on 
DELRATE becomes smaller the larger the size of land holdings (Tables 
XVII through XIX). 
It is also important to point out that operator borrowers who 
borrow from other credit sources may give first priority to repaying 
these sources before SAAB. This may have a direct positive effect 
on the delinquency problem. 
Annual Payment (AP). The results of the reduced form model indi-
cates that AP has no effect on the endogenous variables except DELRATE. 
The direct and indirect effect of AP on DELRATE is negative. A SR. 
·' 
1,000 change in AP is associated with -0.49 days change in DELRATE. 
Change in land holding levels did not have any effect on the impact 
multiplier of AP on DELRATE in terms of sign or magnitude. 
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Timeliness of Credit (TCRED). The results of the TCRED multi-
plier indicates that a one day consumed for processing and approval 
of loans is associated with 0.1352 days change in DELRATE. The results 
from the previous analysis indicated that the average number of days 
consumed to process and approve the loan due to bureaucratic compli-
cation and red tape is 58 days in the Kharj area. The positive asso-
ciation between TCRED and DELRATE indicates the need for simplifying 
loan ·procedures for the operator borrowers so they may obtain the 
loans at the time they need them. 
Farm Family Labor (FLAB) The direct and indirect FLAB multipliers 
indicate that a one man-day change in FLAB is negatively associated 
with GFR, NFI, TCAP, MACEQ, FACIL, LCOST, and VCAP and positively asso-
ciated with DELRATE. However, the magnitudes of the impact multipliers 
decrease in magnitudes the larger the size of land holdings (Tables 
XVII through XIX. 
The decrease of the impact multipliers of FLAB on the endogenous 
variables included in the model may be due to substituting machinery 
for labor the larger the farm size. 
Family Expepditures Plus Home Produced and Consumed (FAMEXPC). 
The direct and indirect impact multiplier of FAMEXPC indicates that a 
SR. 1,000 change in FAMEXPC is associated with 0.5879 days change in 
DELRATE with land holdings fixed at the mean value of 48.36 dunoms. 
It was previously indicated that to minimize the positive impact of 
FAMEXPC on DELRATE, it may be necessary for SAAB to provide operator 
borrowers with a full line of credit to meet the needs for purchasing 
operating inputs as well as family consumption. 
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Non-farm Income (NFINC) The direct and indirect impact of NFINC 
on GFR is positive and on NFI is negative. A SR. 1.00 change in OFINC 
is associated with changes of SR. 0.0226 and SR. -0.0159 in GFR and 
NFI, respectively, with land holdings fixed at the mean level of 48.36 
dunoms. The largest NFINC direct and indirect effect is on FACIL. A 
SR. 1.00 change in NFINC is associated with SR. 0.0661 change in FACIL 
(Table XVII). However, the results of the FACIL demand equation dis-
cussed previously indicate a positive relationship between FACIL and 
NFINC but the partial regression coefficient is not significant at the 
10 percent probability level~ 
As the size of land holdings increases from lowest to highest 
level, the magnltude of the impact multipliers of NFINC on all the 
endogenous variables in the model increases. This result may indicate 
that the larger the farm size the more the farm operator borrower in-
vests out of income generated from off-farm employment. The results 
also indicate the importance of NFINC for decreasing DELRATE since 
operator borrowers may make their loan payment out of non-farm income 
whenever necessary. 
Wage Rate (WAGE). WAGE impact multipliers indicate that a SR. 
1.00 change in WAGE is associated with SR. 238.7 and SR. -859.5 changes 
in GFR and NFI, respectively (Table XVII). This result indicates that 
WAGE adds more to current operating expenses than to GFR which is re-
flected in the negative association between WAGE and NFI. 
In general, by changing the level of land holdings, the magni-
tudes of the impact multipliers increase. This result may indicate 
that operator borrowers with large land holdings substitute machinery 
in place of labor in order to increase production and improve income. 
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Adverse Weather Conditions (WEATH). The direct and indirect 
WEATH multipliers indicate that a one percent change in farm output 
due to adverse conditions such as frost or other natural factors is 
associated with changes of SR. ~98.3437 and SR. -103.0175 in GFR and 
NFI, respectively. The result from the previous analysis indicated 
that about 33 percent of the operator borrowers• farms were effected 
and 52 percent of the total farm output lost due to adverse weather 
conditions, mainly frost (Table XVIII). 
In this regard, it is important to indicate that SAAB, with joint 
cooperation of the extension agents, should provide operator borrowers 
with adequate information concerning crops that have resistance against 
such weather conditions or develop a crop insurance program for the 
operator to insure crops against risks. 
Evaluating Loan Repayment Capacity 
Using Discriminant Analysis 
Currently, analysis of the farm operator borrowers• financial 
position and credit worthiness is conducted via examinations of indi-
vidual credit files by credit analysts and loan officers at the SAAB's 
branches and sub-branches. Considerable time and costs are required 
for a credit analyst and a loan officer to examine a borrower's loan 
record and accurately determine his financial performance rating and 
credit worthiness. 
The results obtained from the loan delinquency analysis indicate 
that timeliness of credit is an important factor influencing delin-
quency. Questionnaire results also indicated that red tape and bur-
eaucratic complications in processing and approval o'f loans influence 
I 
~ 
':, 
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delinquency. The average time lag from loan application until the loan 
is obtained by the applicant is 57 days (Table VII). Therefore, de-
lays in loan processing and approval result in costs to SAAB atld th~ 
farmer borrowers. 
Since the credit analysts and the loan officers determine the 
farm operator credit worthiness by relying only on the individuals 
credit files, their decisions are often, if not always, based on sub-
jective value judgments. This method of evaluation ignores many eco-
nomic and non-economic factors which affect the borrower•s ability to 
repay loans and thus contribute to the delinquency problem. 
Therefore, it is important to develop a method by which the farm 
operator borrowers can be distinguished according to their financial 
positions and capacity to repay crop production loans obtained from 
SAAB. Discriminant analysis has proven useful in classifying farm 
operator borrowers into two classes: those with potential to repay and 
those without potential, given their financial, social and farm re-
source characteristics. 
Moreover, analysis of each borrower•s financial performance 
establishes the basis for extending, limiting or withdrawing the 
present line of credit and for determining the amount ·and kind of 
supervision needed. 
If the evaluation of the borrower•s application puts him in the 
non-delinquent borrower group, this implies that the likelihood of 
loan repayment is high and only normal supervision is required. How--
ever, if the borrower•s application falls into the potential delin-
quent category, this indicates that the loan possesses serious credit 
deficiencies and requires more than normal supervision. This provides 
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the basis for working closely with the borrower applicant to improve 
his farm operation efficiency and financial performance instead of 
denying him credit services. This is because if the borrower appll~ 
cant is turned away, it will not be consistent with achieving the 
SAAB main objective of helping the small farm operators to increase 
farm production, improve income, and repay the government loans. 
Previous Application of the Discriminant 
Model on Financial Data 
The discriminant model was intensively tested on financial data 
of borrowers of Production Credit Associations (PCA's) in Missouri, 
Illinois, and Arkansas. The purpose was to identify and classify a 
large percentage of the "acceptable" loans in order to achieve the 
following benefits: 
a. Reduce credit examination costsr 
b. Reduce the man hours needed to classify the obviously 
acceptable loans, thereby allowing more time for those 
loans requiring more attention and in-depth analysis. 
c. Create greater opportunity for credit representatives 
to assist the associations in credit training and 
specialized credit handling. 
d. Provide credit scoring index information that will be 
useful to the PCA's in their credit administration. 
Staff members of the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of the above 
indicated states report that these obJectives are being achieved and 
that they are pleased with the performance of the new credit scoring 
program. Since initiating the program, credit representatives in the 
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three-state district, Missouri, Illinois,' and Arkansas, now have more 
time to assist association personnel with the improvement of lending 
procedures (25, p. 62). 
Conceptual Framework of the Discriminant 
Analysis Model 
Discriminant analysis is a statistical tool which lends itself 
to classifying items into predetermined populations. The linear dis-
criminant model has been used previously to quantify the credit rating 
of both consumer and agricultural loan applicants. The technique of 
discriminant analysis is based on the assumption that a linear func-
tion, 
exists which will distinguish between elements of a population. The 
discriminant model utilizes coefficients e1, e2, ... , en chosen in 
such a way that the ratio of between group sum of squares is maximized. 
Factors x1, X2 ..• ,Xn represent the quantitative characteristics of the 
loans, the farm, and the farm operator borrowers (25, p. 57). 
For example~ let factors x1, x2, ... , Xn ben characteristics of 
persons, and let these persons constitute loan groups, each group hav-
ing Nk (k = l, 2, •.. , g) members. let a particular characteristic of 
a particular person in a particular group be identified by xijk' where 
i = 1, 2, ... , n identifies the characteristics, j = 1, 2, ... , Nk 
identifies a person in a particular group, and k = 1, 2, ... , g iden-
tifies the group to which the person belongs. For a given group then, 
say k = 1, there would be N1 members of the group, each person having 
n measurements (42, p. 11). 
Assumptions of the Linear Discriminant Function 
There are certain assumptions which discriminant analysis re-
quires. The most important assumptions include: 
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a. The data vector is assumed to be multivariate-normal in 
distribution to facilitate tests of hypotheses and classification 
routines. The covariance structure among the variables in the data 
vector is assumed to be constant within each category (25, p. 58). 
b. The discriminant coefficients are chosen to maximize the 
ratio of among to within group variance in discriminate score. These 
coefficients are dimensionless and their ratio is important, not 
their value (25, p. 58). Diagram denotes the situation where there 
are two populations and only one variable, i.e., M = 2 and n = 1, 
where M is number of population and n is number of variables. The 
figure assumes samples large enough that all the population para-
meters can be regarded as known. Since the variance of y (which is 
assumed to be the same in the two populations) and the population 
means are known, the likelihood of an observation being classified 
into either population 1 or population 2 is determined by consulting 
a table of normal distributions. The likelihood of an observation 
receiving a classification into either population 1 or population 2 
are equal at Yc· One would classify all cases where y > Yc in popu-
lation 2. Conversely, all observations where y < Yc in population 1. 
The shaded area in Figure 1 represents the expected proportion of 
the misclassified cases (25, p. 58). 
Population 1 Population 2 
Yz 
Figure 5: Classification For Two Populations and One 
Variable: Population Parameters Known 
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The Cut-off Point 
If one assumed that the two kinds of errors, that is, classifying 
an acceptable loan in the problem group and classifying a problem loan 
as acceptable, are of equal significance, the cut-off point would be 
Yc in Figure 1. This point can be determined algebraically: 
y = b1 n Yd- b1 d Yn 
c 
b1 n + b1 d 
where 
b1 n =the standard deviation of they values for the acceptable 
loan group 
b1 d = the standard deviation of they values for the problem 
loan group 
Yn = the mean y value for the acceptable loan group 
~ = the mean y value for the problem loan group 
After detefmining the cut-off point (yc)' a ~statistic can be 
computed for both Yn and Yd. The letter ~ denotes a random variable 
from a normal density function with zero mean, M = 0, and unit stan-
dard deviation, a= 1. 
The ~ statistic is determined according to the following formula: 
~n = Yc - Yn 
b1 n 
Referring to a ~ table, we can determine what percent of acceptable 
and problem loans will be misclassified (25, p. 58). 
Loan Delinquency Linear Discriminant Function 
The linear discriminant function is equivalent to a linear proba-
bility function and is simply a type of linear regression. If, when 
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estimating a regression function, values of zero and one are used as 
a dummy dependent variable, the estimated function will be linear 
probability function. The expected value of the dependent variable 
between zero and one would then be generated when a given set of N 
measurements are substituted.into the estimated equation. The esti-
mated value of the dependent variable could then be interpreted as 
the probability that the event would occur, given the values of the 
N independent variables (42, pp. 14-15). However, in this study 
-1/Nn will be used for Y instead of 0 and 1. 
The Model 
.· . . 
The loan delinquency linear discriminant model is presented as 
follows: 
Y = B1 VCOSGIN + B2FEXGIN + B3APNFI + B4LABCAP + B5IBASSET 
+ B6ACSHTAR + B7TEXCBOR, 
where Y = l/Nd for delinquent; and -1/Nn for non-delinquent; Nd and Nn 
are numbers of observation. 
VCOSGIN = Ratio of total current farm expenses to gross farm 
receipts (SR. 1000) 
FEXGIN = Ratio of farm family living expenses to gross farm 
receipts (SR. 1000) 
APNFI = Ratio of size of annual payment to net farm income 
(SR. 1000) 
LABCAP = Ratio of total farm labor to total farm capital 
(Man-day/SR. 1000) 
TBASSET = Ratio of total current borrowings to total value 
of farm assets (SR. 1000) 
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ACASHTAR = Percent of cropland cultivated for cash crops (dunom) 
TEXCBOR z Ratio of total current farm expenses to current 
borrowings (SR. 1000) 
The independent variables used in the delinquency rate model were 
tested in the linear discriminant model. However, they were deleted 
from the model due to inconsistency in terms of the empirical signs. 
Empirical Results 
The discriminant model in this study is developed on the basis of 
the application of the discriminant analysis to the data obtained from 
the administered questionnaires used for interviewing operator borrow-
ers who have current production loans from SAAB in the Hufuf and the 
Kharj areas. These discriminant models are presented in this section: 
Hufuf. Y = -0.26577910 VCOSGIN + 0.34823531 FEXGIN -0.00721323 
APNFI + 0.00127481 LABCAP + 0.05673530 TBASSET -0.06091127 ACASHTAR 
-0.00088654 TEXCBOR 
F (7, 13 ) = 2. 47 is s i gni fi cant at the 10 percent probability 
1 evel 
The results of the estimated discriminant linear function indi-
cate that VCOSGIN is negatively associated with delinquency rate. The 
higher the ratios of variable capital to gross receipts, the lower the 
delinquency. This is reasonable at least to a certain level, since 
the result of the estimated production function model indicated the 
importance of variable capital in contributing to gross farm receipts. 
The positive sign of the FEXGIN coefficient indicates that the higher 
the ratio of family living expenditures plus home produced and consum-
ed to gross receipts, the higher the likelihood of non-repayment of 
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SAAB loans. This result is also reasonable and consistent with the 
results of the aelinquency rate model discussed earlier where FAMEXPC 
is positively associated with delinquency rate. 
The negative sign of APNFI coefficient was not expected. The 
negative sign indicates that. as the ratio of annual payment to net 
farm income increases, likelihood of loan repayment decreases. This 
inconsistency may probably be resolved by adding a squared term for 
APNFI. 
Ratio of total labor employed on farm to total capital (LABCAP) 
is positively associated with delinquency. The higher the magnitude 
of this ratio, the.higher the likelihood of loan non-repayment. This 
result is reasonable since production is likely to increase if more 
capital is substituted for labor. 
The TBASSET coefficient indicates that the higher the ratio of 
total borrowings to total farm assets, the higher the likelihood of 
non-repayment of SAAB loans. This result may be reasonable for the 
Hufuf area if operators are borrowing more than they need and conse-
quently over capitalizing their farm operation resulting in 1 ower 
net farm income. 
The ACASHTAR coefficient indicates that the higher the propor-
tion of crop land cultivated for cash crops, the higher the likelihood 
of loan repayment. This result is reasonable and consistent with the 
results of the calculated analysis. The result of the tabulated an-
alysis indicates that receipts from cash crops are about 1.4 times 
the receipts from permanent crops in the Hufuf area. 
The mean values of the discriminant variables for the delinquent 
and non-delinquent farm operator borrowers in the Hufuf area are 
presented in Table XX. 
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TABLE XX 
MEAN VALUES FOR THE DELINQUENT AND NON-DELINQUENT FARM OPERATOR 
CHARACTERISTICS INCLUDED IN THE DISCRIMINANT MODEL, 
HUFUF AREA, 1979 
Variable Unit Mean Values Delinquent Non-Delinquent 
VCOSGIN (SR. 1000) 0.5567 0.3989 
FEXGIN (SR. 1000) 1.3333 0.426 
APNFI (SR. 1000) 2.4810 0.8549 
LAB CAP (Man-day/SR. 1000) 52.3883 8.2007 
TBASSET (SR. 1000) 1.1333 0.3789 
ACASHTAR (DUNOM). 0.3550 0.5378 
TEXCBOR (SR. 1000) 9.1018 24.5636 
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The Critical Value for Y. If it is assumed that the ~wo kinds 
of errors in misclassification are of equal significance, the critical 
or cut-off value can be calculated as described previously. 
Yc = b'nYd + b'dYn 
b' + b' 
n d 
= (0.04157628) (.052970611) + (0.08144260) {0.02111978}=0.1930 
(0.04157628 + 0.08144260) 
y - v Zn = _C _ __!! 
b' b 
= 0.1930- 0.02112 = 4.13 
0.0416 
y - v 
zd = c d 
b' d 
= 0.1930- 0.5297 = -4.06 
0.0830 
Referring to a table of values for ''cumulative normal frequency 
distribution'', the computed ~ values indicate that the discriminant 
function would correctly classify 100 percent of the operator borrow-
ers in the Hufuf area. When comparing the cut-off scores to computed 
Y values for operator borrowers in the Hufuf area, those withY values 
equal to or greater than 0.1930 would be classified as delinquent 
while those withY values less than 0.1930 would be classified into 
the non-delinquent borrowers group. The means and their standard 
errors are presented in Table XXI. 
TABLE XXI 
THE MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF MEANS FOR THE DISCRIMINANT MODEL, 
HUFUF AREA, 1979 
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Farm Operator Borrowers Code Sample Mean Standard 
Classification Group Size Discriminant Error of 
Value Means 
Non-delinquent borrowers -0.1111 9 0. 0211 0.0416 
Delinquent borrowers 0.0833 12 0.5297 0.0814 
Kharj. The specific 1 i near discriminant function for the 21 
operator borrowers in the Kharj area is the following: 
Y = 0.10085642 VCOSGIN + 0.27317093 FEXGIN + 0.10492432 APNFI + 
0.02880426 LABCAP -0.47609876 TBASSET + 0.14135500 ACASHTAR 
-0.02571778 TEXCBOR 
F( 3, 17 ) = 2.30 is significant at 10 percent probability level. 
The results of the Kharj discriminant model indicate that as the 
ratio of variable capital to gross income increases the likelihood of 
loan repayment decreases. This result may be reasonable for the Kharj 
area since operators may be employing more variable capital than re-
quired given limited crop land area and poor management. The positive 
sign of the FEXGIN coefficient indicates the higher the ratio of family 
living expenditures plus home produced and consumed to gross recepits, 
the lower the likelihood of loan repayment. 
The ratio of annual payment to net farm income is associated 
with delinquency rate. The result is reasonable because as annual 
payment exceeds operator borrower•s repayment capacity, the likelihood 
of loan repayment decreases. 
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The coefficient of TBASSET carries a negative sign indicating that 
as the ratio of total borrowings, intermediate SAAB credit plus borrow-
ings from other sources, increases the likelihood of loan repayment 
tncreases (delinquency decreases). This result may be reasonable for 
the Kharj area if these borrowings finance farm capital formation and 
increase the operator borrower's equity. 
Proportion of crop land cultivated for cash crop in the Kharj 
area is positively associated with delinquency. The higher this 
proportion, the lower the likelihood of loan repayment. This result 
is reasonable since the Kharj area is subject to variation in weather 
conditions such as frost which has adverse effects on cash crops as 
pointed out earlier in the study. 
The TEXCBOA coefficient indicates a negative relationship with 
nonrepayment of loans. As current farm expenses to current borrowings 
(short-term SAAB plus other borrowings) increases the higher the like-
lihood of loan repayment. 
The mean value of the discriminant variables for the delinquent 
and non-delinquent operator borrowers in the Kharj area are presented 
in Tahle XXII. 
The critical value or cut-off point for the Kharj area is calcu-
lated as discussed in the previous section: 
YC : b I y + b I + y 
n d d n -'-'-----'-~---'--___;_;., 
b 1 + b 1 
n d 
= (0.05633466} {.049404213) + (0~07260177) (-0.01582131)=0.2026 
(0.05633466 + 0.07260177) 
TABLE XXII 
MEAN VALUES FOR THE DELINQUENT AND NON-DELINQUENT FARM OPERATORS 
CHARACTERISTICS INCLUDED IN THE DISCRIMINANT MODEL, 
KHARJ AREA, 1979 
Mean Values 
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Variable Unit Delinquent Non-Delinquent 
VCOSGIN (SR. 1000) 0.4651 0.2613 
FEXGIN (SR. 1000) 1.2285 0.2900 
APNFI (SR. 1000) 1.1038 0.2163 
LAB CAP (Man-day/SR. 1000) 8.8246 7.2363 
TBASSET (SR. 1000) 0.5585 0.4300 
ACASHTAR (DUNOM) 0.3254 0.3010 
TEXCBOR (SR. 1000) 2.3777 7.2512 
z 
n 
and 
zn 
zd 
zd are: 
= V-V c n 
b' 
n 
= 0.2026 - (-0.0158) 
0.060 
= Yc - vd 
b' d 
= 0.2026 - 0.4840 
0.073 
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= 3.64 
= -3.85 
Referring to a table of values for "cumulative normal frequency 
distribution", the computed Z values indicate that the discriminant 
function would correctly classify 100 percent of the operator borrow-
ers in the Kharj area when comparing the cut-off scores to computed 
Y values for operator borrowers. Those withY values equal to or 
greater than 0.2026 would be classified as non-delinquent while those 
with Y values less than 0.2026 would be classified into the delinquent 
borrowers group. 
The means and the standard errors of the means are presented in 
Table XXIII. 
Alternative Cut-off Points 
Based on the results obtained above it is indicated that none of 
the farm operator borrowers in this study who had loans from the SAAB 
would be misclassified. However, since the above computer scoring 
model will supplement the credit analysts' personal examination, a 
more reasonable classification scheme within a more tolerable level 
than zero percent of misclassification may be needed. 
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TABLE XXIII 
THE MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF MEANS FOR THE DISCRIMINANT MODEL, 
KHARJ AREA, 1979 
Farm Operator Borrowers Code Sample Mean Standard 
Classification Group Size Discriminant Error of 
Value Means 
Non-delinquent borrowers -0.20 8 -0.0158 0.0563 
Delinquent borrowers 0.0625 13 0.4840 0.0726 
Therefore, a 0.01 probability of misclassification of the poten-
tial delinquent may be considered a more acceptable level and can be 
calculated. The alternative cut-off score is specified as thecritical 
Y value (CV) for classifying farm operator borrowers (25, p. 61). 
Consulting a table of cumulative normal frequency distribution, 
the appropriate critical value is derived through the following calcu-
lation: 
ycv = yd + (Z) b'd 
Where: 
Ycv = critical Y value 
Yd =mean value for the delinquent loan group 
Z = standard measure, and 
b'd = standard deviation of Yd 
The appropriate value of Z which allows a one percent misclassi-
fication tolerance is 2.33. Thus, multiplying the standard measure 
times the standard deviation of the sample mean (b'd) and adding this 
product to the mean (Yd) results in a critical Y value. Assuming the 
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sample mean (Yd) score approximates the population ~an, there is only 
one chance out of 100 of misclassifying a delinquent loan into the 
non-delinquent loan group (25t p. 61). 
In order to test the discriminant function on operator borrowers 
data, the following critical Y values are calculated: 
(i) Critical Y value for Hufuf area 
Ycv = 0.5297 + (2.33) (0.0814) 
= 0.7194 
(ii) Critical Y value for Kharj area 
Ycv = 0.4840 + (2.33) (0.0726) 
= 0.6532 
The results indicate that all farm operator borrowers receiving 
Y scores equal to or greater than 0.7194 and 0.6532 in the Hufuf and 
the Kharj areas, respectively, will be classified into the delinq~ent 
borrowers group. Conversely, farm operator borrowers with Y scores 
less than Ycv will be categorized into the delinquent borrowers 
group. 
It was indicated previously in this study that some of the major 
problems facing the SAAB are the following: 
1. Need for well trained personnel with enough skills to 
improve the quality of the SAAB portifolio of loans 
and efficiency in appraising, processing, and approval 
of loans. 
2. Need for a grading system differentiating clients 
according to their loan risk at any given point in 
time. 
" 
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In addition, delay in evaluating and processing loan applica-
tions increases credit examination costs and man hours needed for 
evaluating personal and financial attributes of the borrowers. There 
are also other costs associated with loan default such as collection 
and social costs that could be very high if the borrower applicants• 
repayment capacity is not accurately appraised. 
Therefore, discriminant analysis may be an effective, efficient 
and appropriate tool to use by the SAAB•s credit analysts to improve 
the SAAB portifolio and efficiency in providing agricultural produc-
tion loans. This will also reduce the time and social costs involved 
in extending and collecting loans. 
Before closing the discussion in this section, it is necessary 
to point out that the estimation procedures of the discriminant models 
discussed so far were based on small sample sizes of large populations 
in the two study areas. To provide reasonable assurance that the 
estimated discriminant model will classify the operator borrower groups 
with more precision, larger sample size may be needed. The results 
should improve as the number of observations increase since they con-
tain more information relevant to the parent populations. 
The selection of the variables used for estimating the discrimi-
nate function models in this study was limited to the available infor-
mation in the administered farm questionnaires of the operator borrow-
ers. Therefore, SAAB 1 s credit analysts may consider adding other 
variables that may be important in relation to evaluating the operat~r 
borrowers loan repayment capacities and determining the likelihood of 
repaying loans obtained from SAAB. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The main objective for establishing SAAB was to provide interest-
free loans to farm operators, individuals and/or groups of persons en-
gaged in agricultural production and agricultural allied industries. 
The loans extended by SAAB are to be used for acquiring farm capital 
needed by the farm operators to increase production and improve income. 
Increased income should be sufficient to cover farm production expen-
ses, meet family needs and repay the government loans. 
SAAB has been in full operation for 16 years, however, the credit 
program is far from achieving its objective of reaching all of the 
Saudi Arabian farmers. Only three percent of the total number of 
farmers have obtained agricultural loans from SAAB. Limited SAAB activ-
ity in the agricultural financial market is attributed mainly to the 
farms• and operator borrowers• characteristics and SAAB's low opera-
tional efficiency. Farm characteristics refer to low productivity of 
farm units due to small amount of crop land cultivated and consequently 
low income earning potential. The results of the study indicate that 
only 50 percent and 26 percent of the total crop land is utilized for 
crop production in the Hufuf and the Kharj area, respectively (Table 
III). The average size of farm in the Hufuf and the Kharj area is 78 
dunoms and 188 dunoms respectively. Operator borrowers• characteris-
169 
170 
tics refer to the farm and farm financial management which include 
the ability of the operator borrowers to make the best use of credit 
and allocate the scarce farm resources to maximize production and 
increase farm income. The results of the analysis indicate that none 
of operator borrowers in the study kept written records and only 28 
percent and 33 percent of operator borrowers in the Hufuf and Kharj 
areas, respectively, can read and write. SAAB's low operation effi-
ciency refers to slowness in processing and approval of loans when 
they are submitted. The low efficiency is mainly attributed to lack 
of well trained field representatives and credit analysts to gather 
and assimilate information pertaining to farms and operator applicants 
and to evaluate the actual credit needs, farm income earning potential, 
operator credit worthiness and repayment capacity. 
The overall objective of this study is to systematically explore, 
evaluate and determine the important factors contributing to the loan 
delinquency rate. Two approaches were used to model the delinquency 
rate: ordinary least squares techniques and 2SLS in a farm interdepen-
dent system. The models were estimated using technical and economic 
data obtained from personal surveys of 42 farm operators with current 
production loans from SAAB in the Hufuf and the Kharj areas. 
The delinquency model using OLS approach was postulated with 
delinquency as a function of net farm income, size of annual payment, 
farm family living expenditures, non-farm income, timeliness of credit, 
and amount of crop land cultivated. To give further insights, loan 
delinquency was determined within the framework of a farm credit 
interdependent system using the 2SLS approach. The purpose of using 
simultaneity is to evaluate the impact of short-term credit on hired 
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labor and variable capital and the impact of intermediate-term credit 
on farm machinery and facilities. The impact of credit on the indi-
cated factors is translated to delinquency rate through the farm pro-
duction function and net farm income. The specification of the four 
input demand functions for the Hufuf area are: (1) farm machinery and 
equipment (SR. 1000) as a function of hired labor costs (SR. 1000), 
family 1 abor (m.an-days), intermediate-term credit from SAAB plus 
borrowings from other sources (SR. 1000) and total crop land culti-
vated (dunom); (2) facilities as a function of net farm income (SR. 
1000), and non-farm income (SR. 1000); (3) cost of hired farm.labor 
(SR. 1000) as a function of short-term credit from SAAB plus borrow-
ings from other sources (SR. 1000), family labor (man-days per year), 
wage rate (SR. 1000), and total crop land cultivated (dunom); and 
(4) variable capital as a function of net farm income (SR. 1000), total 
farm capital (SR. 1000), short-term credit from SAAB plus borrowings 
from other sources (SR. 1000), and non-farm income (SR. 1000). The 
postulated production function is specified to be a function of total 
farm capital (SR. 1000), cost of hired labor (SR. 1000), variable capi-
tal (SR. 1000), and total crop land cultivated (dunom). 
Two identity equations were included in the system: (1) net farm 
income (SR. 1000) equal to gross farm receipts minus cost of hired 
labor and cost of variable capital used up in the current production 
period; and (2) total farm capital (SR. 100) equal to value of machin-
ery and equipment (SR. 1000) plus value of facilities (SR. 1000). 
The postulated delinquency rate in the system has the same func-
tional specification as the model estimated by using OLS approach. 
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The above indicated interdependent system was also tested on the 
Kharj area. However, examination of structural stability between the 
Hufuf and the Kharj areas indicated structural difference. Therefore, 
an alternative credit interdependence model was developed for the 
Kharj area. 
The differences between the credit interdependent systems for 
the two areas are in the specification of the input demand functions 
and the production function. The postulated input demand equations 
for the Kharj area are: {1) value of farm machinery and equipment as 
a function of cost of hired labor, family labor, intermediate-term 
credit from SAAB plus borrowings from other sources; {2) value of 
facilities as a function of net farm income, costs of hired labor, non-
farm income, and total crop land cultivated; (3) costs of hired labor 
as a function of value of total capital, wage rate and total crop land 
cultivated; and (4) cost of hired labor as a function of value of 
total capital, short-term credit from SAAB plus borrowings from other 
sources, non-farm income and total crop land cultivated. 
The postulated production function model is the value of farm 
output is a function of value of total capital, family labor, value 
of variable capital total crop land cultivated, and a variable re-
flecting loss of crops due to adverse weather conditions {percent 
loss of crop value). 
Furthermore, for policy implication purposes, reduced forms were 
developed and the results evaluated using three different levels of 
farm size; lowest, mean, and highest farm sizes included in the study. 
This was to determine the direct and indirect impact of credit on the 
endogenous variables affecting the level of production such as farm 
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machinery and equipment, facilities, cost of hired labor, and variable 
capital inputs. 
For improving SAAB operation efficiency for evaluating operator 
applicant credit needs and repayment capacity, a linear discriminant 
model was introduced. Operator borrowers in this study were classi-
fied into delinquent and non-delinquent for each study area. The 
dependent variable in the linear discriminant model Y (Y=l/Nd for 
delinquent; Y=-1/Nn for non-delinquent) represents the optimum dis-
criminator between the two groups and the explanatory variables repre-
sent the quantifiable characteristics of the operator borrowers, where 
Nd and Nn are the number of delinquent and non-delinquent borrowers. 
For developing the linear discriminant model, a number of vari-
ables were used. The selection and use of these variables in question 
were limited to the information available in the personal interview 
questionnaires administered in this study. However, the credit ana-
lysts do not have to limit their evaluation of credit worthiness of 
the farm operator applicants to the variables used in this study. The 
credit analysts may use additional variables that they consider to be 
important determinants for loan repayment capacity. 
Policy Implications 
Farm Income 
In this study farm income is one of the most important determi-
nants of the delinquency problem. The impact of credit on income, 
however, cannot be directly measured because credit does not directly 
generate output and income. 
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Short-term credit facilitates the purchase and acquisition of 1m-
proved production factors such as improved seeds and fertilizers. In-
termediate-term credit facilitates the acquisition of lumpy inputs such 
machinery and equipment and farm facilities for irrigation that are 
difficult to finance internally by the farm operator borrowers. These 
lumpy inputs contribute to a greater extent to increasing farm pro-
duction and hence income. Examples are: increasing farm size intro-
duces scale economies; expanding irrigated area raises the productivity 
of fertilizers, land and improved varieties; and mechanization changes 
land-labor relations (10, p. 15). 
Input-output Relationships 
In this study farm production functions for the Hufuf and the 
Kharj areas were estimated by means of multiple linear regression with 
interdependent credit system (2SLS). In the model, the intermediate-
term credit was assumed to shift the production coefficients for 
machinery and equipment and facilities, and short-term credit shifts 
the coefficients of variable capital and cost of labor used as a proxy 
for amount of labor employed. 
Total Capital 
Total capital is directly influenced by intermediate-term credit 
and was found to be positively related with the level of gross farm 
receipts in the production function for the Hufuf and the Kharj areas. 
However, the estimated partial regression coefficients were not signif-
icant at the 10 percent probability level. Results of the tabulated 
analysis indicated the average investment in machinery and equipment 
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plus facilities was SR. 3,056 for the non-delinquent and SR. 3,539 
for the delinquent operator borrowers for the two study area. The 
average gross farm income for the non-delinquent and the de11nqu{lnt 
operator borrowers were SR. 4,052 and SR. 487, respectively. These 
results may indicate that non-delinquent operator borrowers with less 
capital investment relative to the delinquent operator borrowers are 
more able to generate higher incomes. These results may also indicate 
that the delinquent operator borrowers use more capital than they need 
to increase production and income given their limited management capa-
bility to allocate scarce resources among competing farm enterprises. 
Since the availability of capital items is closely related to in-
termediate-term credit from SAAB and borrowings from other sources, 
intermediate credit should be provided based on the actual need and 
the extent of its effectiveness in increasing farm production and in-
come. Failure to scrutinize credit against the operators• actual need 
may result in over-capitalization of the farm production processes 
and burden the operator borrowers with debts which may eventually lead 
to worsening the operator bo.rrowers • financial position and in turn 
influence loan repayment capacity. 
Variable Capital 
Variable capital regression coefficients in the production func-
tions for the Hufuf and the Kharj areas were positive and siqnificantly 
different from zero at the one and five percent probabil it.v 1 eve 1 s, 
respectively. The results obtained from the tabulated analysis indica-
ted the average value of variable capital for the non-delinquent 
borrowers was SR. 2,284 for Hufuf and SR. 2,024 for Kharj per unit of 
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crop land cultivated (dunom). Based on the strong positive relation-
ships between the level of gross farm receipts and the level of vari-
able capit-1l is a Vtll'Y impol'ti\nt vnl'li\bl(\ rontl'lhutltH.J to lm:r'flf\t~pq 111 
income. Therefore, short-term credit for financing variable capital 
should be adequate and be given after accurately evaluating the actual 
credit needs for increasing farm production . 
. 
A large proportion of short-term credit is given to the operator 
borrowers in cash. This may increase the likelihood of using part of 
the short-term credit for consumption purposes rather than farm pro-
duction. This problem of misuse of credit may be solved if farm 
family consumption needs are accounted for in the short-term credit 
package since farm family requirements are as important as the require-
ments of the farm enterprises. A full line of credit may also lessen 
the operator borrowers' dependence on the other non-institutional 
credit sources. 
Borrowing from other credit sources may in fact unfavorably 
influence loan repayment. Farm operator borrowers who borrow addi-
tional funds from credit sources other than SAAB may find it necessary 
to repay these sources before repaying SAAB in order not to jeopardize 
this important source of consumption credit. The analysis indicates 
that the average amount of funds per dunom obtained from other sources 
of credit was SR. 257 and SR. 2,015 for the non-delinquent and the 
delinquent borrowers, respectively. Based on these results, borrowing 
from other sources of credit may be an important factor contributing 
to the delinquency rate problem. 
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The Cost of Hired Farm Labor 
Cost of hired farm labor was used as an explanatory variable in 
the farm production function. It was used as a proxi for the amount 
of hired farm labor employed for farm production. Cost of hired labor 
was positively associated with level of gross receipts and signifi-
cant 1 y different from zero at the five percent probability 1 eve 1 for 
the Hufuf area. However, this variable was dropped from the Kharj 
area production function due to insignificance of its estimated partial 
regression coefficient. But farm family labor in the Kharj area pro-
duction function was negatively related to the level of gross receipts 
and statistically significant at the one percent probability level. 
The negative sign of the partial regression coefficient and its high 
significance level indicates that to increase farm production in the 
Kharj area less labor should be employed so surplus labor can be 
freed for other uses in the non-agricultural sector where the demand 
for labor and its marginal productivity are higher. 
Total Crop Land Cultivated 
Throughout the analysis land was assumed to be of constant qual-
ity in each area of the study and exogenously determined by government 
program policies and social factors such as inheritance. Land was 
used as an explanatory variable to capture the economy of size in the 
farm production process. Its partial regression coefficient indicates 
a positive relationship with gross farm income in the Hufuf and Kharj 
production function models. The partial regression coefficients for 
the two respective areas were very significant at the one percent 
probability level. 
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The results obtained from the tabulated analysis indicate farm 
size in the Hufuf and the Kharj areas was 78 and 188 dunoms, respectiv--
ely, but that only 50 and 74 percent of the totnl land was cult1v~t0~ 
in the respective areas. The information included in the administered 
questionnaire did not provide any indication whether the remaining 
farm land was not utilized because of lack of capital, irrigation water 
or management. 
Since land is one of the most important factors in contributing 
to increases in farm production and income, more of the unused land 
should be brought under cultivation by means of providing operator 
borrowers with the necessary factor inputs. 
Adverse Weather Conditions 
Adverse weather conditions, mainly frost, was one of the important 
factors affecting level of farm output and income in the Kharj area. 
A weather condition variable. in the Kharj production function model 
was negatively associated with the level of gross farm receipts. The 
partial regression coefficient was statistically significant at the 
five percent probability level. This calls attention to the need for 
implementing a crop insurance program so that the operator borrowers 
can insure their crops against risk, increase farm production and in-
come, and hence improve loan repayment capacity. 
Distance From the Market Center 
Distance from the farms to the local market center was tested as 
an explanatory variable in the Hufuf and the Kharj production function 
models as praxis for prices of farm output. The signs of the estimated 
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partial regression coefficients were negative as expected. However, 
the variable was dropped from the production function due to low levels 
of statistical significance. Regardless of low significance of the 
distance variable in the production function, the results may still 
indicate the necessity of developing an efficient transportation net-
work so the farm operators can transport their perishable farm products 
to the markets on time and with lower transportation costs. Results 
obtained from the tabulated analysis indicate that marketing costs 
make up about 10 and 13 percent of the total current operating expenses 
in the Hufuf and the Kharj areas, respectively. 
Net Farm Income 
Net farm income in this study was computed as total gross receipts 
minus costs of variable capital and hired labor. The results of the 
tabulated analysis indicate that the average net farm income per dunom 
for the non-delinquent and delinquent operator borrowers was SR. 1,768 
and SR. -1,537, respectively. This great variation in the level of 
net farm income between the non-delinquent and the delinquent borrowers 
was due in part to the low level of gross farm receipts for the delin-
quent compared to the non-delinquent borrowers. Other factors that 
may have contributed to low net farm income was the level of capital 
items employed by the delinquent operator borrowers. The average in-
vestment in farm machinery and equipment was SR. 3,056 and SR. 3,539 
for the non-delinquent and the delinquent operator borrowers respectiv-
ely. A third factor that may have contributed to the difference in 
net farm income between the two groups is the low level of variable 
capital employed with an average of SR. 2,024 for the delinquent 
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borrowers compared to an average of SR. 2,284 for the non-delinquent 
borrowers. 
Net farm income was assumed to be an important measure of loan 
repayment capacity and as a means of internal financing of farm facili-
ties, cost of labor and variable capital. 
For the delinquency rate determination, it was hypothesized that 
net farm income per dunom is negatively associated with the delinquency 
rate. The results of the delinquency rate models estimated by OLS and 
2SLS were consistent and conformed to the hypothesized relationships. 
The partial regression coefficients estimated by both approaches were 
very significant at the one percent probability level. Therefore, to 
improve the operator borrowers' loan repayment capacity and well being 
which are the main objectives of the credit program, much more effort 
is needed by SAAB and the supporting institutions to help operator 
borrowers make the best use of credit to increase production and in-
come. 
Farm Credit 
It was pointed out earlier in the study that SAAB provides in-
terest-free short and intermediate-term credit to the farm operators. 
Short-term SAAB Credit 
Si nee short-term credit is provided to the operator borrowers 
for acquisition of factor inputs such as variable capital and hired 
labor, its impact on farm production and income was measured through 
its impact on these factor inputs. The results of the input demand 
functions indicate that short-term credit from SAAB plus borrowings 
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from other sources was positively associated with the level of labor 
costs but not significant at the ten percent probability level, and 
positively associated with the level of variable capital and statis-
tically significant at the one percent probability level for the Hufuf 
area. 
. 
For the Kharj area, short-term credit from SAAB plus borrowings 
from other sources was positively associated with the level of variable 
capital and significant at the one percent probability level. However, 
the partial regression of this variable was positively associated with 
the level of hired labor cost but not significant at the ten percent 
probability level. These results indicate the importance of short-term 
credit plus borrowings from other sources for financing variable capi-
tal in the Hufuf and the Kharj areas. 
The farm credit interdependent system estimated in this study 
shows the direct and indirect impact of short-term credit multipliers 
on gross farm income, net farm income, and delinquency rate. The 
magnitudes of the impact multipliers increase as the size of the land 
holdings increase from the lowest level of 6.00 dunom to the mean of 
39.07 dunom and then decrease again as the land size exceeds the mean 
level. This may indicate that operator borrowers with farm size below 
and above the mean obtain more short-term credit than needed for farm 
production and the possibility of diverting short-term credit for con-
sumption rather than for farm production does exist. 
Intermediate-term SAAB Credit 
The average amount of intermediate-term SAAB credit obtained by 
the operator borrowers was SR. 49,082 and SR. 39,244 in the Hufuf and 
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the Kharj areas, respectively (Table VII I). Intermediate-term SAAB 
credit was included in the input demand functions for farm machinery 
and equipment and faci1ities. Intermediate-term SAAB credit was com-
bined with funds borrowed from other sources since part of these funds 
are used by the operator borrowers to finance durable farm capital. 
These combined credit sources (INTOB) are positively associated with 
the level of investment in farm machinery and equipment (MACEQ) and 
the level of investment in farm facilities (FACIL) in the Hufuf and 
the Kharj areas. The INTOB partial regression coefficients in the 
MACEQ and FACIL demand functions were significant at the one percent 
probability level and indicate the importance of credit in financing 
MACEQ and FACIL. 
However, total capital (TCAP) was positively associated with the 
level of gross farm receipts in the production function but was not 
significant at the ten percent probability level. 
The impact multipliers derived from the reduced form indicate 
intermediate-term SAAB credit has a positive impact on gross farm 
receipts and net farm income when land holdings are fixed at the low-
est level but negative impacts at the mean and higher levels for 
the Hufuf area. For the Kharj area, its impact on gross receipts 
is positive but negative on net farm income at the lowest, mean and 
highest levels of land holdings. The impact on loan delinquency is 
positive for both areas. 
Examination reveals that if credit is not closely scrutinized 
and linked with income generating potential of the farm enterprises, 
operator borrowers• financial management ability, and repayment capac-
ity, credit may have a negative impact on production and income and in 
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turn, on the delinquency rate. Therefore, for more effective use of 
credit, actual credit needs for each operator applicant should be 
carefully evaluated in order to avoid the problem of overfinancinq 
and overburdening operator borrowers with debts that may make them 
worse off with credit than without it. 
Borrowings From Other Sources of Credit 
The average amount of additional funds operator borrowers obtain-
ed from other credit sources (OBOR) was SR. 45,100 and SR. 55,095 in 
the Hufuf and the Kharj areas respectively, whereas the average amount 
of short and intermediate-term credit from SAAB was SR. 54,965 and 
SR. 45,786 in the two respective areas. 
The impact of OBOR on farm capital items and facilities was 
jointly determined with that of intermediate-term SAAB credit already 
discussed in the preceding section. However, the results of the re-
duced form indicate that OBOR has negative impacts on GFR and NFI at 
the lowest level of land holding but the impact is positive with land 
holding at the mean in the Hufuf area. Its impact on GFR is positive 
but negative on NFI at the three levels of land holdings in the Kharj 
area. 
The direct and indirect impact of OBOR on delinquency rate is 
positive with land holdings fixed at the lowest level but negative 
with land holdings at the mean and the highest levels in the Hufuf 
area, whereas its impact on delinquency rate in the Kharj area is 
positive at the three levels of land holdings. 
Operator borrowers seek out additional financing from other non-
institutional sources of credit for several reasons: purchasing 
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production inputs, meeting farm family requirements, and repaying 
SAAB loans in the case of default due to inavailability of cash when 
payments are due. Furthermore, OBOR may increase the SAAB delinquency 
rate in that operator borrowers may give first priority to repaying 
other credit sources before SAAB in o~er not to jeopardize this line 
of credit. Therefore, ·provision of a full line of credit by SAAB may 
be necessary to minimize operator borrowers dependence on non-institu-
tional credit sources. 
Credit Policies 
Two credit policy variables were included in this study: timeli-
ness of credit and size of annual payment. 
Timeliness of Credit 
Timeliness of credit (TCRED) as defined in this study is the num-
ber of days from the day loan request was made until the loan was 
approved by SAAB. The results of the tabulated analysis indicate that 
the average days consumed for loan processing and approval was 57 and 
58 days for the Hufuf and the Kharj areas, respectively. Also, the 
partial regression coefficient of timeliness of credit in the delin-
quency rate models using OLS and 2SLS for the respective areas indi-
cate a positive association with loan delinquency. These coefficients 
are significantly different from zero at the ten and five percent 
probability levels in Hufuf and Kharj areas, respectively. 
Based on these results, to minimize the unfavorable impact of 
timeliness of credit on delinquency rate, operational efficiency of 
SAAB for evaluating operator borrowers' credit worthiness, repayment 
capacity, and loan approval should be improved. It can be improved 
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by increasing the skills of the field representatives and the credit 
analysts in the area of agricultural finance. It may also be neces-
sary for SAAB to make use of computerized programs presently in use 
by other credit institutions saving time and operation costs. 
Size of Annual Payments 
It was hypothesized that size of annual payment (AP) is one of 
the factors influencing loan repayment. The average size of annual 
payment for the loans obtained from SAAB is SR. 15,605 and SR. 14,390 
in the Hufuf and the Kharj areas, respectively. AP in the delinquency 
rate model is positively associated with DELRATE for the Hufuf area 
but negatively associated with DELRATE for the Kharj area. However, 
the AP variable in the delinquency rate models for the two areas is 
not significant at the ten percent probability level. Therefore, the 
insignificance of the partial regression coefficients indicates that 
the size of the annual payment as specified is not an important factor 
influencing loan repayment. 
Family Financial Management 
Family financial management is an important factor determining 
the level of investment in farm machinery and equipment, facilities 
and other operating inputs for agricultural production. Farm finan-
cial management becomes relatively crucial the larger the farm oper-
ation. As farms develop into substantial business units, need will 
arise for astute handling of financial affairs. The larger the farm 
fi.rm becomes, the larger the capital requirements and hence the great-
er the need for farm income and borrowed funds to finance purchased 
inputs. 
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Internal Savings and Investment 
It was stated previously that a primary reason for implementing 
an agricultural credit program in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was 
the low farm in~ome constraining operator investment in farm capital 
items and impro~ement of farm facilities. Other factors that may dis-
courage farm operators to save is the lack of well developed financial 
markets to mobilize rural savings. Since charging interest on borrowed 
funds is prohibited by Islam, the government should take the initiative 
in implementing appropriate rural saving schemes not conflicting with 
Islam guidelines but encouraging farm savings and investment. 
In the context of rural savings, SAAB may develop rural savings 
programs where members deposit money in their saving accounts at the 
branches and offices. The money deposited can be mobilized and chan-
neled for investment in the farming or industrial sector. Part of the 
profit can be divided among the participants and the remaining portion 
be allocated for reinvestment and covering operation costs. 
Off-farm Income 
The average off-farm income is SR. 38,719 and SR. 90,071 in the 
Hufuf and the Kharj areas, respectively. Nearness to a large metro-
politan area with greater off-farm employment opportunities was the 
reason for higher off-farm income in Kharj relative to Hufuf. Off-
farm income was assumed to be one of the means for financing farm pro-
duction inputs. The results of the study indicate that off-farm is an 
important means of financing farm facilities in the Hufuf area. Par-
tial regression coefficients indicate positive associations between 
off-farm income and VCAP in the Hufuf area and FACIL and VCAP in the 
Kharj area. However, the coefficients were not significant at the 
ten percent probability 1 evel. 
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Results of the study indicate off-farm income is negatively asso-
ciated with delinquency rate for both areas. The partial regression 
coefficients are statistically significant at the one and five percent 
probability level for Hufuf and Kharj, respectively. Based on these 
results, operator borrowers with low farm income may be using their 
off-farm income to repay SAAB loans. 
But the interesting results in relation to off-farm income is the 
direct and indirect impact of off-farm income on gross receipts and 
net farm income as the size of land holdings increase. The results 
indicate that farm income and off-farm income may be competitive at 
the small farm size. Low farm productivity could be the primary reason 
for low farm income operators seeking off-farm employment. 
Family Living Expenses 
The average family living expenses for the operator borrowers was 
SR. 47,117 and SR. 52,971 in the Hufuf and the Kharj areas, respectiv-
ely. The level of family living expenditures are directly related to 
size of family. The average size of family in the Hufuf and the Kharj 
areas is 15 and 10 persons respectively with only an average of 1.8 
and 0.8 persons contributing to farm production in the two respective 
areas. The remaining family members are either children still in 
school, elderly, disabled, or working off the farm. 
The family living expenditure (FAMEXPC} variable is positively 
associated with loan delinquency and is significant at the ten and 
one percent probability levels in the Hufuf and Kharj areas, 
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respectively. These results indicate the importance of FAMEXPC in 
determining loan delinquency and should not be ignored when evaluating 
operator borrowers• repayment capacity. 
Loan Repayment Capacity 
Repayment capacity of operator borrowers should be carefully and 
accurately anal~zed by the SAAB credit analysts. Average production 
costs, yields, prices and income should be estimated with reasonable 
accuracy and analyzed before approval of loans. 
SAAB Operational Effictency 
It was indicated in the previous sections that timeliness of 
credit and the accuracy in evaluating and determining operator borrow-
ers repayment capacity are among the important factors contributing to 
the delinquency rate. But since SAAB is short of skilled manpower, a 
computerized system may be the answer to this problem. The use of such 
systems should help in in~reasing the credit analysts• efficiency in 
determining the applicants• credit worthiness and, in turn, reducing 
credit examination costs and saving time of the farmers. In the con-
text of this study, the discriminant model proved to be useful and 
effective tool to utilize for credit scoring. Therefore, a credit 
scoring program using the discriminant model, should be considered by 
SAAB for categorizing borrowers into respective loan classification 
groups. 
Limitations of the Study 
In this study, an attempt was made to systematically explore, 
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examine, and evaluate the important factors affecting the level of 
farm output and hence influencing the loan delinquency rate within the 
framework of farm credit interdependence system. Because of the 
structural differences in terms of characteristics of farm and operator 
borrowers between the two areas included in the study, different inter-
dependence systems were developed for each area. 
The inapplicability of one interdependence system to both areas 
is one of the limitations of the model applied in this study. There-
fore, there is some question whether the model developed should be 
applied to all agricultural areas in Saudi Arabia. The SAAB may have 
to develop lending policies that are suited to individual or groups 
of major agricultural areas with similar farms and farm operator char-
acteristics in order to provide more effective credit services. 
Further Research 
Further research on providing farm operators with adequate credit 
to meet their needs for capital inputs to increase agricultural pro-
duction and improve the farm operators' well being will improve as 
researchers develop greater appreciation for the issues raised in this 
study: interdependence of farm and household decision-making, aware-
ness for the need of teaching farm operators better farm and financial 
management, and improving the capability of loan analysts in helping 
farmers with credit needs. The farm financial interdependent systems 
that include econometric models illustrate potential analytical ap-
proaches for measuring credit impact upon farm production and hence 
upon loan delinquency rate problems. 
The immediate priority is to develop a data base by SAAB for a 
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better and more detailed analysis of agricultural credit needs. The 
characteristics:of farm and farm operator borrowers and the financial 
needs that infhtence fann-household decision-making, indicate the need 
for collecting comprehensive data to be utilized for determining 
actual and potential credit needs of the fann-household and for the 
provision of better and more productive credit services. Careful 
monitoring of production expenses, fann investments, consumption and 
nonfarm activites as well as borrowing additional funds from sources 
of credit other than SAAB are necessary to accurately describe when 
to provide credit and how it is to be allocated. Once described, more 
rigorous analysis can be used to identify the important factors ex-
plaining allocation and impact of credit. 
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APPENDIX A 
ESTIMATED EQUATIONS OF THE FARM CREDIT 
INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEM-KHARJ AREA, 
1978/79 
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ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
MACEQ a 105.5951 - 0.563LCOST - 0.0970FLAB + 0.8726UBTIB*** 
(52.69) (1.09) (0.08) (0.29) 
+ 0.1305TAREAC 
(0.68) 
R2 = 0.3557 
F(4, 15) • 2.10 
FACIL ~ 77.5357 + 6.5561NFID + 0.0286INTOB- 0.02010FINC 
(44.34) (16.31) (0.26). (0.12) 
R2 = 0.0132 
F(3,17) .. 0.06 
LCOST • 012.1111 + 0.0709SHB + 0.0098FLAB + 808.4611 WAGE** 
(17.38) (0.06) (0.02) (308.58) 
+ 0.4620TAREAC*** 
(4 .12.) 
R2 "" 0.5658 
F(4, 16) .. 4.68** 
VCAP • -7.7767- 3.6511NFID** + 0.0326TCAP + 0.2515SHOB*** 
(15.25) (1.26) (0.05) (0.08) 
+ 0.02240FINC + 0.8193TAREAC*** 
(0.03) (0.13) 
R2 = 0.8233 
F(5,15) ~ 12.81** 
GFR • 33.5349 - 0.0222TCAP - 0.3416LCOST + 0.6887VCOST** 
(27.85) (0.09) (0.51) (0.32) 
+ 1.4509TAREAC** + 0.0011TAREAC2 
(0.69) (0.002) 
R2 = 0.8495 
F(5, 15) ~ 23.76*** 
DELRATE • 219.6408 - 61.0628NFID*** - 0.4847AP + 0.5879FAMEXPC*** 
(51.22) (13.55) (0.41) (10.18) 
- 0.17610FINC** + 0.1352TCRED** - 1.2730TAREAC** 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.51) 
R2 .. 0.7350 
F(6, 14) • 6.05** 
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APPENDIX B 
REDUCED FORM MODELS FOR THE 
HUFUF AND THE KHARJ AREA 
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~ 
1. Cropland cultivated at the 111can (TAREAC • 39.07 dunom). 
1.0 0 
-0.0276 0 0 
-0.7350 
-2.6361 0 
-1 1.0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 0 
0 0 1.0 
-1.0 -1.0 0 0 0 
0 0 
A .. 
0 1.0 0 1.8069 0 0 
0 
-0.2734 0 0 1.0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 
0 
-0.2429 0.0659 0 0 0 1.0 0 
0 o. 7789 0 0 0 0 0 1. 
1.9613 0.9613 -0.2232 -0.2232 0.8836 4.2089 0 
1. 6012 1.6012 -0.1284 -0.1284 -0.1922 2.6198 0 
-
0.4378 0.4378 0.961.9 0.9649 -1.8595 o. 7162 0 
-1 0 0 0 1.00 -1.8069 0 0 A "' 
0.4378 0.4378 -0.0351 -0.0351 -O.C526 0.7162 0 
0 0 0 0 1.00 0 0 
0.3601 0.3601 -0. 09!t8 -0.0948 0.0758 1.58?1 0 
-1.2472 -1.2472 0.1000 0.10 0.1497 -2.0405 1.00 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-0.0977 0 0 0 1.2615 1. 2615 0 0 -0.0977 
B • 
0 0 2.0856 0 0.6866 0.6866 0 0 0 
-0.0230 0 0 0.0319 0 0.0319 0 178.2744 -0.0230 
0 0 0.2150 0.2017 0 0.2017 0 0 0 
0 1.971t5 -2.6722 0 0 0 0.5184 0 1.1682 
APPENDIX B (Continued) 
-
-32.2789 FLAB 
0 FAMEXPC 
0 OF INC 
140.6676 MACEQ SHCRED 
c- w"' 
-33.1981 FACll. ]{·a ItnCRED 
50.5336 LCOST OBOR 
34.8508 VCAP AP 
117.6342 DELRATE WAGE 
TCRED 
~~ere: A • matrix of the endogenous variables coefficients 
-1 A a inverse matrix of the ~~dogcnous variable co~fficicnts 
W ., vector of the endogenous variables 
B • matrix of the cxogf'nou~ variable coefficients 
X a vector of the cxor,cnous variables 
C ., vector of conf;tant terms 
The reduced form of the model: W"' (A- 1) C + (A)-l llX in presented 
in Table 15. 
2. Cropland cultivated .et hi.ghest value (TARL.t.C r. 48.36 dunom) 
1.0 0 -0.0276 0 0 -0.735 -2.6371 0 
-1.0 1.0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 0 
0 0 1.0 ··1. 0 ··1.0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1.0 0 1. 80(,9 0 0 
A 
- 0 -0.0640 0 0 1.0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 
0 -0.0568 0.0659 0 0 0 1.0 0 
0 0.1823 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
1.1539 0.1539 -0.1585 -0.1585 -0.1585 0.9805 2.8879 0 
1.0962 1.0962 -0.0879 -0.0879 -0.0879 -0.1316 1.7936 0 
0.0702 0.0702 o. 99411 0.994/1 0.9944 -1 .'8153 0.1148 0 
-1 0 0 0 1.0 0 -1.806/t 0 0 
A 
0.0702 0.0702 -0.0056 -0.0056 0.9944 -o. oost, 0.1148 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0576 0.0576 -0. 07CI5 -0.0705 -0.0705. -0.1122 1.0443 0 
-0.1998 -0.1998 0.0160 0.0160 0.0160 O.O?.t.O -0.3270 1.0 
.. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-0.0977 0 0 0 1. 2615 1.2615 0 0 -0.0977 
B • 
0 0 2.0857 0 0.6866 0.6S66 0 0 0 
-0.0230 0 0 0.0319 0 0.0319 0 178.2744 -,0.0230 
0 0 2.2150 0.2107 0 0.2107 0 0 0 
0 1.9745 -26722 0 0 0 0.518'• 0 1.1682 
121.3739 GFR FU..B 
0 NFI FAN EX PC 
0 TCAP OFINC 
291.5360 MACEQ SIICRED 
c. lola X • 
-33.1981 ~'ACIL JNTCRED 
85.3558 LCOST OBOR 
74.5382 VCAP AP 
214.0463 DEI. RATE WAGE 
TCRFD 
The reduced form of the model is presented in Table 16. 
202 
APPENDIX B (Continued) 
3. Cropl.ad cultivate •. at lowest value (T.Ur.AC • 6. 04 duno.) 
1.0 0 -0.0276 0 0 -0.7350 -2.6361 0 
-1.0 1.0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 0 
0 0 1. 0 -1.0 -1.0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1.0 0 1.8069 0 • A .. 
0 -1.7805 0 0 1. 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 
0 -1.5816 0.0659 0 0 0 1.0 0 
0 5.0726 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-1.7056 -2.7056 0.0709 0.0709 0.0709 1. 3238 -1.7905 0 
-0.6921 -0.6921 0.05SS 0.0555 0.0555 0.0831 -1.1324 0 
-1.2323 -1.2323 1.0989 1.0989 1.0989 -1.6590 -2.0162 0 
A-1 0 0 ·0 1.0 0 -1.8069 0 0 
-1.2323 -1.2323 0.0989 0.0989 1.0989 0.1479 -2.0162 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 
-1.0135 -1.0135 0.0154 0.0154 0.0154 0.2407 -0.6581 0 
3.5109 3.5109 -0.2816 -0.2816 -0.2816 -0.421.) 5.744 1. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-0.0977 0 0 0 1. 2615 1.2615 0 0 -0.0977 
II • 
0 0 2.0857 0 0.6866 0.6866 0 0 0 
-0.0230 0 0 0.0319 0 0.0319 D 178.2744 -0.0230 
0 0 0.2150 0.2017 0 0.2017 0 0 0 
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-75.018 CFR FI.AS 
0 NFI FAMEXPC 
0 l'CAP OFINC 
101.5399 MACEQ SHCRED 
c-
-33.1981 \Jn FACIL X • INTCRF.D 
41.5316 LCOST Oil Oil 
Z4. 595/i VCAP AP 
203.3784 . Di'LRATF WAGE 
TCRED 
The reduced form of the model is presented in Table 17. 
1 •. Cropland cultivated at the mean (TARFA" c '·8 3" d ) 
· ,, ., ..  ~unom . 
1.0 0 -0.07G6 0 0 0 -0.5388 0 
-1.0 1.0 0 0 0 1.0 1. 0 0 
0 0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1.0 0 0.3837 0 0 
A• 
0 -0.4899 0 0 1.0 -3.2275 0 0 
0 0 -0.0882 0 0 1.0 0 0 
0 0 -0. O'tOG 0 0 0 1.0 0 
0 1.2627 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 
.0632 0.0632 0.1290 0.1290 0.1290 0.3037 
0.5096 0 
0.9805 0.9805 -0.0398 -0.0398 -0 .. 039!3 -1.0937 
-0.4522 0 
0.6412 0.6412 1.3088 1,3088 1.3088 3.0807 -0.2957 
0 
-1 -0.0217 
-0.0217 -0.0443 0.9557 -O.M43 -0.1,880 0.0100 0 
A • 
0.6629 0.6629 0.3~>31 0.3531 1. 3531 3.5687 -0.3057 
0 
0.0566 0.0566 0. I 15'• 0.1154 o. 115'· !.2717 -0.02&1 
0 
0.0262 -0.0262 0.053l. 0.0534 0.0534 0.1257 0.9379 
0 
-1.2381 -1.2381 0.0503 0.0503 0.0503 l. 3&10 0.5710 
1.0 
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b -
-0.0625 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100.4501 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-0.0962 0 0 0 0.8822 0.8822 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0.0557 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 785.8627 0 0 
0 0 0.0303 0.2588 0.2588 0 0 0 0 6.5008 
0 0.5879 -0.1761 0 0 0 -0.4847 0 0.1352 0 
136.7826 GFR FlAB 
0 NFI FAHEXPC 
0 l"CAP OF INC 
c 104.4013 w .. MACEQ SHCRED 
104.0984 FACII. INTCRED 
X • 
3.0508 LCOST OBOR 
. 3. 0508 VCAP AP 
158.034 DEI.R.ATE WAGE 
TCRED 
WEATH 
The reduced from of the IJKldel is presented in Table 18. 
2. Cropland cultivated at highest value (TAREAC "' 230.00 dunom). 
1.0 0 ·-0. 07(,(, 0 0 0 
-0.5388 0 
-1.0 1.0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 0 
0 0 1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 0 0 0 
0 0 
A• 0 1.0 0 0.3837 0 0 
0 
-0.1030 0 0 l.O 
-3.2275 0 0 
0 0 -0.0882 0 0 1.0 0 0 
0 0 -O.Olt03 0 0 0 1.0 0 
0 0.2655 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 
-l A 
-
1.0135 o.on~ 
0.9958 0.99~·8 
0.1369 0.1369 
-0.0046 -0.0046 
0.1415 0.1415 
0.0121 0.0121 
0.0056 0.0056 
-0.2644 -0.2644 
b = 
- .0625 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
-0.0963 0 0 
0 0 0.0557 
0 0 0 
0 0 0.0303 
0 0.5879 -0.1751 
c. 
475.9638 
0 
0 
328.0969 
79.3229 
79.3229 
-73.1262 
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0.1310 0.1310 0.1310 
-0.040'· -0.0404 -0.0404 
1.3292 1.3292 1.3292 
-0.01!50 0.9550 -0.01.50 
0. 37!,2 0.3742 1.3742 
0. 1172 o. 1172 0.1172 
0. 05!,2 0.0542 o. ost.2 
0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0. 8822 O.fHl72 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0.2588 0.2588 0 0 
0 0 0 
CFR 
f';FJ 
TCt\1' 
tiACEQ 
t'ACll. 
LCOST 
VCAI' 
DEI.<:An. 
-0.4847 
0.3~92 0.5326 
-1. 1108 -0.4593 
3.(>432 -0.0631 
-0.5070 0.0021 
4.1502 -0.0653 
1. 3213 -0.0056 
0. 1486 0.9974 
0.2949 0.1219 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
785. 8(>2 7 0 
0 
0 
X a 
0 
o. 1352 
~~:XPC--1 
OFINC 
SIIC.RED 
~.·rcR't..''D 
OBOR 
AI' 
\-.'AGE 
TCRED 
WE.ATH 
The reduced form of the model is pt·cscnted in Table l9. 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
-100.4501 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.5879 
0 
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3. Cropland cultivated at lowest value (TAREAC • 9.00 •unom). 
1.0 0 -0.0766 0 0 0 -0.5788 0 
-1.0 1.0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 0 
0 0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1.0 0 0.3837 0 0 
A• 
0 -0.4899 0 0 1.0 -3.2275 0 0 
0 0 -0.0882 0 0 1. 0 0 0 
0 0 -0.0408 0 0 0 1.0 0 
0 1.2627 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.0632 0.0632 0.1190 0.7290 0.1290 0.3037 0.5096 0 
0.9805 0.9805 -o. 398 -0.0398 -0.0398 -1.1937 -0.4522 0 
0.6412 0.6412 1.3088 1.3088 1.30R8 3.0807 . -0.2957 0 
A-1 -0.0217 -0.0217 -0.0443 0.9557 -0.0443 -0.1!880 
0.0100 0 
0.6629 0.6629 0.3531 0.3531 1. 3531 3.5687 -0.3057 0 
0.0566 0.0566 0.1154 o. 115/1 0.1154 1.2717 -0.0261 0 
0.0262 0.0262 0.0534 O.O.D4 0.0534 0. 1257 0.9R79 0 
-1.2381 -1.2381 0.0503 0.0503 0.0503 1. 3810 0.5710 1.0 
b -
-0.0625 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-0.092 0 0 0 0.8822 o,gsn 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0.0557 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 785.8627 0 0 
0 0 0.0303 0.2588 0.2588 0 0 0 0 6,5008 
0 0.5879 -0.1761 0 0 0 -0.4847 0 0.1352 0 
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136.7826 GFR FAMEXPC 
0 NFI OFINC 
0 1'CAP sncmm 
104.4013 I'IACEQ INTCRED 
c .. w"' X• 
-10!1,098/1 FACIL OBOR 
3.0508 LCOST AP 
3.0508 VCAP WAGE 
-158.0834 DELRAU TCRED 
WF.ATH 
The reduced form of the model is presented in Table 20. 
APPENDIX C 
PROCEDURES FOR COMPUTING THE CORRECTED 
STANDARD ERRORS, F AND R2 FOR 
THE 2SLS MODELS 
208 
APPENDIX C 
PROCEDURES FOR COMPUTING THE CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS, 
F AND R2 FOR THE 2SLS MODELS 
Consider the hypothetical equation of the model: 
Where Y1 = nxl vector of the observations on the dependent 
variable, 
The 
Y2 = nxL matrix of deservations of the other endogenous 
variables included in the equation, 
x1 = nxk matrix of observations of the predetermined 
variables, 
Bl = Lxl vector of coefficient associated with Y1 , 
¥1 = kxl vector of coefficient associated with x1 , 
U = nxl 1 vector of error terms. 
problem is that Y2 is correlated with ul. This is solved 
replacing Y2 with its estimates Y2 which is uncorrelated with u1 • 
This is done by 2SLS in the following stages: 
209 
by 
First Stage: Obtain unbiased estimates of Y2 by regressing Y2 on 
all X's (all the exogenous variables in the system). 
If the theoritical solution is: Y2 =X Til+ v1 
where Til is the coefficient vector associated with X and v1 is 
the error vector. Let the OLS estimate by Y2 = X Til 
Second Stage: Replacement of Y2 by Y2 and apply OLS to the equa 
A 
tion: Yl = Y2 ~l +X a1 + u1 
The 2SLS solves the over supply of exogenous variable problem by 
linear combinations of the original exogenous variable in the form of: 
/ 
210 
... 
This reduces the number of exogenous variables to the 
desired number. 
The estimate obtained by the 2SLS has also proved to be unbiased 
and consistent. This is because in the second stage of Y2, the esti-
mator of Y1, the endogenous vector is uncorrelated with u1 (21, P. 96). 
However, the standard errors associated with n1 , S1 , t's, F-
2 
statistics, and R are not valid and how to be corrected by the fol-
lowing procedures: 
(1) 
substituting the observed values for Y1 and Y1 in (1) to compute the 
new error terms (residuals) U : 
n 
yl - y2 nl - X Sl = Ul 
where Y2 n+ X s1 = Y1 
Then ESS m U' U s2 = ESS 
n n n n n 
T-K 
(2) 
The corrected standard error of the coefficients (SE ) is computed as: 
n 
Then: Estimated coefficients 
t = from the Second Stage 
c 
F = 
c 
SE 
n 
RSS /k-1 
n 
ESS /T-k 
n 
where ESS = Error sum of squares 
n 
s2n ~ New variance 
211 ~ 
I 
SE0 • Old standard error (from the second stage, equation 1). 
RSSn • New sum of squares due to legressi3n, 
Tss = Total corrected sum of squares, 
s20 • Old variance (from second stage, equation 1), 
T = Number of observation on the dependent variable, 
K Q Number of predetermined variables included in the model. 
~-
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